不完全契约、非对称信息与合作社经营者激励——农民专业合作社“委托—代理”理论模型的构建及其应用

我国农民专业合作社内部的委托—代理关系有其自身的特点,通过对符合我国农民专业合作社运行实践的委托—代理理论模型的构建及理论分析可知,合作社代理人努力行为的激励与其自身经营农产品占合作社经营农产品总量的比重、对互惠关注的敏感性程度和占有合作社盈余分配的比例等因素存在正相关关系。合作社内部产生委托—代理问题的根源在于合作社内部的不完全契约和非对称信息,为避免合作社经营者可能采取的隐藏信息和隐藏行动的机会主义行为,建议从信号传递和信号甄别的角度对合作社内部的相关契约加以改进。     

Inter-firm collaborations and supply chain coordination: review of key elements and case study

Considering the effects of globalisation, the increase of production and energy costs, and the introduction of advanced technologies, companies need to change their way of doing business if they want to stay competitive. One way of doing this is to establish collaborations with suppliers, distributors and retailers, in order to exchange products efficiently and create value for customers. Nevertheless, the structure of the collaboration must be designed carefully and some coordination mechanisms must be implemented to support this way of doing business. In this article, we first analyse: why companies work together, how they should build their partnership, and which strategies they can implement to facilitate coordination of supply chain activities. We then report a case study of collaboration in the forest industry that shows the benefits of implementing coordination mechanisms as well as the necessity of using incentives to better share these benefits.     

管制治理、管制激励与管制绩效关联结构实证研究

在对中国电信产业管制改革进行案例研究的基础上,讨论管制治理、管制激励与管制绩效的构成要素与关联结构,提出了一个表达管制治理、管制激励与管制绩效关联结构的管制框架模型,并应用结构方程的方法对模型进行了统计性实证检验。分析结果表明,改善管制治理对提高管制绩效至关重要。     

Incentives,Contracts, and Markets: A General Equilibrium Theory of Firms1

This paper takes steps toward integrating firm theory in the spirit of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Grossman and Hart (1986), contract theory in the spirit of Holmstrom (1979), and general equilibrium theory in the spirit of Arrow and Debreu (1954) and McKenzie (1959). In the model presented here, the set of firms that form and the contractual arrangements that appear, the assignments of agents to firms, the prices faced by firms for inputs and outputs, and the incentives to agents are all determined endogenously at equilibrium. Agents choose consumption—but they also choose which firms to join, which roles to occupy in those firms, and which actions to take in those roles. Agents interact anonymously with the (large) market, but strategically within the (small) firms they join. The model accommodates moral hazard, adverse selection, signaling, and insurance. Equilibria may be Pareto ranked.     

自然垄断产业信息与激励微观规制探究

始于20世纪80年代末的我国自然垄断产业规制体制改革取得了良好的社会和经济效果。但是,一直以来,对该领域的研究主要集中在宏观管制体制改革方面,自然垄断产业的微观规制问题尚未引起学者们足够的重视。文章提出建立自然垄断产业信息与激励微观规制的理论框架,首先,根据自然垄断企业利益相关者及企业会计责任的变迁,改进自然垄断产业信息披露规制;然后,在此基础上构建自然垄断企业利益相关者导向的综合绩效评价体系;最后,论文剖析了自然垄断企业委托代理关系的特殊性,建立了自然垄断企业双重委托代理模型,提出从制度环境和制度安排两个方面构建自然垄断企业激励约束规制。      

RFID and Operations Management: Technology,Value, and Incentives

As RFID technology matures and organizations seek to deploy it in their business operations, a basic objective in the endeavor is that of extracting business value from the technology. This paper examines three dimensions of the value proposition of RFID and attempts to identify areas for further investigation. The first dimension consists of the generic architecture of RFID implementations and the drivers of value that can result from its components. The second consists of measurement issues associated with quantification of value. Since the complete benefits of RFID will only result when multiple independent organizations deploy the technology and coordinate the resulting information flows, the third dimension addresses incentives for achieving that diffusion. The collection of issues identified through this exercise offers an initial roadmap to view ongoing research and recognize additional problems for further investigation.     

农户参与食品追溯体系激励机制实证研究

通过构建理论模型,探讨了食品追溯体系对农户提高食品安全水平的激励作用,得出以下结论：提高食品追溯体系的有效性、增加对提供安全食品的农户的报酬以及加大对提供不安全食品的农户的惩罚力度是提高食品安全水平的必要条件。食品追溯体系的有效实施可以降低农户的隐匿行动,增加其生产安全食品的努力水平。通过对最早推广蔬菜质量安全追溯体系的北京市蔬菜种植户的调查结果进行统计分析并利用二元logistic模型进行检验,得出影响蔬菜种植户参与蔬菜质量安全追溯体系的正向激励因素主要有：蔬菜种植的高成本收益率、可追溯蔬菜高价预期、加入产业化组织、接受政府补贴和参加技术培训,逆向激励因素主要有：食品安全监管部门对不安全食品供应商的惩罚力度、农户对参与食品追溯体系的风险预期。     

政府激励与增长方式转变:信息不对称的视角

信息不对称在经济增长方式的转变过程中会产生道德风险与逆向选择问题.通过多任务道德风险模型和自愿退出机制的逆向选择模型,可从多级政府间、政府和企业间两方面就信息不对称问题对经济增长方式的影响进行研究.研究表明,信息不对称是我国经济高速增长而增长方式转变未见显著改善的主要原因之一,同时信息不对称也是导致不同地区间存在增长方式转变差距的重要因素.为抑制信息不对称造成的负面影响,上级政府在考核下级政府时应加大对经济增长方式转变的考核权重,建立并完善系统的经济增长方式的评价体系.另一方面,应力避企业隐藏信息的行为,加大对企业转型的转移支付,促进企业生产方式实现从粗放型向集约型的根本转变.     

中国科技税收政策实践与改革

从科技税收政策方式、税收优惠环节、享受优惠主体和科技税收税种等四方面,系统分析了中国改革开放以来科技税收政策的实践。在此基础上,结合新税制改革的背景,提出完善中国科技税收体系的思考。     

经理人激励与公司债务水平的选择

以或有要求权模型研究经理人激励对公司债务水平的影响,研究表明,经理人以股东的激励程度选择公司债务水平与工作努力程度以最大化自己的收益。在一定条件下,当股东所提供的激励较弱时,充分高的债务水平是经理人向外部投资者作出的他将努力工作的可信承诺,是项目得到融资的充分条件;当该激励较强时,经理人所选择的债务水平低于能够最大化公司价值的数值。