海峡两岸休闲农业合作相关主体行为的博弈分析

随着海峡两岸休闲农业合作的逐步发展,各相关主体之间的博弈也逐渐显现。在此过程中,涉及的主要行为主体有地方政府、农户以及台商企业。文章从各主体的利益行为分析出发,构建并分析政府与台商企业、台商企业与农户之间的动态博弈。分析表明：在博弈的过程中,政府处于主动和有利的地位,但其存在不规范行为;台商企业基于趋利的本性,在与政府之间的博弈会展开“寻租”行为,在与农户之间的博弈以牺牲农户的利益来实现其收益最大化;农户与台商企业的博弈相对处于弱势地位,加之其有限理性和知识能力有限,自身利益难以得到保障;为实现各主体利益最大化的可持续发展,应建立健全相关法律法规;完善政府的服务职能;构建合理的利益分配形式。     

Knowledge and opinions of families regarding games—Toy selection for 6 to 12 year old children (the case of Northern Cyprus)

Games and toys are irreplaceable basic needs of children of almost every age. They are also some of the most significant traces of culture. Some of our games and toys lost their original functions, and it is not remembered why they were functionally significant in Turkish Cypriot culture. Families and cultural identity also play a major role regarding different factors leading to changes in toy selection. The purpose of this study is to explore the knowledge and opinions of families regarding games and, in particular, toy selection for 6–12 year old children of Turkish Cypriot families. A survey was administered to 100 households in North Cyprus, and was used as a data collection tool. It was found that the most important factors in the selection of children’s games and toys were (1) the economic opportunities, and (2) children’s desires for toys after seeing them with their friends. A considerable number of families in Northern Cyprus see game-toy selection as important in a child’s social, psychomotor, mental, and cultural construction. Families, especially those living with difficulties, indicated that they cannot afford enough time to encourage playing traditional games. Although new versions of traditional games and toys are being developed and used, it is seen that educated and high-income families are more conscious about the importance of having information about them than others.     

Sociolinguistic interaction and identity construction: The view from game‐theoretic pragmatics

Understanding the dynamics that characterize interaction between conversational participants is a fundamental goal of most theories of socially conditioned language use and identity construction through language. In this paper, I outline a class of formal tools that, I suggest, can be helpful in making progress towards this goal. More precisely, this paper explores how Bayesian signalling game models can be used to formalize key aspects of current sociolinguistic theories, and, in doing so, contribute to our knowledge of how speakers use their linguistic resources to communicate information and carve out their place in the social world. The Bayesian framework has become increasingly popular for the analysis of pragmatic phenomena of many different types, and, more generally, these models have become a dominant paradigm for the explanation of non‐linguistic cognitive processes. As such, I argue that this approach has the potential to yield a formalized theory of personal and social identity construction and to situate the study of sociolinguistic interaction within a broader theory of rationalistic cognition.     

社会性别视域下高校美女文化现象解析

高校美女文化面临着泛化的倾向。造成这种现象的深层次原因与市场经济中女性地位的衰落直接相关。而高校社会性别教育的缺失削弱了女性的独立意识,大众文化的勃兴则强化着社会性别的刻板印象。高校美女文化的泛滥弱化了女大学生独立意识的形成,造成社会资源的浪费．也加剧了社会文化中男女不平等的局面,促使女性向传统价值观回归。为了重塑高校社会性别平等文化,应该使社会性别意识纳入政府决策主流,推动社会性别平等教育进入高等教学体系并实现学科建设主流化,培养大众传媒的社会性别意识。     

移动应用安全监管中的合谋博弈分析与建议

移动应用安全状况日益凸显,亟需采取相应的监管策略.基于完全信息三方静态博弈模型,探讨移动应用安全监管中政府、移动应用商店以及移动应用开发商三者之间的博弈决策问题.政府通过对应用商店的监管发现存在应用商店与开发商合谋的情况.对于减少应用商店与开发商合谋,政府可给予应用商店未来的合作机会等间接激励,其作用优于现金支持的直接激励.而有效控制监管成本,增加应用商店和开发商合谋所产生的损失,是减少应用商店与开发商合谋概率的有效途径.从博弈角度出发,提出了政府从移动应用传播渠道入手的安全监管策略,即政府在何种条件下能更好发挥通过应用商店间接监管的作用.     

Bargaining over waiting time in ultimatum game experiments

While preference-based explanations play an increasing role in economics and sociology, the accurate measurement of social preferences deserves more attention. Most laboratory experiments measure social preferences by studying the division of “a cake that nobody had to bake” (Güth and Kliemt, 2003). This article reports results of the first ultimatum game experiment with bargaining over waiting time. The experiment was created to avoid effects of windfall gains. In contrast to donated money, time is not endowed by the experimenter and implies a natural loss to subjects. This allows for a better measurement of the inherent conflict in the ultimatum game. We implemented three anonymity conditions; one baseline condition, one condition with anonymity among subjects and one double-blind condition in which the experimenter did not know the division of waiting time. While we expected to observe less other-regarding behavior in ultimatum game bargaining over time, our experimental results rather confirm previous ultimatum game experiments, in which people bargained over money. The modal offer was half of the waiting time and only one offer was rejected. Interestingly, anonymity did not change the results significantly. In conclusion, our experiment confirms other-regarding behavior in the ultimatum game.     

我国旅游资源经营权转让中的制度安排研究

转让旅游资源经营权已成为当前我国许多景区管理和经营改革过程中引入企业化经营的一种制度创新模式,目前在旅游资源经营权转让问题上存在一些政策的禁区和理论的障碍。通过对经营权转让存在问题的分析,认为通过科学合理的制度安排是解决问题的关键。旅游景区(点)经营权转让中制度安排的重点是各利益主体的责、权、利制度安排。同时应用重复博弈中的重复剔除占优策略均衡模型,论证了在合理的制度安排下,旅游景区经营者为了长期的经济效益,必将采取保护景区生态环境的战略。     

消费者展厅行为和参考质量效应对O2O供应链动态运营策略的影响

本文研究消费者展厅行为和参考质量效应对O2O供应链动态运营策略的影响问题。分析了集中决策、分散决策和制造商分担实体店服务成本决策3种模式下的制造商产品质量策略、实体店和电商平台的服务竞争策略,以及品牌商誉变化和企业利润等问题。并进行了价格、实体店访问比例和展厅行为强度对企业绩效的影响。研究发现：展厅行为会挫伤实体店提供服务的积极性,降低品牌商誉,从而损害制造商和实体店的利润水平;而消费者的这种搭便车行为会提高电商平台利润,但由于参考质量效应的存在,其提升空间有限。综合而言,展厅行为对供应链总体绩效不利。应对展厅行为的长期战略有：1)加强上下游的纵向合作,制造商分担实体店服务成本契约,能实现供应链总体绩效的帕累托改进。2)从受展厅行为影响最大的实体店角度,保持线下产品高定价、高服务水平,提升消费者支付意愿,全面提升实体店的品牌溢价能力,获取长久生存之道。     

论政府与大学在公共支出中的博弈

在公共教育支出中，政府与大学各自的成本和收益影响着政府对大学的投资。政府投资于大学，需要大学为国家培养人力资本，从而支出经费的同时控制大学的人才培养。博弈分析发现，政府少投入和少控制是大学和政府的优势策略。但现实状况下政府投资于大学还受到其他因素影响，从而使大学与政府的利益格局有不同表现。     

现行成品油定价机制背后的税利博弈简

自成品油定价机制改革以来,成品油定价机制饱受争议,油价一直是人们关注的焦点。分析了国内需求拉动和国际输入型价格变动是引起油价上涨的主要原因;油价变动对用油企业、个人及产油企业的影响。随着我国国内成品油需求量日益增加,引发用油企业、个人及产油的上游企业与下游企业以及国家各方不断进行利益博弈,提出只有通过国家税收政策经济杠杆的调节作用,才能逐步调整各方利益及分配关系。