Noisy Stochastic Games

This paper establishes existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in general stochastic games with noise—a component of the state that is nonatomically distributed and not directly affected by the previous period's state and actions. Noise may be simply a payoff‐irrelevant public randomization device, delivering known results on the existence of correlated equilibrium as a special case. More generally, noise can take the form of shocks that enter into players' stage payoffs and the transition probability on states. The existence result is applied to a model of industry dynamics and to a model of dynamic electoral competition.     

A Purchasing Framework for B2B Pricing Decisions and Risk‐sharing in Supply Chains*

This paper presents a common modelling structure for (i) the implementation of operational policies by individual purchasing managers of risk‐sharing agreements among supply‐chain partners, and (ii) the integration of brick and click purchasing policies in a B2B. The problem of price uncertainty created within these two environments is modelled as a stochastic repetitive‐sales problem, applicable to any probability distribution. The model identifies sufficient conditions for regenerative ordering cycles, which allows for the use of the renewal reward theorem. The end result is a two‐price purchasing policy, which may substantially ease implementation problems across a global corporation's purchasing managers world‐wide and across B2B markets.