城市路网运输性能退化成本评估模型

路网的运行受到诸多因素的影响而使得路网运输性能发生退化,分析了路网运输性能退化的影响因素和作用机理,给出了路网运输性能退化及退化的极端情况路段失效的成本分析过程框架.基于BPR路阻函数和用户均衡分配理论分析路网运输性能退化的成本函数,建立了拥堵情况下城市路网路段失效的成本评估模型.最后,通过实例分析了路网运输性能退化对出行成本影响的变化规律,给出了路网运输性能退化的极端情况路段失效成本评估的具体过程,研究表明路网运输性能退化对出行成本具有很大的影响,二者成显著的正相关关系.     

规制机制设计理论的新发展

论述了在现代市场经济环境下,怎样规制成为规制研究的重要领域;指出机制设计理论为政府怎样规制提供了思路,规制机制设计理论在经历了完全信息假定后,在不对称信息视角下获得长足发展。     

Acquisition and Disclosure of Operational Information*

We study a firm's strategy for acquisition and disclosure of operational information by establishing linkages among information quality, managerial self‐interest, and production planning. We develop a multistage model in which a manager of a publicly traded firm first receives private information about the product demand and then uses it to make production and disclosure decisions. We consider two prevalent disclosure models employed in the accounting literature: all‐or‐nothing and cheap‐talk models. In the all‐or‐nothing model, it is assumed that any disclosure must be truthful, but the manager can strategically withhold information. We show that the manager commits to acquire the value‐added operational information if (i) the managerial self‐interest in the interim share price is low or (ii) the managerial self‐interest in the interim share price is high, but the fixed disclosure cost is either sufficiently low or sufficiently high. We demonstrate that the firm is better off if the production level is observable to the financial market because multidimensional signaling reduces costs. In the cheap‐talk model, we assume that the manager's disclosure may not be truthful. We show that the manager's incentive to acquire value‐added operational information increases along with the penalty cost for misleading investors. Therefore, a high penalty cost for misleading investors can encourage the manager to obtain more precise information, which in turn improves the firm's cash flow.     

Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach

We study mechanism design in dynamic quasilinear environments where private information arrives over time and decisions are made over multiple periods. We make three contributions. First, we provide a necessary condition for incentive compatibility that takes the form of an envelope formula for the derivative of an agent's equilibrium expected payoff with respect to his current type. It combines the familiar marginal effect of types on payoffs with novel marginal effects of the current type on future ones that are captured by “impulse response functions.” The formula yields an expression for dynamic virtual surplus that is instrumental to the design of optimal mechanisms and to the study of distortions under such mechanisms. Second, we characterize the transfers that satisfy the envelope formula and establish a sense in which they are pinned down by the allocation rule (“revenue equivalence”). Third, we characterize perfect Bayesian equilibrium‐implementable allocation rules in Markov environments, which yields tractable sufficient conditions that facilitate novel applications. We illustrate the results by applying them to the design of optimal mechanisms for the sale of experience goods (“bandit auctions”).     

基于网络的“链”式教学模式探索与实践

针对软件平台类课程的特点,阐述了实施＂链＂式教学模式的目标及改革的必要性,给出了该模式的组成要素及具体的实施方案。并以J2EE平台等三门同类课程为试点,采取＂即讲即练＂的教学方法,提高了学生的软件工程能力和实践动手能力,是一种以工程能力为核心的教学理念。     

少数民族高等教育招生政策的法律分析 ———基于不当联结禁止原则的视角

不当联结禁止原则是指行政主体在做出行政行为时,应只考虑合乎事物本质的要素,不可将与法律目的不相干的法律上或事实上的要素纳入考虑。少数民族高等教育招生政策是对具有少数民族身份的学生实施的特殊招生政策,鉴于教育中考虑民族因素的合理性和无恶意性,这一政策虽然在招生中考虑了除智力因素外的民族因素,但并不违反不当联结禁止原则。     

Asymmetric Forecast Information and the Value of Demand Observation in Repeated Procurement

In many supply chain relationships that continue over multiple periods, information about the hidden properties of the supply chain partners can be revealed throughout the course of the relationship. This article examines how the availability of such information affects the contracting scheme between a supplier and his manufacturer in a relationship that persists over several selling seasons. At the beginning of the first selling season, the manufacturer observes private information about the demand distribution, whereas the supplier who is less familiar with the market is endowed only with a prior belief about the market condition. When the supplier cannot observe the demand realization during the first selling period, she offers a contract that induces the manufacturer to reveal the market condition in the first selling season. However, the opportunity for the supplier to observe demand realization can result in the supplier offering the manufacturer a simple contract that does not induce the manufacturer to reveal his private information during the first selling season. In the latter case, the supplier observes the demand realization and designs the second period contract based on this information. We show that when the supplier chooses to offer such a contract, the manufacturer becomes worse‐off, and it has an ambiguous effect on the performance of the supply chain.     

谈谈大学新生辅导员工作的几个重要环节

新生辅导员工作是素质教育的重要组成部分,它对年级学风形成有着直接的影响。要做好辅导员工作,就应提高对工作的认识,明确工作职责;树立和增强责任意识、服务意识、全局意识;坚持十条原则,不失时机地做好新生入学教育,当好学生成材的指路人,使学生尽快适应大学生活。     

Windows环境下动态链接库的开发与调用

从动态链接库的基本概念出发 ,全面论述了用户动态链接库的设计与实现方法 ,指出了编制用户动态链接库程序的注意事项 ,详细说明了动态链接库的调用规则 ,并给出了参考示例