Weakly implementable social choice rules

Previous investigations have shown that a social choice function which is partially implementable must be characterized by pervasive veto power. This paper investigates how much additional latitude in the design of social choice functions, and how much relief from this vetoers result, can be achieved by examining multi-valued social choice rules and relaxing the requirement of partial implementability to a requirement that we call weak partial implementability. We find that the power structures which characterize partially implementable social choice functions, including the veto properties, also characterize weakly partially implementable social choice rules. The conclusion is that invoking multi-valuedness and implementation of appealing social choice rules in strong Nash equilibria. Our results apparently exhaust the possibilities for implementation in strong Nash equilibrium. If any implementation possibility results are to be achieved, they can apparently come only by weakening the equilibrium requirement.     

思想政治教育的文化本性与文化选择

思想政治教育具有其特殊的文化本性。从教育内容上看 ,思想政治教育是一种特殊的文化传播 ;从教育的主客体属性及其运作过程看 ,它主要是文化原理的运作 ,是一个文化过程 ;从其作为社会统治和控制手段看 ,它是一种人文力。这种文化本性要求思想政治教育必须遵循文化的逻辑 ,进行正确的文化选择。一是要弘扬中国传统文化精华 ,抵御西方文化中的消极因素 ,二是要严格按照教育目的进行文化选择 ,三是要提高教育者的文化素质 ,强化文化选择 ,四是要加强亚文化建设 ,引导受教育者的文化选择。这既有助于实现思想政治教育的目的 ,而且达到了文化价值的展现     

罗默社会公正思想的方法论意义

当代美国著名经济学家和政治哲学家罗默的阶级—剥削对应理论是通过使用了理性选择的个人主义方法论原则中的"合作博弈"理论阐述了其社会公正思想。其独特研究方法的运用,丰富和发展了马克思主义剥削与阶级理论,对于我国现阶段社会公正理论的确立具有一定的借鉴意义。     

Almost Consistent Estimation of Panel Probit Models with “Small” Fixed Effects

We propose four different GMM estimators that allow almost consistent estimation of the structural parameters of panel probit models with fixed effects for the case of small Tand large N. The moments used are derived for each period from a first order approximation of the mean of the dependent variable conditional on explanatory variables and on the fixed effect. The estimators differ w.r.t. the choice of instruments and whether they use trimming to reduce the bias or not. In a Monte Carlo study, we compare these estimators with pooled probit and conditional logit estimators for different data generating processes. The results show that the proposed estimators outperform these competitors in several situations.     

社会化改革后高校后勤运行模式的理性选择

高校后勤社会化改革是一个复杂的系统工程,需经历一个发展的过程.辩证地分析高校后勤现行运行模式的优缺点,探讨社会化改革后高校后勤运行模式选择的基本原则和理性选择的思路,提出高校深化后勤社会化改革的参考模式.     

Partner Choice and the Differential Retreat From Marriage

The contemporary retreat from marriage in the United States has had a differential impact across socioeconomic and racial groups. Here, 1990 marriage rates and propensities for Virginia, North Carolina, and Wisconsin are analyzed regarding (a) the likelihood that persons in different groups ever marry and (b) patterns of partner choice with respect to race and educational level. Marriage remains strong in most race‐education groups but is substantially lower among Blacks and among those with less than 12 years of education. Patterns of partner choice have shifted to show greater symmetry between the educational levels of brides and grooms. Changes have been modest with regard to the level and pattern of interracial (Black‐White) marriage. Marriage is increasingly a union of equals, but a union chosen more by Whites than by Blacks and more by the well educated than by the poorly educated.     

Effects of fixed costs in two-person sequential bargaining

Rubinstein (1982) considered the problem of dividing a given surplus between two players sequentially, and then proposed a model in which the two players alternately make and respond to each other's offers through time. He further characterized the perfect equilibrium outcomes, which depend on the players time preferences and order of moves. Using both equal and unequal bargaining cost conditions and an unlimited number of rounds, two experiments were designed to compare the perfect equilibrium model to alternative models based on norms of fairness. We report analyses of final agreements, first offers, and number of bargaining rounds, which provide limited support to the perfect equilibrium model, and then conclude by recommending a shift in focus from model testing to specification of the conditions favoring one model over another.     

On the difficulty of making social choices

The difficulty of making social choices seems to take on two forms: one that is related to both preferences and the method used in aggregating them and one which is related to the preferences only. In the former type the difficulty has to do with the discrepancies of outcomes resulting from various preference aggregation methods and the computation of winners in elections. Some approaches and results which take their motivation from the computability theory are discussed. The latter institution-free type of difficulty pertains to solution theory of the voting games. We discuss the relationships between various solution concepts, e.g. uncovered set, Banks set, Copeland winners. Finally rough sets are utilized in an effort to measure the difficulty of making social choices.