核威慑的四大风险及其应对

风险社会中的核威慑自身具有很大的不确定性,容易引发技术风险、信任风险、政治风险和道德风险。对立的主客思维方式、失序的国际规范、内在的逻辑矛盾以及缺失的道德责任导致了核威慑风险的产生与升级,而其中的道德责任是根本性的影响因子。面对日趋严峻的核安全形势,各国应该培植政治智慧与道德理性,强化共生意识和本体性安全,构建平等、正义的核安全合作机制,积极打造安全共同体,让参与者共享安全与和平。拥核国应该承担更大的道德责任,切实维护核不扩散体制,努力铲除核恐怖主义,稳步推进世界无核化进程。     

俄罗斯安全战略的演变与核裁军政策

俄罗斯的安全战略经历了继承、调整到逐步成熟的演变,这一演变过程也明显地反映在俄罗斯的核领域,深刻地影响了俄罗斯的核裁军政策。独立初期俄罗斯在核裁军领域对美国的巨大让步非但没有得到相应的回报,还使俄国家利益受损,国际地位进一步下降。俄安全战略的调整导致核裁军步伐放缓:从1993年到2000年的7年时间里,俄美核裁军领域未取得任何实质性进展。普京上台后俄罗斯安全战略已基本调整到位,俄核裁军也不再是为政治需要而实行的阶段性对策,而是服从于国家安全战略,服务于国家利益的一种长期、稳定的政策。未来俄罗斯核裁军政策的变化既取决于其安全战略的变化,也受到其经济发展水平的影响。     

关于培育我国核电企业核心竞争力的思考

文章初步定义了核电核心竞争力及其构成,在介绍国外核发达国家核电核心竞争力的基础上,对我国核电核心竞争力的现状及制约因素进行简述,并就如何培育我国核电核心竞争力提出了对策。     

"9·11"事件后美国反恐战略对南亚安全格局的影响

“9.11”事件及布什政府的反恐战略推动美国关注南亚地区的安全与稳定,同时印度与巴基斯坦围绕克什米尔的争端成为美国必须面对的重要挑战。印度、巴基斯坦加入反恐盟约并不能使印巴危机缓解,在美国反恐战略和印巴“核因素”的双重制约下,2002年印巴军事对峙最后成为双方解决争端、实现和平的难得机会,致使“9.11”事件及其后续发展成为推动南亚和平进程的重要催化剂。     

Does a Reactor Need a Safety Backfit? Case Study on Communicating Decision and Risk Analysis Information to Managers

An approach to communicating decision and risk analysis findings to managers is illustrated in a real case context. This article consists essentially of a report prepared for senior managers of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to help them make a reactor safety decision. It illustrates the communication of decision analysis findings relating to technical risks, costs, and benefits in support of a major risk management decision: whether or not to require a safety backfit. Its focus is on the needs of decision makers, and it introduces some novel communication devices.     

The Risks of Using Nuclear Energy Sources in Space: Some Lay Activists'Perceptions

A combination of directive and nondirective techniques was used to study the mental models of 30 lay activists regarding the risks of nuclear energy sources in space. Respondents'perceptions were compared with an "expert model" of the processes generating and controlling these risks, in terms of both the substance of their beliefs and several statistical measures of their performance. These analyses revealed a complex pattern of strengths and weaknesses. Their details are used to derive recommendations for formulating messages about these risks.     

Public Distrust and Hazard Management Success at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant

Based on experience gained while serving a public oversight commission appointed by the governor of Colorado, hazard management at the Department of Energy's Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant is reviewed. Specific reference is made to the plant's history of controversy, its defense-in-depth strategy of hazard control, occupational health issues, public exposure to plutonium, and the assessment of low-probability, high-consequence risks. This leads to the conclusion that Rocky Flats is, by any objective standard, a hazard management success. It follows that public distrust of Rocky Flats arises as much from fear and loathing of nuclear weapons themselves as from the manufacturing process by which they are made.     

A Review of the High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository Siting Analysis

We critique two 1986 Department of Energy reports concerning the selection of sites for characterization as the nation's first high-level nuclear waste repository. We find that the multiattribute utility analysis of the five nominated sites was well done, although we express concern about the assessed probabilities, question the construction of two important attribute scales, and disagree with some of the value tradeoffs that were used. In contrast, we find the logic of the recommendations report to be weak and unconvincing.     

Analyzing Evacuation Versus Shelter‐in‐Place Strategies After a Terrorist Nuclear Detonation

We superimpose a radiation fallout model onto a traffic flow model to assess the evacuation versus shelter‐in‐place decisions after the daytime ground‐level detonation of a 10‐kt improvised nuclear device in Washington, DC. In our model, ≈80k people are killed by the prompt effects of blast, burn, and radiation. Of the ≈360k survivors without access to a vehicle, 42.6k would die if they immediately self‐evacuated on foot. Sheltering above ground would save several thousand of these lives and sheltering in a basement (or near the middle of a large building) would save of them. Among survivors of the prompt effects with access to a vehicle, the number of deaths depends on the fraction of people who shelter in a basement rather than self‐evacuate in their vehicle: 23.1k people die if 90% shelter in a basement and 54.6k die if 10% shelter. Sheltering above ground saves approximately half as many lives as sheltering in a basement. The details related to delayed (i.e., organized) evacuation, search and rescue, decontamination, and situational awareness (via, e.g., telecommunications) have very little impact on the number of casualties. Although antibiotics and transfusion support have the potential to save ≈10k lives (and the number of lives saved from medical care increases with the fraction of people who shelter in basements), the logistical challenge appears to be well beyond current response capabilities. Taken together, our results suggest that the government should initiate an aggressive outreach program to educate citizens and the private sector about the importance of sheltering in place in a basement for at least 12 hours after a terrorist nuclear detonation.     

日本核损害赔偿责任制度研究——以福岛核事故为例

地震、海啸等自然灾害的出现是引发福岛核事故的重要因素,但不是唯一原因,日本东京电力公司自身不听劝阻冒险作业、隐瞒真相、设备老化以及政府监管不力等难则其咎,因此其不能免除责任。但完全依靠1200亿日元的财务保证无法充分弥补被害人损失,且受责任集中原则以及无限责任失效性影响,最终,日本政府以设立核事故损害赔偿支援机构的方式介入此事,并发布了赔偿指南,将精神损失、经济收入损失、传闻损失、间接损失、自愿避难损失等项目都纳入其中。为了得到及时救济,受影响的民众可单独或同时通过协商、诉讼、调解等方式求偿。