Information Acquisition and Voluntary Disclosure in an Export‐Processing System

We study a strategic information management problem in the export‐processing trade, where the buyer controls the raw material input and sales and the producer is responsible for production. The production is vulnerable to random yield risk. The producer can exert a costly effort to acquire the private yield rate information and discretionarily share it with the buyer. We develop a sequential Bayesian game model that captures three key features of the system—endogenous information endowment, voluntary disclosure, and ex post information sharing—a significant departure from the literature. The optimal disclosure strategy is driven by the trade‐off between the gains from Pareto efficiency improvement and self‐interested overproduction. It is specified by two thresholds on yield rate: only the middle‐yield producers (with yield rate between these two thresholds) share private information to improve supply‐demand match; the low‐ and high‐yield producers withhold information to extract excess input from the buyer. The buyer in response penalizes nondisclosure with reduced input and rewards information sharing with a larger order. This strategic interaction is further exacerbated by the double marginalization effect from decentralization, resulting in severe efficiency loss. We examine the effectiveness of three corrective mechanisms—vertical integration, mandatory disclosure, and production restriction—and reveal the costs of information suppressive effect and overinvestment incentive and the benefit from concessions on the processing fee. Our study endogenizes the asymmetric supply risk and provides the first attempt to rationalize the strategic interactions of informational and operational incentives in the export‐processing system.     

Improving Humanitarian Operations through Technology‐Enabled Collaboration

Humanitarian supply chains involve many different entities, such as government, military, private, and non‐governmental organizations and individuals. Well‐coordinated interactions between entities can lead to synergies and improved humanitarian outcomes. Information technology (IT) tools can help facilitate collaboration, but cost and other barriers have limited their use. We document the use of an IT tool to improve last‐mile supply distribution and data management in one of many camps for internally displaced persons after the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and we describe other current uses of technology in camp management. Motivated by these examples and the interest among humanitarian organizations in expanding the use of such tools to facilitate coordination, we introduce a cooperative game theory model and explore insights about the conditions under which multi‐agency coordination is feasible and desirable. We also outline an agenda for future research in the area of technology‐enabled collaboration in the humanitarian sector.     

基于分量差的线性及匿名合作对策值的简化算法

通过给出Shapley值、均分Shapley值、贴现Shapley值、Solidarity值、广义Solidarity值、合意值、 Banzhaf值及最小二乘预核仁分量差的显式解析表达式,本文提出了一种同时计算这些线性及匿名效用可转移合作对策值的简化算法.特别地,这一算法也适用于同时计算这些值中的两种及以上.为了详细说明简化算法的计算过程及优越性,文中给出了具体的数值算例,并将其与传统算法进行了比较分析,结果表明简化算法确实能显著降低同时计算多个值的时间复杂度.     

股权众筹投融资方的最优策略分析

分析了股权众筹融资方和投资方的最优策略.依据股权众筹的流程,构建了股权众筹过程中投融资方利益博弈的3阶段模型,并在同时满足融资方与投资方预期收益最大化的条件下,求解了相应的最优化问题并给出了投融资方最优策略的解析式.研究结果表明,在参数满足一定条件时,股权众筹投融资方均存在最优策略,且最优策略受边际收益、项目成功概率、预期回报率等因素的影响.     

Cross‐Milieu Terrorist Collaboration: Using Game Theory to Assess the Risk of a Novel Threat

This article uses a game‐theoretic approach to analyze the risk of cross‐milieu terrorist collaboration—the possibility that, despite marked ideological differences, extremist groups from very different milieus might align to a degree where operational collaboration against Western societies becomes possible. Based upon theoretical insights drawn from a variety of literatures, a bargaining model is constructed that reflects the various benefits and costs for terrorists’ collaboration across ideological milieus. Analyzed in both sequential and simultaneous decision‐making contexts and through numerical simulations, the model confirms several theoretical arguments. The most important of these is that although likely to be quite rare, successful collaboration across terrorist milieus is indeed feasible in certain circumstances. The model also highlights several structural elements that might play a larger role than previously recognized in the collaboration decision, including that the prospect of nonmaterial gains (amplification of terror and reputational boost) plays at least as important a role in the decision to collaborate as potential increased capabilities does. Numerical simulation further suggests that prospects for successful collaboration over most scenarios (including operational) increase when a large, effective Islamist terrorist organization initiates collaboration with a smaller right‐wing group, as compared with the other scenarios considered. Although the small number of historical cases precludes robust statistical validation, the simulation results are supported by existing empirical evidence of collaboration between Islamists and right‐ or left‐wing extremists. The game‐theoretic approach, therefore, provides guidance regarding the circumstances under which such an unholy alliance of violent actors is likely to succeed.     

基于区间数大小不能直接判定的灰矩阵博弈的策略优超及其最优解研究

对于区间灰数大小不能直接判定的灰矩阵博弈G(⊗)={S₁,S₂,A(⊗)}问题,其策略优超和纯策略求解问题的关键在于A(⊗)中区间灰数大小判定准则的设定与判定方法的设计。本文运用灰色系统思想和系统工程的理论,揭示了人们在灰信息条件下的博弈心理与博弈决策规则,根据区间灰数势关系的判定规则,提出了灰数势意义下的策略优超法则,定义了纯策略解。最后,以商业银行贷款动态损失准备金计提为案例,对其灰势意义下的策略优超和纯策略解问题进行了研究。     

基于产业集群的企业重点投资地区决策的仿真

用多Agent仿真技术,研究了基于产业集群的台资IT企业在大陆重点投资地区的决策问题。提出了针对这一问题的、将集群竞争力评价的GEM模型、多Agent仿真技术及演化博弈相结合的思路与方法。仿真模型对集群的研究方法以及多Agent的应用领域有拓展意义,而仿真发现与结论可为政府制定有关政策提供参考。     

零售市场价格策略的演化博弈分析

基于一个三阶段Hotelling博弈模型:位于[0,1]线性城市两端的零售A和B第一阶段同时选择价格策略变量,第二阶段确定价格的大小,第三阶段由消费者选择零售商。应用演化博弈论进行研究,分析了零售市场价格策略的演化稳定性。     

不完全竞争环境下不对称企业技术创新战略投资

研究了在不完全竞争环境下,投资成本差异和创新成功所需时间对企业的技术创新战略投资决策的影响,给出了抢先均衡、序贯均衡、同时均衡出现的条件,指出创新成功所需时间和投资成本差异是影响均衡类型的主要原因.在抢先均衡和序贯均衡中,分析了投资成本差异和创新成功所需时间对企业平均投资时间间隔的影响,得到了一些有意义的结论,并给出了经济解释.     

基于非线性理论的企业市场价值取向战略研究

针对传统企业对市场价值的线性思维模式,利用非线性理论建立了基于Logistic方程的市场价值模型,以及企业内部市场领先战略与技术领先战略模型;通过模型分析了实施单一市场领先战略或技术领先战略企业的发展前景;提出了企业市场价值取向的双绞线均衡战略及战略动态控制要求.