基于可变强度跳跃-GARCH模型的资产价格跳跃行为分析——以中国上市公司股票市场数据为例

近年来,美国金融危机、欧债危机、地震等突发事件不断冲击着我国金融市场,各类资产价格频繁出现大幅跳动,收益风险短期内急剧扩大。鉴于此,本文构建了门限效应下状态变量依赖自回归强度跳跃-GARCH模型（简称TSD-ARJI-GARCH模型）来探讨股票资产价格随时间平滑波动和大幅度跳跃的双重特征。该模型扩展了现有可变强度跳跃-GARCH模型,克服了片面强调内生或外生因素的局限性,既允许跳跃强度受单个资产异质因素的内生驱动,以刻画跳跃变化的时变性及集聚性,也考虑了外部状态变量影响的门限效应。通过对不同类型中国上市公司股票市场数据的实证分析,验证了该模型对各类上市公司股票资产价格跳跃特征都具有较好的辨别和预测能力,可为动态监管金融资产的跳跃风险提供理论依据。     

Coordinating Production and Marketing with Dynamic Transfer Prices

Decentralized decision making is a fact in the modern business world accompanied by extensive research that looks into its consequences for overall firm profits. We study the interactions of decentralized marketing and operations divisions in a corporation and explore their impact on overall firm profits in the case with and without coordination of the two decentralized units. We assume that the marketing department is responsible for the price that influences the demand (sales), and the operations department is responsible for the production rate. We allow for backlogging over time. We model the interdependence involving marketing and operations decisions as a non‐cooperative differential game, with the two divisions as strategically interacting players. We find that, without coordination, strategic interactions of marketing and production result in inefficiencies that can quantitatively be substantial. Next, we introduce a dynamic transfer pricing scheme as a coordination device and evaluate if it establishes efficient (first best and fully coordinated) outcomes. We show that if production and marketing play a game with pre‐commitment strategies, there exists a dynamic transfer price that efficiently (fully) coordinates decentralized decision making and hence results in Pareto‐efficient company profits. If the two decentralized divisions play a game without pre‐commitment, dynamic transfer prices can partially coordinate decentralized decision making but fail to fully eliminate overall inefficiencies arising from strategic interactions among decentralized divisions.     

两阶段供应链中三种定价方式研究

本文考虑渠道一体化对品牌建设的作用,在一个制造商和两个零售商的两阶段供应链系统中,其中确定性的市场需求与产品的市场零售价格有关,通过分析以下三种定价方式下的最优定价和库存策略下供应链成员和系统的收益,1)商品市场零售价格由零售商各自决定,两零售商和制造商之间存在着竞争活动;2)商品市场零售价格由制造商统一制定;3)市场零售价格、转让价格和系统库存水平按渠道协调的最优原则确定,确定了同一产品品牌内部的市场竞争、定价控制权及转让价格对渠道性能及品牌自身造成的影响,并由此提出了分散决策系统中的一种激励机制.     

PC软件产品竞争性升级的定价研究

通过Hotelling模型对PC软件产品竞争性升级进行了研究,重点分析了网络外部性、转换成本、升级产品质量(或功能)的提高对升级定价及其竞争策略的影响.主要成果包括以下几个方面(1)在消费者静态预期的条件下,网络规模大的厂商总是偏好不兼容,网络规模小的厂商偏好全兼容.(2)分析了影响版本升级价格、竞争性价格和全价的相关因素.(3)解释了转换成本和实施竞争性升级的关系.(4)分析了厂商夺取竞争对手厂商客户的条件以及争夺新客户的竞争策略.对厂商的竞争性升级定价具有重要的理论指导意义.     

基于反向物流的商品定价和退货政策研究

综述了基于反向物流的商品定价和退货政策的最新研究成果。在此基础上,通过建立模型,对基于反向物流的商品定价策略和退货政策进行了进一步的研究,并求出了商品的最优价格和最优退货价格。基于模型,对管理提出了一些建议。最后指出了将来可能的研究方向。     

Sticky Price Models of the Business Cycle: Can the Contract Multiplier Solve the Persistence Problem?

We construct a quantitative equilibrium model with firms setting prices in a staggered fashion and use it to ask whether monetary shocks can generate business cycle fluctuations. These fluctuations include persistent movements in output along with the other defining features of business cycles, like volatile investment and smooth consumption. We assume that prices are exogenously sticky for a short time. Persistent output fluctuations require endogenous price stickiness in the sense that firms choose not to change prices much when they can do so. We find that for a wide range of parameter values, the amount of endogenous stickiness is small. Thus, we find that in a standard quantitative model, staggered price‐setting, alone, does not generate business cycle fluctuations.     

An inventory model with random discount offerings

We consider an inventory model in which a supplier makes deal offers with random discount prices at random points in time. Assuming that discount offerings follow a Poisson process and discount price is a discrete random variable with a known distribution, we propose a continuous-review control policy for the model and derive optimality conditions for the policy parameters. The model is then extended to the case of multiple suppliers that offer discount deals with supplier-specific Poisson processes and discount prices. Numerical examples are presented to demonstrate cost savings due to discount offers.     

不同带宽ISP 的定价博弈与结盟动因分析

不同带宽的网络接入服务商( ISP) 需要有不同的定价策略. 在消费者的单位时间成本不 同情况下,分析了网络接入商的定价博弈. 通过比较静态和动态的纳什均衡价格与收益,得到 了接入服务商的先动优势,也得到了技术进步对宽带接入的有利性. 然后分析了形成价格联盟 后的最优定价,得出了不同带宽的接入服务商之间具有形成价格联盟的激励的结论,并使窄带 接入退出市场. 最后探讨了结成价格联盟以后社会总福利的变化情况,指出这种结盟对于社会 整体来说是无益的.     

金融市场多标度分形现象及与风险管理的关系

已有研究通过对汇率、股票收益率、黄金价格等金融市场实证数据的分析,发现这些数据 具有多标度分形(multifractal) 特征. 通过对中国金融市场的代表数据之一———上海证券交易 所综合股价指数(SSECI) 的研究得出了相似的结论,并且初步提出了运用多标度分形理论所 提供的信息来进行金融风险管理的风险管理思路.     

一种新型的商品最优化定价方法

本文在偏态分布^[5]及收益区间定位分析^[6]的基础上,给出了商品的市场最优定价方法,从而可以方便地计算出商品在市场中的最优销售价及相应的预期利润额;本文同时给出了偏态分布的参数估计方法,这使本文所述最优化定价方法更具实用性。