Evaluating the Move to a Linear Tax System in Germany and Other European Countries

This paper proposes a comparison of the results of tax policy analysis obtained on the basis of unitary and collective representations of the household. We first generate labour supplies consistent with the collective rationality, by use of a model calibrated on microdata as described in Vermeulen et al. [Collective Models of Household Labor Supply with Nonconvex Budget Sets and Nonparticipation: A Calibration Approach (2006)]. A unitary model is then estimated on these collective data and unitary and collective responses to a tax reform are compared. We focus on the introduction of linear taxation in Germany. The exercise is replicated for other European countries and other topical reforms. Distortions due to the use of a unitary model turn out to be important in predicting labour supply adjustments, in the design of tax revenue neutral reforms, and in predicting a reform’s welfare implications.

Social networks and occupational choice: The endogenous formation of attitudes and beliefs about tax compliance

The paper analyses the emergence of group-specific attitudes and beliefs about tax compliance when individuals interact in a social network. It develops a model in which taxpayers possess a range of individual characteristics – including attitude to risk, potential for success in self-employment, and the weight attached to the social custom for honesty – and make an occupational choice based on these characteristics. Occupations differ in the possibility for evading tax. The social network determines which taxpayers are linked, and information about auditing and compliance is transmitted at meetings between linked taxpayers. Using agent-based simulations, the analysis demonstrates how attitudes and beliefs endogenously emerge that differ across sub-groups of the population. Compliance behaviour is different across occupational groups, and this is reinforced by the development of group-specific attitudes and beliefs. Taxpayers self-select into occupations according to the degree of risk aversion, the subjective probability of audit is sustained above the objective probability, and the weight attached to the social custom differs across occupations. These factors combine to lead to compliance levels that differ across occupations.     

The effects of income source,context, and income level on tax compliance decisions in a dynamic experiment

This study employs a laboratory experiment to explore the joint effect of income source (earned versus endowed) and decision context (tax versus nontax) on tax compliance behavior. During the experiment, subjects faced various income levels and made multiple reporting decisions. The results indicate that overall compliance is not significantly affected by the interaction of income source and context. However, this joint effect influences the relationship between income level and compliance and how compliance behavior evolves over time. In both cases, the treatment group with earned income in a tax context displays behavior that is distinct from the other three groups.     

The slippery slope framework on tax compliance: An attempt to formalization

Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl (2008) presented with the so-called ‘slippery slope’ framework a new approach to understand tax compliance. The slippery slope approach supposes two routes to tax compliance: deterrence of tax evasion by audits and fines on the one hand, and building a trusting relationship with taxpayers by services and support on the other hand. In this paper, the slippery slope framework is formalized by assuming two groups of taxpayers: compliance-minded and evasion-minded persons. Defining reaction functions for persons of both groups with respect to coercive and persuasive power instruments of tax authorities, the typical slippery slope picture emerges that characterises the authorities’ work. As a consequence, both groups of policy tools are considered necessary to generate tax compliance. In addition to that, it is shown that coercive and persuasive power may be substitutes or complements to each other, depending of the parameters of the taxpayers’ reaction functions. As a further crucial determinant of tax compliance, the behaviour of the fellow citizens with respect to taxpaying is identified.     

Citizenship and power in an agent-based model of tax compliance with public expenditure

In this paper we present a model of tax compliance with heterogeneous agents who maximize their individual utility based on income and the conjectured level of per capita public expenditure. We formally include psychological drivers in this model. These drivers affect individual behavior, such as risk aversion, together with appreciation of public expenditure, expectations about peers’ compliance and a natural inclination to comply, all of which we summarize in a quality termed “citizenship”. The enforcement system, based on random inspections, is standard and only partially known to agents.The agent-based model is simulated under a variety of settings, representing different “societies”. We use the artificial data produced by the model to estimate the effects of taxpayers’ traits on personal tax behavior and to build a compliance societal slippery slope. At the individual level, we find a positive dependence of compliance on all variables, with the significant exception of the tax rate, which has a negative impact. As far as societies are concerned, we show how aggregate tax compliance depends on composite indices of citizenship and power, and we find that the former is more important than the latter.     

Reference dependent preferences,hedonic adaptation and tax evasion: Does the tax burden matter?

We study the effects of the tax burden on tax evasion both theoretically and experimentally. We develop a theoretical framework of tax evasion decisions that is based on two behavioral assumptions: (1) taxpayers are endowed with reference dependent preferences that are subject to hedonic adaptation and (2) in making their choices, taxpayers are affected by ethical concerns. The model generates new predictions on how a change in the tax rate affects the decision to evade taxes. Contrary to the classical expected utility theory, but in line with previous applications of reference dependent preferences to taxpayers’ decisions, an increase in the tax rate increases tax evasion. Moreover, as taxpayers adapt to the new legal tax rate, the decision to evade taxes becomes independent of the tax rate. We present results from a laboratory experiment that support the main predictions of the model.     

Behavioral dynamics of tax evasion – A survey

Since the 1950s (Schmölders, 1959) it is well known that behavioral aspects have an influence on tax evasion or tax compliance. In particular, interactions among the various entities involved in the taxation process (e.g. taxpayers, law makers, tax practitioners, tax authorities, etc.), and the dynamics that these interactions may generate, seem to play an important role for the actual level of tax compliance. However, the mainstream neoclassical approach to tax evasion (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972) cannot account for such interactions and dynamics. Therefore, during the last two decades new approaches (e.g. lab experiments, agent-based modeling, etc.) have been developed with a view to model how behavioral dynamics may foster or prevent tax evasion. In addition, empirical evidence has been generated that supports a role for such interaction dynamics. In this contribution we survey the main developments in this research area and provide some suggestions for further research.     

Measuring and explaining tax evasion: Improving self-reports using the crosswise model

Due to its sensitive nature, tax compliance is difficult to study empirically, and valid information on tax evasion is rare. More specifically, when directly asked on surveys, respondents are likely to underreport their evasion behavior. Such invalid responses not only bias prevalence estimates but may also obscure associations with individual predictors. To generate more valid estimates of tax evasion, we used a new method of data collection for sensitive questions, the crosswise model (CM). The CM is conceptually based on the randomized response technique (RRT), but due to its advanced design, it is better suited for large surveys than classical RRTs. In an experimental online survey, we compared the CM (N = 862) to standard direct questioning (DQ; N = 305). First, our results showed that the CM was able to elicit a higher proportion of self-stigmatizing reports of tax evasion by increasing privacy in the data collection process. Second, on average, we found stronger effects of our predictor variables on tax evasion in the CM condition compared with the DQ condition such that an egoistic personality and the opportunity for tax evasion predicted actual tax evasion only in the CM condition.     

Shifting taxes away from labour enhances equity and fiscal efficiency

This paper analyzes the effects of a hypothetical tax reform in Italy, which makes current tax credits more generous and refundable, shifting the tax burden from labour to property. Our methodology contains novel features of great relevance for policy analysis: first, a structural model of labour supply of both employees and self-employed; second, a labour market equilibrium model that encompasses demand side constraints; last, detailed tax system simulation under fiscal neutrality. The empirical findings provide guidance for policy makers’ actions to enhance equity and efficiency of tax system and confirm the relevance of the methodological approach.     

Legalism and creativity: tax non-compliance in the eyes of the economic elite

This paper analyzes elite tax compliance from a sociological perspective in order to examine how different tax behaviors are justified or how they embody different taxpayers’ subjectivities. Drawing from the case of Chile and using a qualitative approach based on 32 interviews conducted with members of the economic elite, it is argued that forms of non-compliance -such as evasion and avoidance- are grounded in different ‘repertoires of evaluation’ while denoting a plurality of distinctions and criteria of evaluation which relate to the legal culture in which the tax system operates. Findings show that legalism -a literal conception of the rules- does not always favor tax compliance and that it may even go against the purpose of tax collection when a creative use of the law prevails. Furthermore, legalism and creativity allow for the main justifications for challenging tax payment as well as the perceptions and beliefs that underlie the everyday relationship between taxpayers and the state to be understood.