全文获取类型
收费全文 | 2549篇 |
免费 | 131篇 |
国内免费 | 59篇 |
专业分类
管理学 | 787篇 |
民族学 | 4篇 |
人才学 | 2篇 |
人口学 | 14篇 |
丛书文集 | 153篇 |
理论方法论 | 93篇 |
综合类 | 1496篇 |
社会学 | 111篇 |
统计学 | 79篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 4篇 |
2023年 | 26篇 |
2022年 | 70篇 |
2021年 | 68篇 |
2020年 | 79篇 |
2019年 | 71篇 |
2018年 | 67篇 |
2017年 | 61篇 |
2016年 | 93篇 |
2015年 | 97篇 |
2014年 | 139篇 |
2013年 | 170篇 |
2012年 | 157篇 |
2011年 | 193篇 |
2010年 | 154篇 |
2009年 | 165篇 |
2008年 | 132篇 |
2007年 | 160篇 |
2006年 | 160篇 |
2005年 | 168篇 |
2004年 | 133篇 |
2003年 | 94篇 |
2002年 | 73篇 |
2001年 | 46篇 |
2000年 | 23篇 |
1999年 | 21篇 |
1998年 | 15篇 |
1997年 | 7篇 |
1996年 | 8篇 |
1995年 | 5篇 |
1994年 | 13篇 |
1993年 | 8篇 |
1992年 | 15篇 |
1991年 | 7篇 |
1990年 | 6篇 |
1989年 | 8篇 |
1988年 | 4篇 |
1987年 | 3篇 |
1986年 | 4篇 |
1985年 | 4篇 |
1984年 | 2篇 |
1983年 | 2篇 |
1982年 | 1篇 |
1981年 | 1篇 |
1980年 | 1篇 |
1977年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有2739条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
61.
The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods. 相似文献
62.
Using data from a large representative US sample (N = 1519), we compare hypothetical moral fairness values from the Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale with actual fairness behavior in an incentivized dictator game with either low or high stakes. We find that people with high moral fairness values fail to live up to their high fairness standards, when stake size increases. This violates principles from consistency theories according to which moral values are supposedly aligned with moral behavior, but is in line with temptation theories that question the absoluteness of morality values. 相似文献
63.
儿童文学的"游戏精神"主要是指在儿童作品文本中体现出的、通过人物游戏所传递的一种符合儿童心理需求和审美旨趣,并实现儿童内心愿望的精神。周作人认为儿童文学的游戏精神是"幻想精神""愉悦精神"和"自由精神"。儿童文学游戏精神具有快乐性、幻想性和自由性的三性特征"。游戏精神"在儿童文学中作品的主要呈现形式为:通过"顽童""小大人""、反派"等人物形象的塑造凸显游戏精神;通过故事情节蕴涵的笨拙与聪明、嬉笑与吵闹、虚拟与真实凸显游戏精神;通过语言夸张凸显荒诞美、语言颠倒凸显逆向思维、语言突转凸显惊奇,从而凸显游戏精神。游戏精神对于儿童文学作品编创的意义在于:游戏精神是儿童文学的基本属性和内涵所在,新媒介时代儿童文学的发展需要延续游戏精神。因此游戏精神是儿童文学的作品编创的重要依据和准则。 相似文献
64.
We demonstrate that personality has a systematic effect on strategic behavior. We focus on two personality traits: anxiousness and aggressiveness, and consider a 2-player entry game, where each player can guarantee a payoff by staying out, a higher payoff if she is the only player to enter, but a lower payoff if both players enter. We find that: anxious players enter less; aggressive players enter more; players are more likely to enter against anxious than non-anxious players; and players are less likely to enter against aggressive than non-aggressive players. We discuss the possible mechanism through which personality affects strategic behavior. 相似文献
65.
We propose a methodology, called defender–attacker decision tree analysis, to evaluate defensive actions against terrorist attacks in a dynamic and hostile environment. Like most game‐theoretic formulations of this problem, we assume that the defenders act rationally by maximizing their expected utility or minimizing their expected costs. However, we do not assume that attackers maximize their expected utilities. Instead, we encode the defender's limited knowledge about the attacker's motivations and capabilities as a conditional probability distribution over the attacker's decisions. We apply this methodology to the problem of defending against possible terrorist attacks on commercial airplanes, using one of three weapons: infrared‐guided MANPADS (man‐portable air defense systems), laser‐guided MANPADS, or visually targeted RPGs (rocket propelled grenades). We also evaluate three countermeasures against these weapons: DIRCMs (directional infrared countermeasures), perimeter control around the airport, and hardening airplanes. The model includes deterrence effects, the effectiveness of the countermeasures, and the substitution of weapons and targets once a specific countermeasure is selected. It also includes a second stage of defensive decisions after an attack occurs. Key findings are: (1) due to the high cost of the countermeasures, not implementing countermeasures is the preferred defensive alternative for a large range of parameters; (2) if the probability of an attack and the associated consequences are large, a combination of DIRCMs and ground perimeter control are preferred over any single countermeasure. 相似文献
66.
《Journal of Technology in Human Services》2013,31(3):1-19
ABSTRACT The effectiveness of a bilingual (English/Spanish) computer-assisted alcohol screening/intervention for hazardous and harmful alcohol use, the Health Habits Survey (HHS) was tested in primary care settings. Assessment-only patients were compared with patients exposed to the HHS. Of the 2053 recruited, 151 (7.4%) screened positive on the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT) and were re-contacted six months later for follow-up. Significant alcohol reduction was observed in both conditions. No between-group differences were observed. Computer-assisted screening and intervention are feasible in primary care settings and may be a realistic provider-extender when traditional screening is absent or inconsistently implemented. 相似文献
67.
堵琴囡 《湛江师范学院学报》2011,32(5):107-111
现有研究所提出的消解公共政策执行阻滞现象的对策多为事后性对策,且偏于刚性方式。以博弈论为理论依据,通过建构传统策略下中央与地方的策略互动、“协调”作为中央策略下的策略互动、协调引入博弈最始端下的策略互动三个博弈模型,比较得出将协调引入公共政策的制定和执行中,将有助于公共政策执行阻滞现象的减少和消除,并在此基础上提出以协调为理念构建的对策。 相似文献
68.
69.
William Schmidt Vishal Gaur Richard Lai Ananth Raman 《Production and Operations Management》2015,24(3):383-401
We analyze a signaling game between the manager of a firm and an investor in the firm. The manager has private information about the firm's demand and cares about the short‐term stock price assigned by the investor. Previous research has shown that under continuous decision choices and the Intuitive Criterion refinement, the least‐cost separating equilibrium will result, in which a low‐quality firm chooses its optimal capacity and a high‐quality firm over‐invests in order to signal its quality to investors. We build on this research by showing the existence of pooling outcomes in which low‐quality firms over‐invest and high‐quality firms under‐invest so as to provide identical signals to investors. The pooling equilibrium is practically appealing because it yields a Pareto improvement compared to the least‐cost separating equilibrium. Distinguishing features of our analysis are that: (i) we allow the capacity decision to have either discrete or continuous support, and (ii) we allow beliefs to be refined based on either the Undefeated refinement or the Intuitive Criterion refinement. We find that the newsvendor model parameters impact the likelihood of a pooling outcome, and this impact changes in both sign and magnitude depending on which refinement is used. 相似文献
70.
We study competition and coordination in a supply chain in which a single supplier both operates a direct channel and sells its product through multiple differentiated retailers. We study analytically the supply chain with symmetric retailers and find that the supplier prefers to have as many retailers as possible in the market, even if the retailers' equilibrium retail price is lower than that of the supplier, and even if the number of retailers and their cost or market advantage prevent sales through the direct channel. We find that the two‐channel supply chain may be subject to inefficiencies not present in the single‐channel supply chain. We show that several contracts known to coordinate a single‐channel supply chain do not coordinate the two‐channel supply chain; thus we propose a linear quantity discount contract and demonstrate its ability to perfectly coordinate the two‐channel supply chain with symmetric retailers. We provide some analytical results for the supply chain with asymmetric retailers and propose an efficient solution approach for finding the equilibrium. We find numerically that the supplier still benefits from having more retailers in the market and that linear quantity discount contracts can mitigate supply chain inefficiency, though they no longer achieve perfect coordination. 相似文献