A股上市公司股权激励效果的实证检验

我国上市公司启动股权激励已有5年,为了客观评价A股上市公司股权激励效果,文章运用期望理论、公平理论分析并提出研究假设,通过合理筛选样本公司,构建以2006中期至2010年中期为时间跨度的面板数据,最后借助基于科布-道格拉斯生产函数的静态面板和动态面板模型进行实证分析,实证结果显示我国上市公司2006年以来实施的股权激励计划对公司长期产出并没有显著影响,这一结论将对正确认识上市公司股权激励效用及完善其机制有着重要的参考价值。     

论复变函数教学中的逻辑性

对在复变函数教学中如何遵循严密的逻辑关系进行了初步探讨,以便使学生能系统、准确地理解复数以及复变函数的概念和知识体系。根据现代数学的泛函分析理论,把复数的概念等效为一个有序的实数对,并建立起包括复数相等、复数的和、积的"公理"体系,在此基础上重新研究和认识复数。从复变函数的幂级数理论出发,给出指数函数的定义并推导出计算公式,再由指数函数,结合有关公式和概念来引入和理解各种常见的初等复变函数。     

相对损失函数下的保费估计

在经典的信度理论中,几乎所有的保费模型都建立在纯保费基础上。但是在实际保险业务中,要求收取的保费带有安全负荷。文章在相对损失函数下,建立了保费估计模型,得到了该模型下风险保费的6个估计,即聚合保费、聚合估计、Bayes保费、Bayes估计、信度保费和信度估计,并验证了这些估计的相合性。文章还将这6个估计分为两类,用例子比较了这两类估计的异同。     

一类多元响应降维子空间的估计及其应用

在高维空间中进行统计建模通常会碰到"维数祸根"问题,解决办法之一是降维,充分降维是一种有效的降维方法。针对多维响应降维子空间提出一类矩生成函数估计方法及其改进估计量,并给出该类方法估计量的大样本性质:相合性、渐近正态性。通过随机模拟与实例分析,表明改进估计量估计效果有较大幅度提高。     

Monte Carlo EM梯度法在MATLAB中的实现

文章使用空间广义线性混合模型为连续空间非正态变量建模,在MATLAB中实现模型参数估计的MCEMG算法,即结合Monte Carlo样本的EM梯度法,求解参数的极大似然估计及采样点随机效应的最小均方误估计。在GS+中进行随机效应的普通克里格插值,并最终对非采样点响应变量进行预测。模拟仿真结果显示该方法参数估计与真实值较接近,响应变量预测结果能反应真实数据总体分布情况。     

固定效应部分线性变系数面板模型的快速有效估计

本文将最小二乘支持向量机(LSSVM) 和二次推断函数法(QIF) 相结合，为个体内具有相关结构的固定效应部分线性变系数面板模型提供了一种新的快速估计方法；在一定的正则条件下，论证了参数估计量的渐近正态性和非参数估计量的收敛速度；采用Monte Carlo模拟考察了估计方法在有限样本下的表现并将估计技术应用于现实数据分析。该方法不仅保证了估计的有效性和统计推断力，而且程序运行速度得到较大幅度提升。     

红薯的多种美味吃法

正在春季,饮食要注意省酸增甘,多吃些性温味甘的红薯是一个不错的选择。平时我们在家吃红薯,最多的无非就是煮熟或者烤熟,其实红薯还有很多种美味吃法。豆沙红薯饼原料:红薯150克,糯米粉150克,豆沙适量。做法:1.将红薯洗净,保留水分,用保鲜膜包好,放入微波炉高火烤8分钟至软烂;2.将红薯碾成泥,如果太干,可以加少量牛奶混合均匀;3.加入适量糯米粉,和成光滑面团;4.将面团分成若干份,放入豆沙馅,团成圆球,压扁;     

三维轮胎与路面相互作用研究

基于轮胎和路面的接触研究现状,大多研究者都将轮胎与路面接触形式简化为点接触或者线接触形式。在重构三维路面谱的基础上,构建了三维轮胎和路面接触模型,为确定轮胎的接地面积,利用自主研发的压力作动器系统,在多次试验的基础上,得到标准载荷,标准胎压下的轮胎接地面积。然后,把轮胎与路面的面接触模型看作有限多个点接触的模型,每个点的刚度相同,分别采用重构三维路面谱的多点接触和任一剖面二维曲线对路面随机激励下的车路耦合系统进行了计算。最后,将点接触模型和三维面接触模型在随机路面和减速带路面工况下的垂向动力学响应进行仿真对比分析,发现所建立模型的车体响应要比点接触模型的响应小。     

基于多因子选股的半监督核聚类算法改进研究

研究了一种附有引力影响因子的半监督K-means核函数聚类算法,并将该方法应用于多因子选股模型中。研究表明,相比传统的聚类模型,改进的模型具有较强的泛化能力,模型在处理样本线性不可分、样本分布非球状簇等问题上具有明显的优势,能选出较优的股票组合。     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.