基于混合智能算法的电子市场供应链期权合同协调

在电子市场环境下,考虑了需求、市场价格和市场准入程度的随机性,基于Stack-erlberg主从对策,建立了供应链期权合同协调的随机期望值模型。在这一主从对策模型中,主方供应商的目标函数是预期利润,决策变量是期权合同预订费用和执行费用;从方分销商的目标函数是预期利润,决策变量是订货量。应用包括随机模拟、人工神经元网络和遗传算法组成的混合智能算法求解该主从对策问题。最后,结合上海宝钢集团益昌公司电子商务的运作实例,运用混合智能算法进行了仿真计算与分析。     

供应链合作及其契约研究

供应链合约是影响供应链整体绩效的重要因素,已引起众多学者的关注。本文对供应链合作进行了博弈分析,得出了不同合约下的均衡结果及相关结论,同时通过两种合约的比较探讨了利益共享合约的优越性。最后,文章也介绍了订立合约的影响因素及方法。     

优先级债务与次级债务的激励效应

把通货膨胀率和红利支付率融入优先级债务和次级债务的激励效应模型. 利用期权的 对策论分析方法,给出了优先级债务、次级债务、股票和公司价值的解析评价公式,并分析了通 货膨胀率和红利支付对公司的破产决策、次债务的发行决策,以及对股东和债权人之间财富转 移的重要影响. 说明了通胀率和红利支付率在实际借债合同中是不能被忽略的因素.     

不同决策模式下农产品质量控制策略研究

农产品质量已经引起公众的广泛关注。考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商构成的两级农产品供应链,构建零售商主导下的Stackelberg分散决策博弈模型和两者协同合作下的集中决策博弈模型,以供应商和零售商的最优质量努力水平为状态变量,利用逆向求解法得出供应商和零售商的最优质量决策。研究表明:在一定条件下,农产品供应链中主体的合作可以实现供应商、零售商和整个供应链系统利润的Pareto改善,在此基础上分析实现Pareto改善的条件以推动农产品供应链达到协调。     

基于主体不平等的跨国界河流水资源分配的破产博弈研究

基于破产理论和讨价还价博弈,构建水资源分配的破产博弈模型。借鉴国际水法,构建主体在水资源分配谈判中的议价能力评价指标体系,将议价能力运用到破产博弈模型中,突出主体在水资源分配中的不平等性,减少水资源分配量与贡献、需求量和对水资源依赖程度的非对称性;结合主体的谈判破裂点,根据主体满意度函数的联动函数寻找水资源分配的最优解,使分配能同时满足个体理性和集体理性,并对澜沧江-湄公河流域进行实例研究。     

绘本游戏阅读活动开展的意义及其指导策略

游戏式阅读活动旨在充分发挥绘本中的游戏精神和教育价值,让幼儿在获得充分的游戏体验的同时,促进其各种能力的发展。教师在游戏式阅读活动中指导的关键在于能否正确看待绘本中的游戏精神与教育价值,满足幼儿“阅读游戏”的体验,把握“游戏式阅读”的指导要点,避免陷入重知识传授、轻游戏体验的教学误区。     

网络购物中的社会诚信问题研究——基于不完美信息动态博弈理论

将一次网络交易抽象为不完美信息动态博弈模型，通过对买卖双方博弈行为的分析，得出网络交易纠纷频发的原因。并通过对模型进一步扩展，分析当前网络交易规则存在的缺陷，针对其中的问题，提出提高市场效率的建议。     

论成品油定价机制中的有限规制：基于合谋的视角

利用单期静态博弈分析法、有限期动态博弈分析法和无限期动态博弈分析法对成品油定价机制中寡头厂商的合谋行为进行了分析。研究发现：两家寡头厂商在合谋条件下的收益均高于双方各自独立定产条件下的收益，因此，双方存在进行价格合谋的利益激励。基于此，我国成品油价格形成机制的改革可以考虑采用有限规制等手段。     

Cross‐Milieu Terrorist Collaboration: Using Game Theory to Assess the Risk of a Novel Threat

This article uses a game‐theoretic approach to analyze the risk of cross‐milieu terrorist collaboration—the possibility that, despite marked ideological differences, extremist groups from very different milieus might align to a degree where operational collaboration against Western societies becomes possible. Based upon theoretical insights drawn from a variety of literatures, a bargaining model is constructed that reflects the various benefits and costs for terrorists’ collaboration across ideological milieus. Analyzed in both sequential and simultaneous decision‐making contexts and through numerical simulations, the model confirms several theoretical arguments. The most important of these is that although likely to be quite rare, successful collaboration across terrorist milieus is indeed feasible in certain circumstances. The model also highlights several structural elements that might play a larger role than previously recognized in the collaboration decision, including that the prospect of nonmaterial gains (amplification of terror and reputational boost) plays at least as important a role in the decision to collaborate as potential increased capabilities does. Numerical simulation further suggests that prospects for successful collaboration over most scenarios (including operational) increase when a large, effective Islamist terrorist organization initiates collaboration with a smaller right‐wing group, as compared with the other scenarios considered. Although the small number of historical cases precludes robust statistical validation, the simulation results are supported by existing empirical evidence of collaboration between Islamists and right‐ or left‐wing extremists. The game‐theoretic approach, therefore, provides guidance regarding the circumstances under which such an unholy alliance of violent actors is likely to succeed.     

Inventory and transshipment decisions in the rationing game under capacity uncertainty

In this paper, we consider the inventory decisions of two retailers who are supplied by a single supplier with uncertain capacity. When capacity is allocated in proportion to the retailers׳ orders, the retailers compete for the capacity by inflating their orders (i.e., the rationing game). In addition, we allow the retailers to implement transshipment between them such that they cooperate by transshipping the surplus stock of one to another who is out of stock. Our analysis of Nash equilibrium orders shows that, while order inflation in the equilibrium orders persists in the rationing game with transshipment, it may not occur if the amount of capacity shortage is small and the transshipment prices are low. Thus, carefully chosen transshipment prices may alleviate order inflation behavior. We also characterize centralized orders that maximize the total profit of the retailers and compare them to equilibrium orders. In particular, we investigate coordinating transshipment prices that induce the retailers to choose centralized orders. Our numerical analysis shows that, even for two identical retailers, coordinating transshipment prices exist in a more limited range of parameter values in the rationing game than they do outside the rationing game due to capacity uncertainty and limitation.