Exploitation aversion: When financial incentives fail to motivate agents

Studies of the principal-agent relationship find that monetary incentives work in many instances but that they can also backfire. Various mechanisms for this failure have been examined (e.g., intrinsic motivation, image concerns). We posit that an aversion to being exploited, i.e., being used instrumentally for another’s benefit, can also cause incentives to fail. Using an experiment we find that compliance is lower for exploitative principals compared to neutral ones despite using the same contracts. To corroborate our results we show that surveyed “exploitation aversion” mediates this effect. Our results have implications for the design and implementation of incentives within organizations.     

Rent-seeking and competitive preferences

In this experiment, I examine the extent to which competitive social preferences can explain over-bidding in rent-seeking contests. The Human treatment is a standard two-player contest. In the Robot treatment, a single player bids against a computerized player, eliminating potential social preference motives. The results show no difference in bids between treatments at the aggregate level. Further analysis shows evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects between impulsive and reflective subjects. Moreover, impulsive subjects are more likely than reflective subjects to deviate qualitatively from the shape of the theoretical best response function.     

Reconsidering the philanthropic foundation minimum payout policy under a “new normal”

With the increasing salience of foundations in many policy fields, and recent changes in market conditions, policies towards foundations designed decades ago seem outdated. In this article we suggest reassessing foundation payout minimums. To examine the impact of payout rates on grantmaking foundations lifespan and performance under “new normal” economics, we simulate multiple foundations lifecycles using Monte Carlo methods in diverse capital market conditions, with varied investment and payout strategies.We find that while under past market regime perpetuity seems to be a given, under more probable future scenarios, foundations might face increasingly early mortality and endowment depletion, limiting their potential impact. Furthermore, lower payout rates allow for higher lifetime grantmaking, higher mean annual grantmaking, and lower giving volatility. Accordingly, we suggest a tiered payout policy, in line with foundations’ missions and proper financial planning.     

The relationship between conflict events and commodity prices in Sudan

Though recent literature uncovers linkages between commodity prices and conflict, the causal direction of the relationship remains ambiguous. We attempt to contribute to this strand of research by studying the dynamic relationship of commodity prices and the onsets of conflict events in Sudan. Using monthly data ranging from January 2001 through December 2012, we identify a structural breakpoint in the multivariate time series model of prices of the three staple foods (sorghum, millet, and wheat) and conflict measure (number of conflict events) in September of 2011. Applying structural vector autoregression (SVAR) and linear non-Gaussian acyclic model (LiNGAM), we find that wheat price fluctuation is a root cause of conflict events in Sudan. We recommend several policy and programmatic suggestions structured toward production, subsidy, price regulation and support for rural farmers and consumers to stabilize commodity prices.     

Replication: Cheating,loss aversion,and moral attitudes in Vietnam

We use the coin-flip paradigm and a short survey about moral attitudes under three conditions to answer three questions: (i) Do people cheat more when financial incentives are present in comparison with no incentives? (ii) Do they find it more difficult to maintain their ethical standards when they have been given a small amount of money? and (iii) Do moral attitudes predict cheating behavior? Using a sample of Vietnamese college students, we discover that a financial incentive does not matter until people feel that they are facing a loss. In addition, we do not find any evidence that moral attitudes could predict the unethical behavior in our sample. Our findings shed further light on cheating behaviors and loss aversion through an experimental investigation.     

TRADE QUOTAS AND BUYER POWER,WITH AN APPLICATION TO THE E.U. NATURAL GAS MARKET

We consider a market in which domestic buyers negotiate contracts with foreign sellers, and explore how trade quotas can help to increase the buyers' countervailing power. We use the Shapley value to describe bargaining power and the distribution of the trade surplus in such a bilateral oligopoly. By exploiting strategic externalities among the buyers, bilateral trade quotas can improve the buyers' bargaining positions. In contrast, aggregate trade restrictions on all buyers' trade never improve buyer surplus. Minimum quotas on imports from fringe suppliers can benefit nonaffected buyers, as these enjoy positive externalities. We apply these insights to the E.U. market for natural gas and show that the effects of trade quotas on E.U. gas importers' power can be significant.     

PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTION AND PERCEPTION OF FAIRNESS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how demand for redistribution of income depends on self‐interest, insurance motives, and social concerns relating to inequality and efficiency. Our choice environments feature large groups of subjects and real‐world framing, and differ with respect to the source of inequality (earned or arbitrary), the cost of taxation to the decision maker, the dead‐weight loss of taxation, uncertainty about own pretax income, and whether the decision maker is affected by redistribution. We estimate utility weights for the different sources of demand for redistribution, with the potential to inform modeling in macroeconomics and political economy     

EXPLAINING GIFT‐EXCHANGE—THE LIMITS OF GOOD INTENTIONS

This paper explores the limitations of intention‐based social preferences as an explanation of gift‐exchange between a firm and a worker. In a framework with one self‐interested and one reciprocal player, gift‐giving never arises in equilibrium. Instead, any equilibrium in a large class of multistage games must involve mutually unkind behavior of both players. Besides gift‐exchange, this class of games also includes moral hazard models and the rotten kid framework. Even though equilibrium behavior may appear positively reciprocal in some of these games, the self‐interested player never benefits from reciprocity. We discuss the relation of these results to the theoretical and empirical literature on gift‐exchange in employment relations.     

Does Formal Education for Older Workers Increase Earnings? — Evidence Based on Rich Data and Long‐term Follow‐up

Governments in Europe, Canada and the USA have expressed an ambition to stimulate education of older. In this paper, we analyse if there are effects on annual earnings of formal education for participants aged 42–55 at the time of enrolment in 1994–95. The analysis explores longitudinal population register data stretching from 1982 to 2007. The method used is difference‐in‐differences propensity score matching based on a rich set of covariates, including indicators of health and labor market marginalization. Our findings underline the importance of long follow up periods and imply positive effects for women, especially so for women with children, and no significant average earnings effects for men. These results differ from earlier studies but are stable to several alternative assumptions regarding unobservable characteristics. Data further indicate that the gender gap in our estimates may stem from differences in underlying reasons for enrolment.     

Output-Flexibilität in der Dienstleistungsproduktion

Zusammenfassung  Den Ausgangspunkt der überlegungen bildet die Interpretation von Dienstleistungen als Probleml?sungen, die eine M?glichkeit zur formalen Analyse der Output-Flexibilit?t er?ffnet. Im vorliegenden Beitrag werden in einer eigenschaftsorientierten Betrachtung zun?chst die Komponenten der Output-Flexibilit?t identifiziert, um dann darauf aufbauend ein Kalkül zur Gestaltung der Output-Flexibilit?t von Dienstleistungsunternehmungen abzuleiten.

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Summary  Output flexibility enables the service provider to cope with both uncertainties in demand and the external production factor. This paper aims at formulating a calculus for the design of output flexibility based on production theory. The interpretation of services as specific problem solutions serves as a basis for a feature-oriented modelling of service production.

Die Autoren danken zwei anonymen Gutachtern für wertvolle Verbesserungsvorschl?ge.