Designing Efficient Infrastructural Investment and Asset Transfer Mechanisms in Humanitarian Supply Chains

We analyze the efficacy of different asset transfer mechanisms and provide policy recommendations for the design of humanitarian supply chains. As a part of their preparedness effort, humanitarian organizations often make decisions on resource investments ex ante because doing so allows for rapid response if an adverse event occurs. However, programs typically operate under funding constraints and donor earmarks with autonomous decision‐making authority resting with the local entities, which makes the design of efficient humanitarian supply chains a challenging problem. We formulate this problem in an agency setting with two independent aid programs, where different asset transfer mechanisms are considered and where investments in resources are of two types: primary resources that are needed for providing the aid and infrastructural investments that improve the operation of the aid program in using the primary resources. The primary resources are acquired from earmarked donations. We show that allowing aid programs the flexibility of transferring primary resources improves the efficiency of the system by yielding greater social welfare than when this flexibility does not exist. More importantly, we show that a central entity that can acquire primary resources from one program and sell them to the other program can further improve system efficiency by providing a mechanism that facilitates the transfer of primary resources and eliminates losses from gaming. This outcome is achieved without depriving the individual aid programs of their decision‐making autonomy while maintaining the constraints under which they operate. We find that outcomes with centralized resource transfer but decentralized infrastructural investments by the aid programs are the same as with a completely centralized system (where both resource transfer and infrastructural investments are centralized).     

Buttressing Supply Chains against Floods in Asia for Humanitarian Relief and Economic Recovery

Floods are the most frequent category of disasters worldwide. Among all geographic regions, Asia has suffered the most. While there are several ongoing humanitarian efforts and initiatives, we believe there is a new opportunity to coordinate “last mile” humanitarian efforts in the event of a flood using micro‐retailers. Because micro‐retailers are the “last mile” nodes in traditional retail supply chains in many Asian countries, we propose the use of social enterprise to buttress these supply chains for distribution of essential goods by coordinating with micro‐retailers before and after floods. We also present a stylized model to quantify the benefits of doing so.     

Quality Risk Ratings in Global Supply Chains

Extended enterprises face many challenges in managing the product quality of their suppliers. Consequently characterizing the quality risk posed by value‐chain partners has become increasingly important. There have been several recent efforts to develop frameworks for rating the quality risk posed by suppliers. We develop an analytical model to examine the impact of such quality ratings on suppliers, manufacturers, and social welfare. While it might seem that quality ratings would benefit high‐quality suppliers and hurt low‐quality suppliers, we show that this is not always the case. We find that such quality ratings can hurt both types of suppliers or benefit both, depending on the market conditions. We also find that quality ratings do not always benefit the most demanding manufacturers who desire high‐quality suppliers. Finally, we find that social welfare is not always improved by risk ratings. These results suggest that public policy initiatives addressing risk ratings must be carefully considered.     

Strategic Information Sharing in Competing Channels

We investigate strategic information sharing in two competing channels. The retailer in a channel can ex post decide whether to share private demand information with his upstream manufacturer after the content of information becomes known. We find that a retailer discloses low demand and withholds high demand to induce lower wholesale prices from his manufacturer. We show that a retailer should share less information when the retail market becomes more competitive, but should disclose more information when his capability to acquire information improves. When a decentralized supply chain competes with an integrated channel, we show that firms in the supply chain benefit from the rival channel's effort to improve information capability, that the incentive for the retailer in the supply chain to improve his information capability increases with the intensity of competition and with the rival channel's information capability, and that the retailer may not want to pursue perfect information acquisition even when doing so is costless. Extensive numerical studies demonstrate that similar results also hold for two decentralized supply chains competing with each other.     

Optimal Inventory Control with Retail Pre‐Packs

A pre‐pack is a collection of items used in retail distribution. By grouping multiple units of one or more stock keeping units (SKU), distribution and handling costs can be reduced; however, ordering flexibility at the retail outlet is limited. This paper studies an inventory system at a retail level where both pre‐packs and individual items (at additional handling cost) can be ordered. For a single‐SKU, single‐period problem, we show that the optimal policy is to order into a “band” with as few individual units as possible. For the multi‐period problem with modular demand, the band policy is still optimal, and the steady‐state distribution of the target inventory position possesses a semi‐uniform structure, which greatly facilitates the computation of optimal policies and approximations under general demand. For the multi‐SKU case, the optimal policy has a generalized band structure. Our numerical results show that pre‐pack use is beneficial when facing stable and complementary demands, and substantial handling savings at the distribution center. The cost premium of using simple policies, such as strict base‐stock and batch‐ordering (pre‐packs only), can be substantial for medium parameter ranges.     

区块链构建农产品供应链信任:现状、问题与发展

本文针对农产品供应链外部农产品信任度低,供应链内部成员之间信任缺失等问题,分析了基于区块链技术的解决之道,梳理了现有农产品供应链的信任问题,详细阐述了区块链技术在面向可追溯、可跟踪的供应链系统中的研究和应用现状.同时,进一步分析了适用于农产品供应链的共识机制,总结了当前面临的挑战,并提出了未来的发展方向.研究表明区块链技术能建立农产品供应链上的消费者信心,增强供应链企业之间的信任.     

以现代产业体系发展推动“十四五”经济体系优化升级

现代产业体系是现代经济体系的子系统与基础支撑,通过对“十四五”时期中国建设现代化经济体系内在要求的分析,探索推动中国经济体系优化升级的基本路径。研究认为,需要以创新升级建立现代产业体系发展的动力体系,以协同融合形成现代产业体系发展的结构体系,以数字转型构建现代产业体系发展的效能体系; 在此基础上,推进政府职能改革和完善知识产权制度,创建优化制度环境; 推动数据信息交易价格机制的完善,加快培育数据要素市场; 利用新一代信息技术改造提升传统产业,统筹推进新型基础设施建设,优化升级“十四五”时期的经济体系。     

基于网络的“链”式教学模式探索与实践

针对软件平台类课程的特点,阐述了实施＂链＂式教学模式的目标及改革的必要性,给出了该模式的组成要素及具体的实施方案。并以J2EE平台等三门同类课程为试点,采取＂即讲即练＂的教学方法,提高了学生的软件工程能力和实践动手能力,是一种以工程能力为核心的教学理念。     

宏达公司战略成本控制模式

针对宏达公司成本管理问题,采用规范研究的方法,分析了宏达船舶配套机械制造公司战略定位、成本动因、价值链以及业务流程,对其在设计成本、研发成本和制造成本方面提出战略成本模式的改进建议。希望宏达公司成本管理能从传统的成本控制模式转变到适应新环境的战略成本控制模式。