Is There a Double‐Negative Effect? Gender and Ethnic Wage Differentials in Italy

This paper investigates the gender and ethnic wage differentials for female migrants in Italy by applying the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition, with and without Heckman correction, to account for self‐selection into the labour market. The gender wage gap is nearly 15 per cent, more than 60 per cent of which is unexplained by observable differences. The ethnic wage gap is much larger (39 per cent), but endowments explain 53 per cent of the gap. We also estimate the double‐negative effect of being both female and a migrant. A female migrant earns 42 per cent less than an Italian male; the unexplained component is estimated to be 53–65 per cent. Results are robust to different specifications.     

New Firms as Employers: The Wage Penalty for Voluntary and Involuntary Job Switchers

According to previous research, new firms pay lower wages. However, previous studies have been unable to control for the possibility that the opportunity costs of accepting employment at new firms may differ across individuals. In this paper, we investigate whether a wage penalty for being employed at a new firm exists if we take the individual employee's experience and status in the labour market into consideration. We focus on individuals who decide to switch jobs and use matched employee–employer data about all firms and employees in Sweden for the period 1998–2010. Our results show that the share of job transitions into lower wages are higher for those who switch to new firms compared with incumbent firms (40 per cent and 31 per cent, respectively). Our endogenous wage equation estimates indicate that being an involuntary job switcher has an equally negative effect on wages at both new and incumbent firms. However, the positive effect of education on wages is more pronounced for job switchers selecting into incumbent firms.     

What Survey Data Reveal about Price and Wage Rigidity in Portugal

This paper exploits the information collected from a survey conducted on a sample of Portuguese firms to study the patterns of firms’ price and wage adjustments and the extent of nominal price and wage rigidities. The evidence shows that the frequency of price changes varies substantially across sectors and depends on the intensity of competition, the share of labor costs and firms’ price reviewing behavior. The results also suggest that the constraint imposed by the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity is less important in firms where the fraction of permanent and high‐skilled workers is lower and the share of flexible pay components is higher.     

LABOR‐MARKET HETEROGENEITY,AGGREGATION, AND POLICY (IN)VARIANCE OF DSGE MODEL PARAMETERS

Data from a heterogeneous‐agents economy with incomplete asset markets and indivisible labor supply are simulated under various fiscal policy regimes and an approximating representative‐agent model is estimated. Preference and technology parameter estimates of the representative‐agent model are not invariant to policy changes and the bias in the representative‐agent model’s policy predictions is large compared to predictive intervals that reflect parameter uncertainty. Since it is not always feasible to account for heterogeneity explicitly, it is important to recognize the possibility that the parameters of a highly aggregated model may not be invariant with respect to policy changes.     

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND CULTURAL TRANSMISSION: THEORY AND APPLICATION TO EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT

This paper emphasizes the two‐way causality between the provision of unemployment insurance and the cultural transmission of civicness. The returns to being uncivic are increasing in the generosity of unemployment insurance; but this generosity is decreasing in the number of uncivic individuals. In this context, I determine the evolution of preferences across generations and show that cultural heterogeneity is sustained over the long‐run. The dynamics of cultural transmission can generate a long lag between the introduction of unemployment insurance and an increase in people's willingness to live off government‐provided benefits. Hence, it offers an explanation to the ‘European unemployment puzzle’ due to the coexistence of generous unemployment insurance and low unemployment in the 1950s and 1960s.     

Can the Augmented Solow Model with Migration Explain the Italian Internal Brain Drain?

We extend the Dolado et al. (1994) model to both inflows and outflows of migrants and assume that they have a human capital endowment that contributes to increase/decrease the stock of human capital in the receiving/sending economy. We derive the conditional convergence equation in which the impact of migration flows on the growth rate is disentangled in a pure quantity effect and in a quality or composition effect of immigration and emigration rates that accounts for the relative human capital endowment of migrants with respect to resident population. Next, we test the model with Italian regional data for the 1970–2005 time period. We find that the model provides a good explanation of the Italian experience. The quantity effect is negative for the immigration rate and positive for the emigration rate, whereas the composition effect is positive for immigration and negative for emigration. Finally, we separate the centre‐north from the south and find that the composition effect of emigration is stronger for the latter. We interpret these results as a clear evidence of a brain drain from the Mezzogiorno to the centre‐northern regions.     

Managerial Delegation under Alternative Unionization Structures

This paper studies the effects of managerial delegation in a duopoly game under alternative unionization structures. Introducing managerial delegation in a framework with centralized unionization leads to incentives for sales, lower profits and higher consumer surplus as well as overall welfare. In contrast, delegating output decisions to managers in the presence of decentralized unionization produces opposite results unless unions are strongly employment‐oriented. Moreover, managerial delegation makes unionization structure neutral in relation to consumer surplus and overall efficiency. Finally, the timing of moves in the three‐stage game proves to be important for obtaining the above qualitative results under decentralized unionization.     

International and National R&D Networks in Unionized Oligopoly

We study the endogenous formation of R&D networks between two domestic and one foreign firms in a unionized oligopoly. We find that the equilibrium networks are sensitive to the extent of knowledge spillovers between networked firms. If spillovers are sufficiently low, the complete network will arise in equilibrium; however, if spillovers are sufficiently high, the foreign partial network that includes a domestic and a foreign firm will arise. Moreover, for intermediate spillovers, no equilibrium network emerges. These results have implications for aggregate outcomes: equilibrium networks are not necessarily optimal in terms of aggregate effective R&D and aggregate firm profits.     

Immigration,Growth, and Unemployment: Panel VAR Evidence from OECD Countries

This paper examines empirically the interaction between immigration and host country economic conditions. We employ panel vector autoregression (VAR) techniques for a large annual data set on 22 OECD countries over the period 1987–2009. The VAR approach addresses the endogeneity problem by allowing for endogenous interactions between the variables in the system. Our results provide evidence of migration contribution to host economic prosperity (positive impact on GDP per capita and negative impact on aggregate unemployment, native‐ and foreign‐born unemployment rates). We also find that migration is influenced by host economic conditions (migration responds positively to host GDP per capita and negatively to host total unemployment rate).