Externalities in a Bargaining Model of Public Price Announcements and Resale

We study the one-seller/two-buyer bargaining problem with negative identity-dependent externalities with an alternating offer bargaining model in which new owners of the object have the opportunity of resale. We identify the generically unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. The resale opportunity increases the competition among the buyers and therefore benefits the seller. When competition between buyers is very fierce, the seller may prefer to respond to bids rather than to propose an offer herself: a first-mover disadvantage.     

Theories of network exchange: Anomalies,desirable properties,and critical networks

The present study evaluates four well-known theories of exchange in networks. In previous research these theories’ predictions were compared for a small set of networks using experimental data. We compared their predictions for all 12,112 networks up to size 8. By comparing these predictions we (i) identified anomalies in theories of network exchange, (ii) investigated to what extent the theories satisfy basic principles of exchange, (iii) identified ‘critical’ networks for which predictions are very different. We conclude that exchange in networks is not yet well understood.     

Bargaining with reasonable aspirations

Consider bargaining situations with two persons, where both have a specific idea of what would be an equitable outcome. In case these ideas differ, a procedure is needed which leads to a compromise between the different views. In the present paper the axioms of restricted homogeneity and of relative monotonicity are introduced, each of which, together with other standard conditions, allows one to determine a solution for this class of bargaining problems. An extension of this solution to bargaining problems with more than two persons is formulated.     

损耗控制、农户议价能力与农产品销售价格——基于对河北、湖北两省梨果种植农户的调查

就易腐农产品而言,损耗控制会影响农户在市场交易过程中的议价能力,并进一步影响农产品的销售价格.本文利用对河北省辛集市和湖北省宣恩县梨果种植农户的调查数据,通过建立多元回归模型,实证分析了损耗控制对农户梨果销售价格的影响.研究结果表明,反映损耗控制的是否通过冷藏库贮藏梨果变量、与最近冷藏库距离变量和获得科技服务推广渠道变量对梨果销售价格有显著影响.另外,梨果种植规模、销售方式、从事梨果种植年数、是否了解市场信息等其他控制变量对梨果销售价格也有显著影响,且其影响方向为正.     

The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution

The coalitional Nash bargaining solution is defined to be the core allocation for which the product of players' payoffs is maximal. We consider a non‐cooperative model with discounting in which one team may form and every player is randomly selected to make a proposal in every period. The grand team, consisting of all players, generates the largest surplus. But a smaller team may form. We show that as players get more patient if an efficient and stationary equilibrium exists, it must deliver payoffs that correspond to the coalitional Nash bargaining solution. We also characterize when an efficient and stationary equilibrium exists, which requires conditions that go beyond the nonemptiness of the core.     

Mechanism robustness in multilateral bargaining

This paper discusses the relationship between coalitional stability and the robustness of bargaining outcomes to the bargaining procedure. We consider a class of bargaining procedures described by extensive form games, where payoff opportunities are given by a characteristic function (cooperative) game. The extensive form games differ on the probability distribution assigned to chance moves which determine the order in which players take actions. One way to define mechanism robustness is in terms of the property of no first mover advantage. An equilibrium is mechanism robust if for each member the expected payoff before and after being called to propose is the same. Alternatively one can define mechanism robustness as a property of equilibrium outcomes. An outcome is said to be mechanism robust if it is supported by some equilibrium in all the extensive form games (mechanisms) within our class. We show that both definitions of mechanism robustness provide an interesting characterization of the core of the underlying cooperative game.     

Coordination of Supply Chains with Risk‐Averse Agents

The extant supply chain management literature has not addressed the issue of coordination in supply chains involving risk‐averse agents. We take up this issue and begin with defining a coordinating contract as one that results in a Pareto‐optimal solution acceptable to each agent. Our definition generalizes the standard one in the risk‐neutral case. We then develop coordinating contracts in three specific cases: (i) the supplier is risk neutral and the retailer maximizes his expected profit subject to a downside risk constraint; (ii) the supplier and the retailer each maximizes his own mean‐variance trade‐off; and (iii) the supplier and the retailer each maximizes his own expected utility. Moreover, in case (iii), we show that our contract yields the Nash Bargaining solution. In each case, we show how we can find the set of Pareto‐optimal solutions, and then design a contract to achieve the solutions. We also exhibit a case in which we obtain Pareto‐optimal sharing rules explicitly, and outline a procedure to obtain Pareto‐optimal solutions.     

Specialization and happiness in marriage: A U.S.–Japan comparison

This paper examines the relationship between specialization and happiness in marriage in the U.S. and Japan. Our findings, based on the General Social Surveys in the U.S. and Japan, indicate both similarities and differences in the determinants of marital happiness in the two countries. In the U.S., the findings are mixed. Women’s reported marital happiness in the U.S. is more likely to follow the predictions of the bargaining model where their happiness is determined by their own income. Men’s marital happiness in the U.S. follows the predictions of the specialization model; they are happier if their wives are not working or, alternatively, if they are financially dependent on their wives. In Japan, we find support for the specialization model, particularly in the case of women; they are happier if they are specialized in the household and they have a higher household income. Our research highlights how marital quality is affected by the institutional context and the normative environment.     

MULTIPLE-CRITERIA DECISION MAKING INCLUDING QUALITATIVE FACTORS: THE POST-MODEL ANALYSIS APPROACH

As a method of solving multiple-criteria decision making problems with a single quantitative objective and multiple qualitative objectives, the post-model analysis (PMA) approach is proposed. The essence of PMA is to support the trade-offs between a quantitative objective and multiple qualitative objectives so that the decision maker can find a perceived most preferred nondominated solution. To this end, the optimal solution of a quantitative model is found first, without regard for qualitative factors. The solution is then evaluated in terms of qualitative objectives. When the initial quantitatively optimal solution is adjusted to allow improvement of qualitative goals, opportunity costs of achieving qualitative goals are incurred. In this process, an expert system and/or graphical display can be used. PMA therefore provides a way to incorporate quantitative models into knowledge-based expert systems.