UNCERTAINTY AND STICKY-DOWNWARD BUT UPWARD-MOBILE WAGES

The usual search models of unemployment hold that firms do not offer wage cuts to employees in time of slack demand because the employees have alternatives open to them at wages higher than the reduced wage that would be required to maintain full employment. This paper extends these models by considering employees as choosing in conditions of uncertainty and showing that refusal to accept a wage cut is often rational in the absence of a higher alternative wage. Additional implications are derived for union behavior and simultaneous inflation and unemployment.     

GENDER MATCHING AND COMPETITIVENESS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

This paper experimentally investigates if and how people's competitiveness depends on their own gender and on the gender of people with whom they interact. Participants are given information about the gender of the co‐participant they are matched with, they then choose between a tournament or a piece rate payment scheme, and finally perform a real task. As already observed in the literature, we find that significantly more men than women choose the tournament. The gender of the co‐participant directly influences men's choices (men compete less against other men than against women), but only when the gender information is made sufficiently salient. A higher predicted competitiveness of women induces more competition. Giving stronger tournament incentives, or allowing the participants to choose the gender of their co‐participant, increases women's willingness to compete, but does not close the gender gap in competitiveness. (JEL C70, C91, J16, J24, J31, M52)     

EXTERNALITIES, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

Most economists who have analyzed professional baseball have concluded that two distinctive features of its labor market—the reserve clause and player draft—influence the distribution of wealth between players and owners but do not affect the allocation of playing talent among teams. Such conclusions, which are strongly at variance with laymen's views of such matters, are derived from theoretical considerations rather than empirical examinations. Our paper examines data from the two decades of major league history and concludes that, on the basis of that data, the empirical generalizations of previous economists do not appear to be justified.     

Your E‐mail Trail: Where Ethics Meets Forensics1

This article addresses ethical and legal issues arising from the increasing use of e‐mail and other forms of instant written communication in the conduct of business. E‐mail communications are often casual and informal. Yet e‐mail is a written record that can be more permanent and widely accessible than a paper communication. This article focuses on the implications of this fact, including (1) how individuals compromise their own privacy by the voluntary use of e‐mail; (2) how e‐mail has complicated the duty of confidentiality of employees to employers, and professionals to clients; (3) whether the use of e‐mail affects ethical deliberation and choice; and (4) the use of e‐mail as evidence of corporate conduct and intent in civil and criminal litigation. The article suggests that e‐mail users think “forensically” about their e‐mail—i.e., consider its potential as evidence in the context of other emails and underlying events—before pressing the “send” button.     

The Taking of a Position: A Reinterpretation of the Elaboration Likelihood Model

This article explains how data associated with attitude change and persuasion in mainstream psychology and social psychology can be reinterpreted as evidence of the agentive ability of taking a position. A critical review is made of the elaboration likelihood model and a position model is adapted from positioning theory. The postulates of the elaboration likelihood model are then subjected to critical scrutiny by means of comparison with our position model. In this way regularities associated with attitude change and persuasion are interpreted as evidence of a deliberative process, involving negotiation and the use of supporting and opposing arguments. We present this as evidence of the commonly held agentive ability to position oneself and anticipate the positions of others.