金融创新对我国金融发展的影响

金融创新导致了金融市场结构发生根本性改变 ,促进了金融机构的全球化、全能化和集团化发展 ,并使金融监管机制由分业监管走向混业和职能监管。我国金融创新相对落后 ,而金融业的全面开放将引发我国金融创新高潮 ,同时也对我国金融监管体制提出严峻挑战     

论金融消费者的替代性纠纷解决机制

后危机时代金融消费者保护的重要性突显,如何为金融消费者提供灵活多元的救济途径是理论界和学术界关注的热点。发达资本主义国家早对金融消费者替代性纠纷处理机制进行了探索,形成了许多有益经验,相比之下,我国金融消费者纠纷处理机制单一,缺乏灵活性和实效性。在金融市场的迅速发展的背景下,我国有必要借鉴他国经验,将金融消费者保护作为金融监管的首要基础价值,建立统一的金融纠纷处理中心,整合现有的资源,制定严格和完善的纠纷解决程序,实现保护金融消费者的监管目标。     

基于声誉约束的民间金融组织风险及其防范

从发起者和参与者博弈的角度解释：参与者会基于发起者的资金回报承诺、发起者本人的信誉和相应的法律约束对民间金融组织进行投资;随着组织规模扩大,发起人违约成本减少、违约收益增加使得发起者放弃声誉而导致民间金融组织风险爆发;在极端情形下民间金融组织继续运营的最低限度依赖于市场在未来对违约者的惩罚,而这一惩罚不能低于发起者违约而获得本应属于参与者参与组织的利息收益。     

不可扼杀的顽强生命——从当前国际金融危机再论马克思主义命运

由美国次贷危机引发的世界性金融危机以及由金融危机发展而来的经济危机,充分揭示了资本主义制度的寄生性、腐朽性,进一步证明了马克思主义关于资本主义必然灭亡、社会主义必然胜利的结论的科学性,更加证明马克思主义仍然具有强大生命力。主要表现在：资本主义制度无法克服其自身固有矛盾;马克思的经济理论及其巨著《资本论》声誉大振;社会主义社会在曲折中不断前进。     

建立中国(上海)自由贸易试验区动因及其经济效应分析

上海自贸试验区的建立,不是着眼于一城市、一区域的发展,而是力图通过开放转变政府角色、推动制度创新,突破金融领域的改革难点,从而带来"制度红利",充分运用市场调配资源的高效为我国社会主义建设事业服务。上海要实现建成金融中心、贸易中心的宏伟目标,必须从自贸试验区开始,从根本上摒除要素流动的障碍,协调好与经济腹地,与香港、深圳前海等区域的关系,实现区域经济协同发展。上海自贸试验区的建成,必将进一步推动上海服务业产业集聚,推动上海金融中心、航运中心、贸易中心更上一个能级,辐射长江流域甚至更广阔的地域。     

Pre-decisional information acquisition: Why do we pay too much for information? Brief report

People tend to acquire more information while making their decisions than a rational and risk-neutral benchmark would predict. We conduct a carefully designed experiment to derive five plausible reasons for pre-decision information overpurchasing. The results show that overpurchasing of information can be almost entirely explained by systematic information processing errors (misestimation or incorrect Bayesian updating), possibly caused by biased intuitive decision processes. Other factors, such as overoptimism about the validity of the new information, risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, and curiosity about (irrelevant) information, play at most a minor role. Our results imply that information overacquisitions are mainly driven by the overestimation of the usefulness of additional information.     

Financial Intermediation Modernization in Countries with Transition Economy

During the modern phase of economic reforms directed at the establishment of market economy, many countries with transition economies face the challenge of solving the issue of formation and rational usage of internal sources of financing the real sector of the economy, as well as attracting considerable volume of direct foreign investment. In general, financial market imperfections hold back innovation and growth, and that public policy can complement financial markets. Therefore, the most relevant issue at the present time is the formation of attendant and complex supervision institutions, as well as an exigency of innovative economy governance as mainframe principles for further banking system elaboration and financial sector development in general. We have taken Armenia as a case study for transition economy as far as Armenia is currently in the stage of capital market development through integration into international financial markets.      

Pension reforms in EU11 countries: An evaluation of post‐socialist pension policies

This article evaluates the pension policy pathways of the 11 former state socialist nations that have joined the European Union since 2004. Focusing primarily on the post‐2004 period, the analysis discusses the most important measurable outcomes of these countries’ pension reforms, in terms of poverty alleviation, pension adequacy and fiscal sustainability. Going beyond the quantifiable concepts, we also investigate the quality of the 11 countries’ pension systems in terms of equity as well as efficiency, emphasizing the less conspicuous design errors present in these systems. Although these errors have received little attention to date, they may harm pension schemes along several dimensions, including their fiscal sustainability.     

Exploitation aversion: When financial incentives fail to motivate agents

Studies of the principal-agent relationship find that monetary incentives work in many instances but that they can also backfire. Various mechanisms for this failure have been examined (e.g., intrinsic motivation, image concerns). We posit that an aversion to being exploited, i.e., being used instrumentally for another’s benefit, can also cause incentives to fail. Using an experiment we find that compliance is lower for exploitative principals compared to neutral ones despite using the same contracts. To corroborate our results we show that surveyed “exploitation aversion” mediates this effect. Our results have implications for the design and implementation of incentives within organizations.     

Markets or networks: Households’ choice of financial intermediary in Western China

We argue that households’ choice of financial intermediary is conditioned by households’ social network structures and socioeconomic status. Analyses show that households’ social network size and network composition affect their choices by limiting the quality and quantity of information, resources, and social influence one can access through social ties. Moreover, we find that high-SES families favor formal intermediaries due not only to their richer financial knowledge, higher affordability, and greater capacity to repay loans, but also to their high demands and special types of financial needs that can hardly be satisfied by embedded resources.