中国对中亚能源投资的法律问题及对策

中国与中亚在能源方面合作不断加强,逐步形成了更加紧密的能源安全共同体,然而在双方投资与合作过程中诸多相关法律问题也不断涌现,使中国对中亚地区的能源投资风险加大。文章对中亚能源投资中对投资的界定、投资准入、政治风险及环境保护等相关投资法律问题进行研究与分析,提出中国在中亚投资与合作过程中的相应对策,将对中国能源投资规避风险、保护投资利益大有裨益。     

未焊透缺陷安全尺寸的评价研究

未焊透是压力管道焊接接头常见缺陷之一,严重时会导致管道的承载能力明显降低,进而引发严重的安全事故。 目前我国的《在用工业管道定期检验规程》中对未焊透管道的定级是很保守的,为了减少对未焊透缺陷的返修,文章采 用非线性有限元分析的方法,通过简化未焊透管道的影响因素,并研究在不同载荷工况下管道失效模式与缺陷尺寸的关 系,获得了未焊透管道的极限载荷曲线簇;再运用塑性力学分析方法对有限元分析结果进行筛选,得到了焊接缺陷的安 全尺寸;最终通过试验验证极限载荷数值分析结果的合理性。研究结果表明含有超标焊接缺陷（如未焊透）的管道不通 过复杂应力计算和安全评定即可在保证安全前提下最大限度地使用。     

On asymptotic distribution of prediction in functional linear regression

There has been substantial recent attention on problems involving a functional linear regression model with scalar response. Among them, there have been few works dealing with asymptotic distribution of prediction in functional linear regression models. In recent literature, the centeral limit theorem for prediction has been discussed, but the proof and conditions under which the random bias terms for a fixed predictor converge to zero have been ignored so that the impact of these terms on the convergence of the prediction has not been well understood. Clarifying the proof and conditions under which the bias terms converge to zero, we show that the asymptotic distribution of the prediction is normal. Furthermore, we have derived those results related to other terms that already obtained by others, under milder conditions. Finally, we conduct a simulation study to investigate performance of the asymptotic distribution under various parameter settings.     

理性极限及其突破断想

思维具有历史的特征.而理性思维只是人类思维的一个阶段.因此,理性思维及与之相对应的理性哲学都无法超越自身的历史局限.理性哲学缺失与当下生活的对应的根本原因就在于理性极限.而理性的偏见与虚妄的悲剧价值预设正是这种极限的表现.打破理性极限的前提是将理性还原于历史中并具体列出突破理性哲学的叙述方案.     

驳精神损害赔偿限额论

精神损害赔偿的主要功能在于填补受害人因此而受到的损害,使其得到抚慰,以便能开始新生活。因此,精神损害赔偿应本着“全面赔偿损害”的原则,不能脱离实际人为地限定数额。     

湖南省区域中心城市发展中的人口问题研究——以长株潭城市群为例

基于长株潭城市群人口发展现状,利用相关人口指标与武汉、广州等经济发达城市相比较,表明长株潭城市群在人口规模、行业人口结构及人口质量等方面存在一些问题,并提出促进城市发展的人口对策。     

朝鲜战争期间美国决策层内部分歧与战争限度

朝鲜战争爆发,美国决策层对之作出迅速反应,然而对其干涉限度意见不一。战争限度问题成为杜鲁门政府和麦克阿瑟争执的焦点所在。以麦克阿瑟的解职为结局的事实,一方面反映了美国决策层内部矛盾发展的必然走向,另一方面也反映了美国政府执行的“有限战争”不仅符合冷战国际背景下美国全球战略的需要,而且也是美国政府和人民最易接受的理性选择。     

程序优位:遏制违反法定期限行为之关键

司法机关案件无期限拖结,虽属程序违法,但却使当事人合法的人身自由权、财产权受到严重侵犯。我国已有的三大诉讼法就期限问题了详尽的规定,仍无法杜绝。要依法规制,首先从观念上应加强执法者程序优位观念,其次,从制度上在程序规则中引入法律后果、法律责任规定,从程序法治整体上进行救济性立法设计,把违反法定期限行为纳入司法审查制度中国家赔偿的范畴,通过救济途径对该行为予以必要制约。     

Reconciliation with the Utility of Chance by Elaborated Outcomes Destroys the Axiomatic Basis of Expected Utility Theory

Expected utility theory does not directly deal with the utility of chance. It has been suggested in the literature (Samuelson, 1952, Markowitz, 1959) that this can be remedied by an approach which explicitly models the emotional consequences which give rise to the utility of chance. We refer to this as the elaborated outcomes approach. It is argued that the elaborated outcomes approach destroys the possibility of deriving a representation theorem based on the usual axioms of expected utility theory. This is shown with the help of an example due to Markowitz. It turns out that the space of conceivable lotteries over elaborated outcomes is too narrow to permit the application of the axioms. Moreover it is shown that a representation theorem does not hold for the example.     

On the coase theorem and coalitional stability: the principle of equal relative concession

The Coase theorem is argued to be incompatible with bargaining set stability due to a tension between the grand coalition and sub-coalitions. We provide a counter-intuitive argument to demonstrate that the Coase theorem may be in complete consonance with bargaining set stability. We establish that an uncertainty concerning the formation of sub-coalitions will explain such compatibility: each agent fears that others may `gang up' against him and this fear forces the agents to negotiate. The grand coalition emerges from the negotiations if each agent uses the principle of equal relative sacrifice to determine the actual allocation. We also establish the rational basis for the choice of the principle of equal relative concession by the negotiating agents. Hence we argue that the Coase theorem will be valid even if there are stable sub-coalitions.