理解资本主义国家:杰索普的方法、框架和范畴

作为新马克思主义国家理论的集大成者,杰索普为我们提供了关于当代资本主义国家的一种综合性研究范式和理论分析。通过生态系统与经济统治、结构耦合与策略国家、调节方式与治理模式、时空定位与尺度秩序等四个方面的分析,可以概述杰索普国家理论的方法、框架和范畴。杰索普以问题为导向、结合"前学科"与"后学科"方法的国家理论,对全球化时代的国家研究具有重大的启示与借鉴意义。     

中国A股市场价值成长效应的边际条件随机占优分析

利用边际条件随机占优(MCSD)方法对中国A股市场进行了价值成长效应的检验,选取2000～2007年申银万国全市场A股股价指数日收益率作为市场核心组合的基准,分别选取市盈率和市净率指数作为价值/成长型股票的划分指标,将核心组合划分为互斥的子组合.运用MCSD两两比较子组合,发现依据E/P指标划分的价值型股票占优于成长型股票,市场组合存在显著的价值成长效应,且该效应仅在下降市场中显著;而依据B/P指标划分的成长型股票占优于价值型股票,且仅在2005年之后的上升市场中显著.研究结果表明,上市公司财务特征可以部分地作为投资者考察股票收益的一个思路,在不同的市场条件下,投资者应根据不同的财务指标进行投资判断.     

Transform orders and stochastic monotonicity of statistical functionals

In some inferential statistical methods, such as tests and confidence intervals, it is important to describe the stochastic behavior of statistical functionals, aside from their large sample properties. We study such a behavior in terms of the usual stochastic order. For this purpose, we introduce a generalized family of stochastic orders, which is referred to as transform orders, showing that it provides a flexible framework for deriving stochastic monotonicity results. Given that our general definition makes it possible to obtain some well known ordering relations as particular cases, we can easily apply our method to different families of functionals. These include some prominent inequality measures, such as the generalized entropy, the Gini index, and its generalizations. We also illustrate the applicability of our approach by determining the least favorable distribution, and the behavior of some bootstrap statistics, in some goodness-of-fit testing procedures.     

Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World

We study a coordination game with randomly changing payoffs and small frictions in changing actions. Using only backwards induction, we find that players must coordinate on the risk‐dominant equilibrium. More precisely, a continuum of fully rational players are randomly matched to play a symmetric 2×2 game. The payoff matrix changes according to a random walk. Players observe these payoffs and the population distribution of actions as they evolve. The game has frictions: opportunities to change strategies arrive from independent random processes, so that the players are locked into their actions for some time. As the frictions disappear, each player ignores what the others are doing and switches at her first opportunity to the risk‐dominant action. History dependence emerges in some cases when frictions remain positive.