一种确定权重的新方法

本文介绍利用客观信息和主观偏好信息确定权重的一种新方法。这一方法既能从客观上反映各因素的权重,又能充分体现出决策者对各因素权重的认识     

商业银行操作风险不容小视

在2004年6月颁布的巴塞尔新资本协议正式文件中,操作风险被定义为“由于内部程序、人员、系统的不完善或失误,或外部事件造成损失的风险”,包括法律风险,但不包括策略风险、信誉风险和体制风险。     

中国经济波动的解释:投资冲击与全要素生产率冲击

本文利用产出缺口、投资缺口和全要素生产率缺口度量了宏观经济、投资与全要素生产率的波动,并简要分析了1978～2002年间我国宏观经济、投资与全要素生产率的波动特点,然后利用脉冲响应函数、线性回归和格兰杰因果检验分析了经济波动对于投资波动和全要素生产率波动冲击的动态反应,投资波动和全要素生产率波动冲击对经济波动的影响力度和三者之间的因果关系。分析表明,(1)1978～2002年间我国的产出缺口、投资缺口和全要素生产率缺口都出现了波动水平正负交替的古典周期情形,其中投资缺口波动更为剧烈且变化步调相对超前;(2)投资波动冲击和全要素生产率波动冲击对于解释我国宏观经济波动成因都非常重要,其中全要素生产率波动对宏观经济波动的影响力度更大但时滞较长。     

基于AHP/DEA的自然灾害损失评估模型初探

层次分析法(AHP)以及数据包络分析(DEA)的结合使用,可以避免人为设定AHP判断矩阵的主观性和随意性,以及DEA决策单元不能在同一尺度上全排序的缺点.本文探索性地把AHP和DEA模型结合用于自然灾害损失评估中,阐述了基本原理和算法,并且结合实例给出灾害损失排序.     

网上一口价拍卖顾客投标策略研究

网上一口价拍卖作为网上拍卖的创新模式,打破了固定拍卖结束时间的局限因而得到广泛应用.网上一口价拍卖有3种比较典型的方式,投标者的决策决定了拍卖的最终结果,也是拍卖理论研究的重点之一.在独立的私有估价模型下,分别对这3种拍卖方式的顾客投标策略进行研究,结果表明,在固定一口价中,估价高于一口价的投标者的最优选择是及早选择一口价;在临时一口价中存在一个均衡点,使估价高于此均衡点的投标者及早选择一口价是最优的;持久一口价中存在一个门限函数和一个均衡点,使估价满足门限函数或高于均衡点的投标者及早选择一口价是最优的.     

国债利率期限结构拟合模型及在金融中的应用

众所周知,利率是经济和金融领域的一个核心变量,它实质上是资金的价格,反映了资金的供求关系。随着中国国债市场的发展和利率市场化的改革深入,研究国债的利率期限结构,为资金市场提供有普遍参考价值的利率,从而为市场上的各种利率产品进行定价以及进行利率市场风险管理是我国的重要研究课题,而国债利率期限结构的估计又是研究国债利率期限结构的根本,也就是如何从国债的市场价格信息中的构造出利率和到期期限的关系。     

美国次级债市场的运作机制及其危机启示

美国次级债危机目前是全球瞩目的焦点。次级债危机对我国影响不大,但却给处于经济高位增长、资产价格过快攀升、流动性过剩的中国敲响了警钟。本文通过分析美国次级债市场的运作机制和流程,剖析了次级债危机产生的根源及其给我国带来的诸多启示。     

经理股票期权与受限制股票报酬的效果分析

股票期权激励和受限制性股票报酬是目前世界上常用的长期激励报酬形式,而企业经理却认为传统上使用的B-S公式对股票期权的估价"太高",相对于"价值相同"的受限制性股票,经理更愿意接受受限制性股票.我们通过经理获得这两种报酬的效用模型的比较,分析了风险厌恶型经理对股权报酬以及受限制性股票的估价,并进一步估计了企业向经理提供股权报酬的绝对损失.从而解释为什么经理股票期权的激励效果不佳的问题.     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

半参数空间ZISF的估计、分类与蒙特卡罗模拟

零无效率随机前沿模型（ZISF）包含随机前沿模型和回归模型,两模型各有一定的发生概率,适用于技术无效生产单元和技术有效生产单元同时存在的情形。本文在ZISF的生产函数中引入空间效应和非参函数,并假设回归模型的发生概率为非参函数,构建了半参数空间ZISF。该模型可有效避免忽略空间效应导致的有偏且不一致估计量,也避免了线性模型的拟合不足。本文对非参函数采用B样条逼近,使用极大似然方法和JLMS法分别估计参数和技术效率。蒙特卡罗结果表明：①本文方法的估计精度和分类精度均较高。随着样本容量的增大,精度增加。②忽略空间效应或者非参数效应,估计精度和分类精度降低,文中模型有存在必要性。③忽略发生概率的非参数效应会严重降低估计和分类精度,远大于忽略生产函数的非参数效应的影响。