排序方式: 共有65条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
61.
Candace M. Miller Maxton Tsoka Kathryn Reichert 《Development policy review : the journal of the Overseas Development Institute》2010,28(4):481-502
Governments target transfers so that limited resources reach impoverished households; targeting errors therefore indicate inefficiency in resource use and inability to reach the poorest households. This article examines the Malawi Social Cash Transfer Scheme (SCTS), using mixed methods and multiple data sources, including examination of underlying assumptions, the operationalisation of key concepts, questions of implementation, and errors of inclusion and exclusion. Despite serious challenges, the scheme's error rates are within the range of global averages. Its impressive impacts provide strong motivation for improving the targeting process before it is scaled up to the national level. 相似文献
62.
程露悬 《广州大学学报(社会科学版)》2001,(10)
经过十几年的发展,国内度假旅游行业已逐渐走向成熟,但目前许多度假地酒店盲目建设,数量过大、档次太高,导致大量客房空置,资源浪费严重。本文在分析国内度假地的世界竞争能力后提出,国内游客是我国度假区的主要目标市场,因此在进行度假区酒店的开发和建设时,应针对国内旅游市场的消费需求,做好酒店的建设和开发工作。 相似文献
63.
正The former National Population and Family Planning Commission implemented the United Nations Development Programme(UNDP)regional project'Safe mobility and HIV Prevention in northern China'(the Project)in 2005-2011.This article summaries the achievements of the project and provides reference on HIV prevention intervention targeting 相似文献
64.
互联网平台向用户开放社交账号登录,在方便用户登录的同时,可通过共享用户信息提升广告定向能力。本文通过构建博弈模型,在考虑用户隐私风险感知时,研究社交账号登录对平台、广告主和用户三方的影响以及平台开放社交账号登录的决策选择。研究结果表明,因用户隐私风险感知的存在,平台不一定会开放社交账号登录。当隐私敏感用户占比较高时,若社交账号登录为平台带来定向能力提升值较高,开放社交账号登录反而会降低平台收益。此外,研究还发现,若平台开放社交账号登录,不同隐私风险感知的用户占比及平台定向能力提升值都将影响平台的广告定向能力及社交账号登录的引流效果。 相似文献
65.
Katharina Müller 《International Journal of Social Welfare》2009,18(2):163-172
Bolivia is the only Latin American country to feature a universal old-age pension scheme. Though strikingly modest, originating at US$248 per annum, this benefit runs counter to the prevailing targeting paradigm. Ten years after the scheme's controversial start in South America's poorest country, this article is the first to focus on the interesting political economy of the universal benefit. The introduction of the benefit was not motivated by social policy considerations but by the desire to privatise state-owned enterprises and pensions. Conceived by neoliberal structural reformers, the benefit was challenged first by the international financial institutions and then by Bolivia's developmentalist government, before the latter found a way to reconcile its re-nationalisation project with a re-branded universal pension. 相似文献