产能约束下考虑消费者偏好的双渠道供应链决策与协调

制造商产能和消费者偏好均会对双渠道供应链成员决策产生影响。考虑消费者渠道和低碳双重偏好，研究产能约束下双渠道供应链成员决策与协调问题。构建集中决策和分散决策两种情形下的双渠道供应链成员决策模型，比较分析两种情形下产能约束、消费者渠道偏好和低碳偏好对供应链决策影响；设计改进的收益共享契约协调机制，证明了其有效性。研究结果表明：在集中决策和分散决策两种情形下消费者渠道偏好对供应链收益都起到促进作用，其中在集中决策下不考虑消费者渠道偏好时供应链收益最少；消费者低碳偏好程度的提高促使两渠道产品销售价格的提高，进而增加供应链收益；在分散决策下随着供应链产能的增大，网络直销渠道具有比传统零售渠道更大的销量增长幅度；设计的协调机制消除了供应链的"双重边际效应"，实现帕累托改进。最后通过算例验证以上研究结论。     

环境规制下区域合作减排演化博弈研究

通过构建政府间减排演化博弈模型，模拟了无约束条件下区域内地方政府间独立减排、合作减排及在环境规制的条件下区域内地方政府独立减排的策略选择演化过程。研究发现，（1）无环境规制的独立减排情形下，先发地区减排意向薄弱，后发地区有减排意愿，但减排效果不显著；（2）合作减排时，当协同收益小于交易成本时，随着地方政府经济发展，减排博弈最终会向地方政府一方减排一方不减排的方向演进；当协同收益大于交易成本时，通过合作减排，提高了减排意愿。（3）地方政府独立减排条件下，环境规制仅在经济后发地区可以起到作用，减排效果并不显著。通过提高协同收益、减低交易成本及有效促进区域合作减排，对实现减排目标具有重要意义。     

基于利益相关者视角的社区旅游发展模式研究

发展社区旅游需要在不同利益主体之间建立一个合理的利益协调和分配机制,而利益相关者角色的错位、缺位,其间关系的交叉、矛盾是制约我国社区旅游发展的关键。为了确保社区旅游的可持续发展。需要对现有的利益相关者角色和关系进行调整,真正使政府、当地社区、旅游企业和旅游者这四大利益主体在制度制约下规范自己的行为。通过对利益相关者理论研究的综述,对我国社区旅游发展中的利益相关者建立博弈模型进行帕累托最优分析,并在此基础上,提出基于利益相关者视角的社区旅游发展模式研究。     

游戏元素对消费者参与行为影响的研究述评与展望

游戏元素作为新型的营销工具,已经被越来越多的企业用于营销实践,旨在提高消费者参与。鉴于此,通过对国内外相关文献的梳理与回顾,将游戏元素划分为游戏设计对象、游戏设计机制和游戏设计原则这三类,并从工具结果和体验结果上界定了游戏元素与游戏、游戏化以及游戏化营销等概念的关系。在此基础上,通过对背后理论基础的探讨,发现这三类游戏元素会影响消费者的认知、情感和内部动机,进而增强消费者的参与行为,并且产品类型和消费者特征都会调节游戏元素与消费者参与行为之间的关系。最后对未来研究进行了展望。     

网络直播平台监管策略的演化博弈分析及仿真研究

针对当前我国网络直播行业乱象频生的现实情况,文章运用演化博弈理论构建了政府部门与直播平台间的动态演化模型,围绕政府部门对网络直播平台违规行为的惩罚力度以及直播平台潜在收益与违规收益三个关键参数的大小,运用matlab7.0数值仿真工具模拟了4种场景下政府部门与网络直播平台的策略互动过程。研究表明,当关键参数取值位于不同数值区间时,系统分别呈现出3种演化稳定结果与一种周期性的随机状态。加大对网络直播平台违规行为的惩罚力度,同时增加合规潜在收益和降低违规收益,有利于引导网络直播平台策略选择向合规演化。     

核威慑机理:实力基础、信号传递和心理博弈

基辛格提出了威慑分析框架,认为威慑需要实力、使用实力的意志以及潜在的进攻者对这两方面因素的综合评估等三方面因素的结合,但他没有对这一分析框架进行深入分析。本文跳出从战略稳定性角度分析核威慑的传统思路,把认知和心理因素植入核威慑分析之中,对基辛格建构的威慑分析框架进行了细化,并将其用于核威慑分析,把威慑的三个构成要素置换为核实力基础、核威慑信号传递和核威慑心理博弈三个变量,把核威慑界定为在核力量基础上通过信号传递进行的心理博弈。影响核武器数量规模的因素分为国家政策因素、确定一国核武器数量的直接依据、国家资源约束和国际环境的影响。核威慑信号传递包括口头信号传递、书面信号传递、捆绑信号传递和行动信号传递四种方式,每一种传递方式各有其传递路径。在核威慑心理博弈部分,分析了对核威慑正确认知的形成机制,并在此基础上分析了核力量平衡国家间的核威慑心理博弈、核力量悬殊国家间的核威慑心理博弈和导弹防御系统对核威慑心理博弈的影响。分析核威慑中核力量与使用核力量意志的关系、描述核威慑过程中信号传递的方式与路径和威慑与被威慑双方的心理博弈过程,对于分析核威慑有效性、维持大国间战略稳定性,具有一定的理论价值和现实意义。     

What are you calling intuitive? Subject heterogeneity as a driver of response times in an impunity game

Studies on the intuitive or deliberate nature of human actions often use time constraints for identification, assuming that constrained individuals fall back to intuitive behavior. This identification strategy disregards individual heterogeneity and self-priming, i.e. the behavioral rule that subjects can form during the instructions phase, and then apply irrespective of the time constraint. We use respondent data from an impunity game as an example of how subject heterogeneity can drive results. 24 respondents face 240 more or less unfair allocation proposals out of a small or large pie and can accept or reject the offer. Upon rejection respondents burn their own money, but not the proposer’s. Respondents decisions are communicated to the proposer. On average, emotional rejections take longer than deliberate acceptances. Including individual heterogeneity, though, we find that subjects who mostly accept (reject) take more time to reject (accept). Faster decisions are the ones conforming with the modal early reaction. We attribute this finding to heterogeneity in self-priming. Since self-priming is orthogonal to time constraints, it has the capacity to invalidate their use in the identification of dual decision modes.     

Dictator game variants with probabilistic (and cost-saving) payoffs: A systematic test

Driven by methodological concerns, theoretical considerations, and previous evidence, I systematically test the validity of common dictator game variants with probabilistic payoffs. Using a unified experimental framework, I include four approaches and compare them to a standard dictator game: involving fewer receivers than dictators, paying only some players, paying only some decisions, and role uncertainty. I also relate transfers in the dictator game variants to established complementary individual difference measures of prosociality: social value orientation, personal values, a donation to charity, and the Big Five personality factor agreeableness. My data shows that the standard dictator game presents the expected correlations with the complementary measures of prosociality. Involving fewer receivers yields comparably valid results. By contrast, when only some players or decisions are paid or, particularly, when subjects face role uncertainty, the expected associations with complementary prosociality measures are distorted. Under role uncertainty, generosity is also significantly biased upward. I conclude that the validity of dictator game outcomes is highly sensitive to the applied methods. Not all dictator game variants can be recommended for the valid measurement of social preferences.     

Simple guilt and cooperation

We introduce simple guilt into a generic prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game and solve for the equilibria of the resulting psychological game. It is shown that for all guilt parameters, it is a pure strategy equilibrium that both players defect. But if the guilt parameter surpasses a threshold, a mixed strategy equilibrium and a pure strategy equilibrium in which both players cooperate emerge. We implement three payoff constellations of the PD game in a laboratory experiment and find in line with our equilibrium analysis that first- and second-order beliefs are highly correlated and that the probability of cooperation depends positively on these beliefs. Maximum likelihood estimations of a model of noisy introspection reveal that experimental data is best fitted with positive guilt levels and that omission of guilt results in a substantial increase in the noise parameters.     

建构游戏中大班幼儿意志品质发展现状调查

意志品质的发展水平对幼儿良好习惯的养成起着决定作用,甚至对幼儿终生的发展有着积极影响。本研究抽取合肥市某幼儿园大班的90名幼儿,采用自制观察表开展为期27天的调查研究,以调查大班幼儿意志品质的发展状况。结果发现,建构游戏中大班幼儿的意志品质发展存在诸如建构有计划性但依赖性较强;选择有指向性但容易受诱导;对行为有自控力但在建构中坚持性不足等问题。为此,笔者建议：应增强幼儿对建构游戏的了解,丰富相关知识经验;创设良好的游戏环境,发挥个体积极性;鼓励教师采用多样的游戏组织形式,重视正面语言的价值;提高幼儿的建构游戏水平,发挥主题建构游戏的作用;进行家园合作,共同努力提高幼儿意志水平。