Existence and Nash implementation of efficient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology

Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumption good by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributions with a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of allocations obtained by any continuous sharing rule contains Pareto efficient allocations. We also present a mechanism that implements in Nash equilibrium the Pareto efficient allocations contained in an arbitrary sharing rule. Received: 29 June 1998/Accepted: 15 November 2000     

International and intercultural issues in English teaching textbooks: the case of Spain

The sociocultural content of foreign language textbooks has become a concern of scholars and practitioners owing to the fact that the traditional emphasis on purely linguistic issues has been expanded to embrace a language in context approach. This paper studies the English‐speaking communities that are described in English language teaching textbooks marketed in Spain. It examines to what extent an international and/or intercultural approach is a constituent element in their design.     

Erroneous perceptions and arousal among regular and occasional video poker players

This study investigated the relationship between the level of arousal (Heart Rate) and the number of erroneous perceptions among video poker players. Twelve regular and twelve occasional gamblers participated in a gambling session conducted in a natural environment. It was hypothesised that 1) a significant positive correlation would be observed between arousal and the number of erroneous verbalizations, 2) regular players would show a higher level of arousal than occasional players, and 3) they would emit more erroneous verbalizations. Results showed that hypotheses one and three were confirmed. Theoretical and practical implications of these results for the psychology of gambling are discussed.This study was supported by a grant from Loto-Québec.     

How bad can a voting location be

Two questions concerning the location of a single facility by a voting process are investigated for transportation networks:

- What is the maximum number of customers located on the network preferring some rival point over a voting solution?

- How does the average distance of the customers to the facility increase when a voting location instead of a Weber location is chosen for the facility?

Complete answers are given for general networks and for certain planar networks, viz., the so-called generalized cacti.