代理人间具有竞争关系的薪酬激励机制设计

销售系统中存在着典型的信息不对称情况:委托人(公司)对代理人(销售人员)的努力程度具有不对称信息,委托人不能观测到代理人努力程度,因而常根据销售业绩来制定薪酬激励机制.本文研究销售系统中具有多个代理人且代理人之间存在竞争关系的委托代理问题.在假设市场最终需求对努力水平敏感,且某代理人努力水平提高时,他可以在开拓市场的同时,吸引对方顾客的条件下,建立了具有多代理人且代理人间存在竞争的委托代理模型.得到当努力成本、风险规避度、产出不确定性越大,代理人的风险分担越小,利润提成越低,越倾向于取得固定工资;竞争程度越高,代理人的努力程度也随之提高;利用代理人之间的竞争可以使委托人获利等结论.     

数据驱动下收货方质量偏好与电商配送服务质量优化

针对"互联网+大数据"优化电商配送服务质量问题,明确不同收货方的质量需求稳定性,引导电商根据收货方不同质量敏感性提供相对精准服务,提升配送服务质量。模拟投票结果的形成过程聚类得到收货方对服务质量偏好的记忆性特征：（1）"无记忆"型收货方;（2）"记忆"型收货方;（3）"不确定"型收货方;（4）收货方总体。进一步推导不同规划类型求解空间,设计得到"无记忆"型收货方动态规划精确求解方法,及其他三种类型近似求解粒子群算法。研究过程中,配送资源质量感知度被嵌入到模型约束;"无记忆"型收货方的质量需求规划问题转化为零库存策略最优解问题,进而证明存在精确解;"记忆"型收货方呈现出对质量感知的累积;"不确定"型收货方模型通过赋值即可得总体收货方表达式。结果表明：数据驱动研究框架借助大数据资源,使得电商更易通过收货方的质量偏好设计更加匹配的配送方案;不确定服务需求得到有效满足,投入成本的利用率更高;通过特征分类的方式,尽可能地抽取能够精确最优化的部分,缩小NP范围,提高整体求解的精确度。     

Pollutant Ground Concentrations of Nonneutrally Buoyant Particles

A methodology is suggested for the estimation of the mass density and the cumulative ground deposition of a nonvolatile, nonneutrally buoyant, air pollutant (liquid or solid) released from a polluted column (following an explosion caused during routine operation in, e.g., the chemical industry or due to any kind of hostile act) and deposited on the ground via gravitational settling. In many cases, the deposited mass due to gravitational settling constitutes a significant fraction of the original inventory released from the source. Implementation of the methodology in preliminary risk assessments can serve as an efficient tool for emergency planning for both immediate and long‐term measures such as evacuation and decontamination. The methodology considers, inter alia, an estimation of the critical particle diameter, particle size, and mass distributions along the polluted column. This methodology was developed to apply in rural regions since proper application of relevant meteorological input data can be accomplished mainly for such areas.     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

陕西农村劳动力流向分析

陕西农村劳动力流动地域分布特征明显。农村劳动力流动地域广阔,西部地区和省会及地级城市较集中,地域分布由省内为主转向以跨省流动为主,跨省劳务输出规模优势明显。不同地区就业收入差距较大以致务工地域比较集中。陕西农村劳动力流动产业分布以二、三产业居多,劳务品牌优势突出,不同产业收入差距较大,行业分布地域化明显。     

The empirical Bayes estimators of the parameter of the Poisson distribution with a conjugate gamma prior under Stein's loss function

For the hierarchical Poisson and gamma model, we calculate the Bayes posterior estimator of the parameter of the Poisson distribution under Stein's loss function which penalizes gross overestimation and gross underestimation equally and the corresponding Posterior Expected Stein's Loss (PESL). We also obtain the Bayes posterior estimator of the parameter under the squared error loss and the corresponding PESL. Moreover, we obtain the empirical Bayes estimators of the parameter of the Poisson distribution with a conjugate gamma prior by two methods. In numerical simulations, we have illustrated: The two inequalities of the Bayes posterior estimators and the PESLs; the moment estimators and the Maximum Likelihood Estimators (MLEs) are consistent estimators of the hyperparameters; the goodness-of-fit of the model to the simulated data. The numerical results indicate that the MLEs are better than the moment estimators when estimating the hyperparameters. Finally, we exploit the attendance data on 314 high school juniors from two urban high schools to illustrate our theoretical studies.     

A new stratified three-stage unrelated randomized response model for estimating a rare sensitive attribute based on the Poisson distribution

This article suggests an efficient method of estimating a rare sensitive attribute which is assumed following Poisson distribution by using three-stage unrelated randomized response model instead of the Land et al. model (2011 Land, M., S. Singh, and S. A. Sedory. 2011. Estimation of a rare sensitive attribute using poisson distribution. Statistics 46 (3):351–60. doi:10.1080/02331888.2010.524300.[Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) when the population consists of some different sized clusters and clusters selected by probability proportional to size(:pps) sampling. A rare sensitive parameter is estimated by using pps sampling and equal probability two-stage sampling when the parameter of a rare unrelated attribute is assumed to be known and unknown.

We extend this method to the case of stratified population by applying stratified pps sampling and stratified equal probability two-stage sampling. An empirical study is carried out to show the efficiency of the two proposed methods when the parameter of a rare unrelated attribute is assumed to be known and unknown.     

Fitting competing risks data to bivariate Pareto models

This paper revisits two bivariate Pareto models for fitting competing risks data. The first model is the Frank copula model, and the second one is a bivariate Pareto model introduced by Sankaran and Nair (1993 Sankaran, P. G., and N. U. Nair. 1993. A bivariate Pareto model and its applications to reliability. Naval Research Logistics 40 (7):1013–1020. doi:10.1002/1520-6750(199312)40:7%3c1013::AID-NAV3220400711%3e3.0.CO;2-7.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). We discuss the identifiability issues of these models and develop the maximum likelihood estimation procedures including their computational algorithms and model-diagnostic procedures. Simulations are conducted to examine the performance of the maximum likelihood estimation. Real data are analyzed for illustration.