Contractors’ and Agency Decisions and Policy Implications in A+B Bidding

The focus of this study is on the A+B transportation procurement mechanism, which uses the proposed cost (A component) and the proposed time (B component) to score contractors’ bids. Empirical studies have shown that this mechanism shortens project durations. We use normative models to study the effect of certain discretionary parameters set by state transportation agencies on contractors’ equilibrium bidding strategies, winner selection, and actual completion times. We model the bidding environment in detail including multi‐dimensional bids, contractors’ uncertainty about completion times, and reputation cost. The latter refers to a private penalty that accrues to tardy contractors from increased cost of posting bonds and reduced prospects of winning future projects. Our model explains why contractors may skew line‐item bids and why winners frequently finish earlier than bid. It has several policy implications as well. For example, we recommend that agencies set the daily incentive, disincentive, and road user cost to be equal and not cap incentives. This is a departure from current practice, where incentives are often capped and weaker than penalties. Furthermore, we show that agencies may be justified in setting daily road user cost strictly smaller than the true cost of traffic disruption during construction.     

Carrots or Sticks? Improving Social and Environmental Compliance at Suppliers Through Incentives and Penalties

Firms are increasingly looking to eradicate social and environmental non‐compliances at their suppliers in response to increasing regulations, consumer demand, potential for supply chain disruptions, and to improve their social, environmental, and economic supply chain performance. This study develops a model of the relationship between the buyer's supplier incentives and penalties for the supplier's social and environmental compliance, and the outcomes in terms of reduction in supplier social and environmental violations as well as the buyer's own operating costs. This model is tested empirically through analysis of a dataset of opinion‐based survey responses from practitioners at 334 companies across 17 industries. The analysis finds specific penalties and incentives that are positively associated with reduced supplier violations and reduced buyer operating costs. In particular, offering suppliers incentives of increased business and training for improving social and environmental performance is strongly associated with a reduction in both violations and operating costs.     

民营中小企业企业激励分配制度研究——构建企业经理层非完备股权制度

我国民营中小企业经营管理面临着许多亟需解决的问题,其中最重要的一个就是内部人控制问题,内部人控制问题存在的根源是企业激励制度设计不合理,从而使管理层、员工和企业的整体效率降低,损害企业所有权者利益,从而影响企业所有权者投资的积极性。从民营中小企业实际出发来探讨企业激励机制的设计,构建企业经理层非完备股权制度是一种适用于民营中小企业的新的激励方式和手段。     

面向预见性激励的预断因子扫描图景模型研究

通过提高激励方法和激励过程的预见性来提高激励的及时性、准确性和有效性,从战略管理高度对预见性激励的路径和扫描方法进行理论研究,提出了预断因子扫描图景模型.扫描图景模型包括4个层次的扫描分析,第一层是员工需求状况分析,包括当前员工需求状况分析和近期3年～5年需求状况分析;第二层是成员间激励冲突对偶权衡分析,包括静态权衡状态分析和动态权衡状态分析;第三层是组织中潜在问题成员状况分析,并建立问题群的三维空间矩阵模型;第四层为突发事件及其行为规律的总结、预测和处理.研究表明,从员工的需求状况、员工之间的冲突关系、员工个体或其周围环境可能发生的事件等维度进行分析,有助于管理者准确把握激励重心,提早储备激励性资源,实现预见性激励的目的.     

认可与激励：学生评教结果应用的价值依归

学生评教作为保障大学教学质量的一种管理实践在国内高校广泛推行，但对如何应用评教结果及应用后产生何种作用则众说纷纭。在分析国内高校学生评教结果应用现状的基础上，结合笔者所在高校学生评教结果应用实践，认为以“认可与激励”为价值依归的使用原则将是学生评教结果合理使用、赋予学生评教生命力的一种必然路径。