不完全信息、预算软约束与企业集团

本文创新地将研究企业与投资人关系的预算软约束理论应用到对企业集团的研究当中。本文按照预算软约束的引入时间将企业集团内部的预算软约束问题从两个方面进行了讨论。在研究了预算软约束造成的历史包袱的解决、多个国有投资主体引入对企业运行效率的改进、企业集团研发体制的选择、预算软约束对企业集团内部运行的影响之后,简要地阐明了防止企业集团内部预算约束软化的措施。     

信息与创新

创新需要的信息具有新颖性、独占性、有用性和可用性 ,创新信息包括需求信息与供给信息、技术信息与人的信息、内部信息与外部信息、现时信息与未来信息。创新的信息活动特征是 ,在信息不确定中追求确定信息 ,在不完全信息中寻找有效信息 ,在信息的独占性与共享性之间建立平衡 ,在缩小知识差距的同时解决信息问题。创新要求的信息模式是 :有效的信息生产组织、合理的信息配置方式和敏捷的信息转换机制     

New 3-level response surface designs constructed from incomplete block designs

Box and Behnken [1958. Some new three level second-order designs for surface fitting. Statistical Technical Research Group Technical Report No. 26. Princeton University, Princeton, NJ; 1960. Some new three level designs for the study of quantitative variables. Technometrics 2, 455–475.] introduced a class of 3-level second-order designs for fitting the second-order response surface model. These 17 Box–Behnken designs (BB designs) are available for 3–12 and 16 factors. Although BB designs were developed nearly 50 years ago, they and the central-composite designs of Box and Wilson [1951. On the experimental attainment of optimum conditions. J. Royal Statist. Soc., Ser. B 13, 1–45.] are still the most often recommended response surface designs. Of the 17 aforementioned BB designs, 10 were constructed from balanced incomplete block designs (BIBDs) and seven were constructed from partially BIBDs (PBIBDs). In this paper we show that these seven BB designs constructed from PBIBDs can be improved in terms of rotatability as well as average prediction variance, D$D$- and G$G$-efficiency. In addition, we also report new orthogonally blocked solutions for 5, 8, 9, 11 and 13 factors. Note that an 11-factor BB design is available but cannot be orthogonally blocked. All new designs can be found at http://www.math.montana.edu/∼$\sim$jobo/bbd/.     

试论确立完整产权制度

完整产权是指剩余控制权与剩余收益权结合在一起并落在同一主体上的一种制度。某一产权主体若只具备其中的一部分,即为产权残缺。产权残缺是当前我国国有企业效益低下的根源,改变残缺产权制度,确立完整产权制度是我国国有企业产权制度改革的方向。     

人与自然关系的独特思考--论土家族的自然宇宙观

自然哲学主要体现在对人与自然（宇宙）关系的思考。在这一问题上,土家族人认为人与自然的关系是一种双向包容的关系,即人是宇宙之子,同时,宇宙又是人类的一个组成部分。围绕这一核心,主要从土家族创世神话、史诗及社会风俗诸方面进行论证,并努力探讨它的形成原因及发展的逻辑轨迹。     

Incentive Contracts in Projects with Unforeseeable Uncertainty

Designing incentive contracts that constructively guide employee efforts is a particularly difficult challenge in novel innovation initiatives, where unforeseen events may occur. Empirical studies have observed a variety of incentive structures in innovation settings: “time and material contracts” (compensation for executing orders), “downside protection” (target‐driven incentives with protection from unexpected risks), and “upside rewards” (additional remuneration for pursuing opportunities). This paper develops a model of incentives in presence of unforeseen events and offers a theoretical prediction of which of the empirically observed incentive structures should be used under which circumstances. The combination of three key influences drives the shape of the best incentive contract. First, the presence of unforeseeable uncertainty, or the occurrence of events that cannot possibly be foreseen at the outset. These may force a change in the project's plan, making pure target setting insufficient. Second, fairness concerns dictate that the employee's expected compensation cannot be shifted downward by unforeseen events, because it would cause demotivation, hostility, and defection. Third, management may not be able to observe the detailed actions of the employee (moral hazard) nor whether a positive or negative unforeseen event has occurred (asymmetric information).     

双向运动与乡村旅游发展

中国是小农经济国家,蓬勃发展的乡村旅游应该放在小农经济场景中进行考察。改革开放以来,中国小农经济正在经历从伦理经济到市场经济的发展转型,由此带来整个乡村社会“脱嵌”与“入嵌”的双向运动。乡村旅游存在于这一特定历史场景中,也面临着经济发展与社会发展的双向运动,由此形成了以乡村振兴和文创乡建为策略的反向运动,诞生了一种新型社区——乡村文创旅游社区。但在众多不确定性风险带来的冲击和扰动下,乡村旅游社区要实现可持续发展需要新的理论做指引,而新兴的韧性理论恰好为乡村旅游社区建设提供了创新途径。     

A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements

Rationalizability is a central solution concept of game theory. Economic models often have many rationalizable outcomes, motivating economists to use refinements of rationalizability, including equilibrium refinements. In this paper we try to achieve a general understanding of when this multiplicity occurs and how one should deal with it. Assuming that the set of possible payoff functions and belief structures is sufficiently rich, we establish a revealing structure of the correspondence of beliefs to sets of rationalizable outcomes. We show that, for any rationalizable action a of any type, we can perturb the beliefs of the type in such a way that a is uniquely rationalizable for the new type. This unique outcome will be robust to further small changes. When multiplicity occurs, then we are in a “knife‐edge” case, where the unique rationalizable outcome changes, sandwiched between open sets of types where each of the rationalizable actions is uniquely rationalizable. As an immediate application of this result, we characterize, for any refinement of rationalizability, the predictions that are robust to small misspecifications of interim beliefs. These are only those predictions that are true for all rationalizable strategies, that is, the predictions that could have been made without the refinement.     

Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition

We describe a two‐step algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the assumption that behavior is consistent with Markov perfect equilibrium. In the first step, the policy functions and the law of motion for the state variables are estimated. In the second step, the remaining structural parameters are estimated using the optimality conditions for equilibrium. The second step estimator is a simple simulated minimum distance estimator. The algorithm applies to a broad class of models, including industry competition models with both discrete and continuous controls such as the Ericson and Pakes (1995) model. We test the algorithm on a class of dynamic discrete choice models with normally distributed errors and a class of dynamic oligopoly models similar to that of Pakes and McGuire (1994).     

不完全确定信息的群体语言指派问题的求解方法

针对决策者权重和准则权重为不完全确定信息且评价语言值确定或位于二个标准语言值之间甚至缺失的多准则指派问题,提出了一种求解方法。首先利用证据推理算法计算得到各候选人完成各任务的优劣程度属于各个语言评价等级的信任度,并据此利用二元语义的Δ函数及其函数Δ-1将其集成为群体在所有准则下的综合评价矩阵,然后结合决策者权重和准则权重的不完全确定信息等构建非线性混合整数规则模型,并利用粒子群算法与匈牙利算法联合进行求解。最后实例说明该方法的可行性和有效性。