Assembly Systems with Sequential Supplier Decisions and Uncertain Demand

We consider multitier push assembly systems with sequential supplier decisions and a wholesale price contract. We show that both an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)–Contract Manufacturer (CM) assembly and a modular assembly with sequential supplier decisions are mathematically equivalent to the corresponding traditional assembly. We determine that, in most cases, the first mover supplier realizes a higher profit than the second mover supplier but we also identify the sufficient conditions for the reverse to occur. We provide conditions under which the order quantity, the second mover profit, total supplier profits, and the assembler profit are either higher or lower for a multitier system with sequential suppliers compared to simultaneous suppliers. We conclude that the first mover is always better off in a three‐tier sequential system while she can be either better off or worse off in a four‐tier sequential system compared to the corresponding simultaneous systems. We also analyze the impact of information asymmetry on the supplier and assembler profits in a three‐tier sequential system. Finally, we determine the profit threshold for an independent manufacturer in a three‐tier system to become a CM in a four‐tier system and vice versa.     

Information is Power: Public Disclosure of Information in the Planning Decision-Making Process

The legitimacy and effectiveness of community engagement in planning lies in the extent to which the public can access the information required for informed decision-making. The control of ‘commercially sensitive material’ by local authorities acting as gatekeepers is a therefore a challenging area of information management within the planning application process. Through the analysis of key cases in England, this paper identifies that regulations do provide for ‘commercially sensitive material’ to be released to communities in many cases, but there is a need to achieve better transparency for communities about what information should be available about a development proposal.     

Supply Chain Contract Design: Impact of Bounded Rationality and Individual Heterogeneity

In this article, we model various forms of non‐optimizing behavior in a newsvendor setting, including biases such as recency, reinforcement, demand chasing, and anchoring, as well as unsystematic decision errors. We assume that a newsvendor may evaluate decisions by examining both past outcomes and future expected payoffs. Our model is motivated by laboratory observations under several types of supply chain contracts. Ordering decisions are found to follow multi‐modal distributions that are dependent on contract structures and incentives. We differ from previous research by using statistics to determine which behavioral factors are applicable to each decision maker. A great deal of heterogeneity was discovered, indicating the importance of calibrating a contract to the individual. Our analysis also shows that the profit performance and the effectiveness of co‐ordinating contracts can be affected by non‐optimizing behaviors significantly. We conclude that, in addition to the aggregate order quantities, the decision distributions should be considered in designing contracts.     

Willingness to Pay for Shifting Inventory Risk: The Role of Contractual Form

In order to reduce their inventory risk, firms can attempt to contract with their suppliers for shorter supply lead‐times, with their buyers for longer demand lead‐times, or both. We designed a controlled laboratory experiment to study contracts that shift a focal firm's inventory risk to its supply chain partners and address two questions. First, is it more effective if the cost of shifting inventory risk is framed as a fixed fee or in per‐unit cost terms? We find that, generally, our participants are willing to pay more to avoid supply–demand mismatches than the expected costs from such mismatches. This tendency to overpay is mitigated under fixed fee schemes. Second, does it matter whether the option to reduce inventory risk is the outcome of either increased responsiveness from the upstream supplier or advanced demand information from the downstream buyer? Our results suggest that this difference, when only a matter of framing, has no significant effect on willingness‐to‐pay.     

信息不对称下零售商自有品牌引入问题研究

零售商引入自有品牌(store brand)已成为商业活动中的常见行为,已有研究表明在信息对称情况下,自有品牌的引入对零售商有利,而对制造商不利.针对信息不对称且零售商可以引入自有品牌的情况,构建制造商和零售商组成的供应链博弈模型,分析在零售商拥有市场信息优势的情形下,零售商引入自有品牌对其订购策略的影响.研究表明:和信息对称情况不同,制造商品牌(national brand)的订购量依赖于两种品牌生产成本之间的关系,并有可能随着自有品牌的引入而增加;此外,通过比较引入自有品牌前后制造商和零售商的相对利润变化,发现在一定的情形下,零售商可以通过共享或不共享市场信息使双方达到"共赢"状态.     

核安保事件应急决策的情景库构建与情景匹配研究

纵观国际社会形势,核扩散风险、核恐怖主义威胁对全球核电发展带来诸多挑战,加强核安保事件应急决策研究至关重要。根据突发事件的情景—应对的相关理论,文章从内因、外因以及应急决策三个维度对核安保事件进行情景切分和关键因素提取,提出了核安保事件情景库的结构和构建过程,并提出了核安保事件案例库索引和基于最近相邻法的核安保事件情景相似度计算方法对核安保事件与情景库进行情景匹配。文章运用的情景库和情景匹配方法可以简练、准确地表达核安保事件应急决策的信息和实现快速的情景匹配,可为核安保事件的应急决策提供重要的支持。     

对于毛泽东民主思想误区几个问题的商榷

郭德宏教授《毛泽东民主思想的误区》说毛泽东《新民主主义论》"只要科学,不要民主",这不是实事求是的。毛泽东认为"大众的"即是"民主的",这并无过错。民主集中制作为共产党的组织原则,无论从理论还是实践上都是不能否定的。把"由民作主"与"为民作主"对立起来,否定"为民作主",这是没有道理的。     

Complex challenges should be approached by a multitude of theories and models

The ongoing pandemic may be regarded as a wicked problem. Therefore, it should be analyzed by a multitude of theories and models. Approaching the complex set of challenges posed to individuals and society by singular methods, can lead to suboptimal decisions. Good decisions must take into account the large set of uncertainties we are facing, by using well established procedures, as for example health technology assessment (HTA) and a nuanced ethical framework.     

Investor preferences for positive social externalities and state-owned enterprises’ facilitated access to capital

State-ownership of commercial companies exists around the world, and it is important to understand its effect on financing and investment decisions. Empirically, firms that are partially state-owned (SOE) usually profit from easier access to capital. We propose a novel explanation for this: investors’ social preferences can affect capital allocation if SOEs are perceived as socially beneficial. In support of this we found that people attribute social benefits more to SOEs than to private firms, and their propensity to invest depends on this attitude. Further, in an incentivized modified stochastic public goods game, participants invested in risky options with positive externalities even when the aggregate of private return and externality was lower than the return of an investment option with only private returns. For the case of the EU, we discuss alternative explanations such as state guarantees and political lending in the light of regulations of state aid. We conclude that even if these regulations prohibit direct or indirect state aid for SOEs, state-ownership can affect capital allocation through investors’ social preferences.