现象学视阈的时间——海德格尔对生存时间的诠释

时间问题是一个重要的哲学问题,时间与世界和人同在.然而在传统物理时间现中,时间只是作为一个计量之数,和空间、运动联系密切,而时间的优先地位和本源意义却被遮蔽了.海德格尔对物理时间观进行了批判,揭示了时间和时间性问题,以全新的视角透视了时间,突出了时间的生存论意义,在现象学的视阈内,时间进入澄明之境.     

马克思人学现象学方法探析

人学是马克思思想的重要组成部分。马克思正是在批判地吸取了黑格尔精神现象学方法的基础上,才实现了哲学的革命变革,从而建构起人学现象学理论。马克思人学现象学方法是对"面向事情本身"现象学方法的继承和超越。马克思人学现象学方法的当代意蕴在科学原则上体现为按照事物的本来面目及其产生情况来理解事物,在价值原则上体现为追求每个人自由全面发展与社会发展的和谐一致。     

人是超越的未知数——当“超越”与现象学邂逅的时候

形而上学的超越就是关于存在者的本质之维和实存之维的追问;现象学以“回到事情本身”的姿态为自身开辟道路。现象学视域中的“超越”有这些取向：只有进行着的体验和其所构成者才能被视为真实的东西,由此可以回溯到原初的奠基者;“人”基于本己的有限性和可能性而作出本真的决断;就趋向于神圣物的人而言,他是超越自身和所有其他生物的存在者;其超越意味着对最高价值的仰承;人是那进行着超越活动的未知数。     

Merleau-Ponty and Nagarjuna – Ethics Within the Self of the No-Self

This essay explores the concept of the self in the philosophies of Nagarjuna and Merleau-Ponty by examining how it is that, according to them, the self is empty and only conventionally real rather than intrinsically so. By analyzing the similarities between their philosophies, the essay aims to shed light on new ways of understanding perception, ethics, and our relationships with others. It will include an analysis of the no-self and the emptiness of entities, as well as an analysis of Merleau-Ponty's writings and philosophy to see how it is that, according to him, in order to better understand ourselves, we must understand the reality of our intersubjectivity and intertwining with the world. It will clearly be shown that Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology and the Madhyamikan school of thought coincide and offer powerful moral philosophies, while seeing the world as being completely separate from the self, distorts both our notions of ourselves and the world we are interconnected with. Virtue must be sought in samsara (perpetually being born into the world) and sunyata (emptiness that is itself empty of inherent existence), for samsara and nirvana (the end of karma) are one. [Correction added on 03 April 2023, after the first online publication: First two sentences of the Abstract have been modified.]     

Questioning Consilience and Autonomy in Self-Determination Theory: A Critique and Hermeneutic-Phenomenological Alternative

This paper offers a theoretical analysis of Self-Determination Theory (SDT) and its claims regarding human autonomy. Self-determination theorists have advanced a form of self-regulated, engaged behavior (i.e., autonomy), founded upon on a consilient account of human motivation that assumes multiple, hierarchical levels of organization and causation (e.g., biological, psychological, and social). Autonomy, from this perspective, is taken to emerge from underlying biological mechanisms, but also able to exert its own causal effects in the world as a unique psychological phenomenon. We contend that in theorizing this way, self-determination theorists have invoked a mixed discourse of mechanism and autonomy that leaves important questions unanswered, perhaps most importantly those concerning how autonomy as a kind of volition can fit coherently in the mechanistic account of world that they advocate. We then offer an alternative perspective based upon the work of various hermeneutic-phenomenological thinkers in philosophy and psychology. This alternative perspective conceptualizes human phenomena such as autonomy and motivation in agentic terms, emphasizing meaningful participation in possibility-laden contexts of everyday practices.     

“拼凑”记忆:作为现象的电影身体

梳理电影理论的发展脉络，在对个体记忆/集体记忆的关系探讨中，“身体”立场在其中发挥的微妙平衡作用值得重视:摄影机械的再现视角无法回避记忆书写过程中的“主观过滤”，而“身体”的影像在历史记忆中对完整经验的保存具有重要潜能，即以影像身体的即时性、片段性的局部经验保持对世界完整性的暗示。从现象学立场出发，论述电影中的身体如何作为“具体经验”完成对作为“完整经验”的记忆“任意”却“丰富”的拼凑，即身体如何“重拾”记忆的“真实”。“身体”作为视角看待记忆的再现，需要重新思考记忆再现时对时间的“连续性”要求。记忆从来都不是与现在割裂的、被想象在银幕上的他者，而是与当下紧密相关的过去，需要注重对“此刻”身体感知经验的表述。同时，电影中的空间并非所叙记忆事件的背景，而是身体记忆所生成的空间，且空间中的身体往往承担着“传感器”的作用。     

《黄帝内经》“情-志”的现象学分析

基于《内经》、道家、海德格尔生存现象学三者之间的密切关系,融合海德格尔生存现象学理论与本土现象学资源对《内经》“情-志”予以分析阐发。《内经》、道家的“情”“志”分别对等于海德格尔“遮蔽”“去蔽”状态的情绪。就情、志为一而言,情志是生命真实活动内隐与外显状态的统一;就情、志为二而言,《内经》、道家之“情”处于本原性地位,是“志”的上位概念;“志”源于“情”、属于“情”,是“情”的下位概念。那种将“情”置于“志”范畴之下,而以“志”作为中医心理学重要概念的观点值得商榷。