ESTIMATION OF A DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION DOMINATING STOCHASTICALLY A KNOWN DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION

This paper considers the problem of estimating a cumulative distribution function (cdf), when it is known a priori to dominate a known cdf. The estimator considered is obtained by adjusting the empirical cdf using the prior information. This adjusted estimator is shown to be consistent, its limiting distribution is found, and its mean squared error (MSE) is shown to be smaller than the MSE of the empirical cdf. Its asymptotic efficiency (compared to the empirical cdf) is also found.     

Mean-preserving changes in risk with tail-dominance

In this paper, we consider a class of mean preserving increases in risk such that all risk-averse decision makers respond to an increase in risk by reducing the level of their risky activities. The type of increase in risk that we consider is based on the notion of tail dominance which generalizes other cases previously discussed in the literature.L. Eeckhoudt is Professor of Economics at the Catholic Faculties of Mons (Belgium) and Lille (France). P. Hansen is Professor of Operations Research at Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Montréal. Both authors have benefited from comments by P. Caperaa, G. Dionne, J. Meyer and H. Varian. They also thank A. Coopman who carefully reviewed and improved the English style.     

非奇H阵行列式的下界和‖A~(-1)B‖_∞的估计

给出了具有广泛实际背景的非奇H矩阵(严格对角占优阵,不可约对角占优阵等均为非奇H阵)行列式的下界估计,且在A为非奇H阵情况下给出,‖A~(-1)B‖_∞的估计。     

Refinements of Nash Equilibrium: A critique

Rational play of Noncooperative Games is investigated under the assumptions that a particular form of Best Reply Principle holds, each player has at least one rational strategy and all strategies are either rational or irrational. These assumptions are shown to imply that (a) some weakly dominated strategies are rational (b) recursive reasoning can be misleading (c) only a Strict Nash Equilibrium can be a solution. A Supplementary Best Reply Principle is formulated. It sheds further light on which games have solutions and on rational play in games without them. The relationship between these results and those of other authors is discussed.     

No‐Betting‐Pareto Dominance

We argue that the notion of Pareto dominance is not as compelling in the presence of uncertainty as it is under certainty. In particular, voluntary trade based on differences in tastes is commonly accepted as desirable, because tastes cannot be wrong. By contrast, voluntary trade based on incompatible beliefs may indicate that at least one agent entertains mistaken beliefs. We propose and characterize a weaker, No‐Betting, notion of Pareto domination which requires, on top of unanimity of preference, the existence of shared beliefs that can rationalize such preference for each agent.     

Individual and group decision making under risk: An experimental study of Bayesian updating and violations of first-order stochastic dominance

This paper reports the results of experiments designed to test whether individuals and groups abide by monotonicity with respect to first-order stochastic dominance and Bayesian updating when making decisions under risk. The results indicate a significant number of violations of both principles. The violation rate when groups make decisions is substantially lower, and decreasing with group size, suggesting that social interaction improves the decision-making process. Greater transparency of the decision task reduces the violation rate, suggesting that these violations are due to judgment errors rather than the preference structure. In one treatment, however, less complex decisions result in a higher error rates.

LEXICOGRAPHIC ADDITIVITY FOR MULTI-ATTRIBUTE PREFERENCES ON FINITE SETS

Payoff dominance, a criterion for choosing between equilibrium points in games, is intuitively compelling, especially in matching games and other games of common interests, but it has not been justified from standard game-theoretic rationality assumptions. A psychological explanation of it is offered in terms of a form of reasoning that we call the Stackelberg heuristic in which players assume that their strategic thinking will be anticipated by their co-player(s). Two-person games are called Stackelberg-soluble if the players' strategies that maximize against their co-players' best replies intersect in a Nash equilibrium. Proofs are given that every game of common interests is Stackelberg-soluble, that a Stackelberg solution is always a payoff-dominant outcome, and that in every game with multiple Nash equilibria a Stackelberg solution is a payoff-dominant equilibrium point. It is argued that the Stackelberg heuristic may be justified by evidentialist reasoning.     

Arrow-Pratt Risk Aversion, Risk Premium and Decision Weights

This paper analyzes two issues: (a) the effect of decision-weights on risk premium, and (b) whether risk-aversion characterizes most investors. We theoretically show that cumulative prospect theory decision-weights systematically increase Arrow's risk premium, and may induce a positive risk premium even in the absence of risk-aversion. However, decision-weights may either increase or reduce Pratt's risk premium. We present three experiments revealing a striking result: a large proportion of the subjects' choices contradicts risk-aversion. This may be due to non-concave preferences, or to decision-weights. This result may have a dramatic impact on equilibrium models in economics and finance.     

Testing Descriptive Utility Theories: Violations of Stochastic Dominance and Cumulative Independence

Choices between gambles show systematic violations of stochastic dominance. For example, most people choose ($6, .05; $91, .03; $99, .92) over ($6, .02; $8, .03; $99, .95), violating dominance. Choices also violate two cumulative independence conditions: (1) If S = (z, r; x, p; y, q) R = (z, r; x, p; y, q) then S = (x, r; y, p + q) R = (x, r + p; y, q). (2) If S = (x, p; y, q; z, r) R = (x, p; y, q; z, r) then S = (x, p + q; y, r) R = (x, p; y, q + r), where 0 < z < x < x < y < y < y < z.Violations contradict any utility theory satisfying transivity, outcome monotonicity, coalescing, and comonotonic independence. Because rank-and sign-dependent utility theories, including cumulative prospect theory (CPT), satisfy these properties, they cannot explain these results.However, the configural weight model of Birnbaum and McIntosh (1996) predicted the observed violations of stochastic dominance, cumulative independence, and branch independence. This model assumes the utility of a gamble is a weighted average of outcomes\' utilities, where each configural weight is a function of the rank order of the outcome\'s value among distinct values and that outcome\'s probability. The configural weight, TAX model with the same number of parameters as CPT fit the data of most individuals better than the model of CPT.     

理解资本主义国家:杰索普的方法、框架和范畴

作为新马克思主义国家理论的集大成者,杰索普为我们提供了关于当代资本主义国家的一种综合性研究范式和理论分析。通过生态系统与经济统治、结构耦合与策略国家、调节方式与治理模式、时空定位与尺度秩序等四个方面的分析,可以概述杰索普国家理论的方法、框架和范畴。杰索普以问题为导向、结合"前学科"与"后学科"方法的国家理论,对全球化时代的国家研究具有重大的启示与借鉴意义。