Can better parenting be achieved through short prevention programs? The challenge of universal prevention through Strengthening Families Program 11–14

With the increase in substance use by young people in recent years' there has been a growth in evidence‐based programs aimed at preventing this problem. This study aims to assess possible changes in family and parental dynamics among families taking part in a short (6‐session) universal program. These changes might act as protective factors for families in preventing substance use. A quasi‐experimental design was used' with pretest and posttest evaluations. The participating schools meeting the inclusion criteria were randomly assigned to the experimental or control group. The sample was made up of 16 experimental groups and 17 control groups' with the participation of 353 parents and 289 youths. The results confirm the strengthening of the families by improving the following key components of parenting: resilience' involvement' family conflicts' and positive parenting. Reinforcing parenting skills through a short program is a good strategy to take' ensuring high levels of adherence (86.40% retention of the initial sample). Hence future universal prevention programs must not just set their sights on high levels of effectiveness' but also on efficiency.     

Extending an order to the power set: The Leximax Criterion

This work analyzes the issue of ranking the levels of well-being enjoyed by an agent when dealing with her opportunity set in a freedom of choice context. We try to propose a natural extension of a preference relation over a (possibly) infinite set X to its power set, compatible with the finite Leximax criterion. This research has been supported by Comisión Interministerial de Ciencia y Tecnología, SEC2000-0838 (Ballester), and Dirección General de Enseñanza Superior e Investigación Científica, PB98-0551 (De Miguel).     

Food Access and Shocks in Rural Households: Evidence from Bangladesh and Ethiopia

As remarked by Ravallion (J Dev Econ 99:201–209, 2012), the recent switch from arithmetic to geometric mean in the aggregation of the United Nations’ Human Development Index has caused a more severe inequality penalization of the index for less developed countries, with outlying consequences. We clarify and explain this fact and propose an aggregation function, the Trichotomy Mean, that depends on two parameters: one regulates the overall penalization of disequilibria (among or within dimensions) in analogy with Atkinson’s inequality aversion parameter for power means; the other modulates the Level Dependence of the Adjustment, a novel concept describing the behavior—decreasing, increasing, or constant—of penalization of given disequilibria for increasing index level. Unlike the geometric mean (which, incidentally, has decreasing LDA type), the TM remains valid for zero or negative—and does not distort for small positive—values of the input variables, thus permitting less restrictive raw-variable normalizations and to overcome the need for exogenous lower bounds. We compare the three versions of TM with the geometric mean in an empirical analysis on the HDI 2014 data. We finally illustrate the contributions of the TM to the development literature debate.     

Ranking opportunity profiles through dependent evaluation of policies

Rankings to evaluate opportunity distributions present in most of the literature judge a policy (change from one distribution of opportunities to another) on the basis of the changes created and, thus, independently of the original situation. This paper proposes a group of axioms capturing the idea that rankings of equality of opportunities might consider not only the changes promoted, but also the initial situation in society. The combination of this group of axioms with other well-established properties enables us to characterize two families of new opportunity distribution rankings. The first family weighs each individual’s percentage share in the total number of opportunities, while the second weighs opportunities depending on how many agents have them available.     

Socioemotional characteristics of minors in foster care: A comparison between the estimation of parents,teachers and children

During the child's first few years, it's of fundamental importance the presence of a strong emotional base as long as it creates the possibility to open themselves to physical and social world with confidence, and as it acts as a facilitator of cognitive development. For this reason, if the family cannot ensure such base, social services are forced to resort to foster care, a resource that has a lot of difficulties, leading to different implications in the development of the child and of the foster family. It is therefore important to analyze in depth the socio-emotional variables that characterize children who are in a situation of foster care in order to provide adequate assistance to optimize their development. For this 32 minors in foster care, 31 foster parents and 28 teachers from the city of Valencia, were administered the BASC. The results highlight that parents are evaluating children, in general, worse than tutors. Specifically they consider children more aggressive, they detect more behavioral and attention problems and recognize in them a greater tendency to externalize the problems, while the teachers consider these children as with more social and adaptive skills. There were no significant differences between the scores of parents, teachers and children. High levels of psychopathology (which are clinically significant in various cases) and the fact that host parents evaluate minors as more problematic, are indicators of parents' and minors' need of support from public organizations.     

Uncertainty with ordinal likelihood information

We present a model that is closely related to the so-called models of choice under complete uncertainty, in which the agent has no information about the probability of the outcomes. There are two approaches within the said models: the state space-based approach, which takes into account the possible states of nature and the correspondence between states and outcomes; and the set-based approach, which ignores such information, and solves certain difficulties arising from the state space-based approach. Kelsey (Int Econ Rev 34:297–308, 1993) incorporates into a state space-based framework the assumption that the agent has ordinal information about the likelihood of the states. This paper incorporates this same assumption into a set-based framework, thus filling a theoretical gap in the literature. Compared to the set-based models of choice under complete uncertainty we introduce the information about the ordinal likelihood of the outcomes while, compared to Kelsey’s approach, we incorporate the advantages of describing uncertainty environments from the set-based perspective. We present an axiomatic study that includes adaptations of some of the axioms found in the related literature and we characterize some rules featuring different combinations of information about the ordinal likelihood of the outcomes and information about their desirability.     

Delinquent Networks

Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Each delinquent decides in a non‐cooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. We characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key‐player policy. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal to optimal group removal, the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent offenses. The key‐player policy turns out to be much more complex because it depends on wages and on the structure of the network. (JEL: A14, C72, K42, L14)     

Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player

Finite population noncooperative games with linear‐quadratic utilities, where each player decides how much action she exerts, can be interpreted as a network game with local payoff complementarities, together with a globally uniform payoff substitutability component and an own‐concavity effect. For these games, the Nash equilibrium action of each player is proportional to her Bonacich centrality in the network of local complementarities, thus establishing a bridge with the sociology literature on social networks. This Bonacich–Nash linkage implies that aggregate equilibrium increases with network size and density. We then analyze a policy that consists of targeting the key player, that is, the player who, once removed, leads to the optimal change in aggregate activity. We provide a geometric characterization of the key player identified with an intercentrality measure, which takes into account both a player's centrality and her contribution to the centrality of the others.     

Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms

We ask whether the absence of information about other voters’ preferences allows optimal voting to be interpreted as sincere.We start by classifying voting mechanisms as simple and complex according to the number of message types voters can use to elect alternatives. We show that while in simple voting mechanisms the elimination of information about other voters’ preferences allows optimal voting to be interpreted as sincere, this is no longer always true for complex ones. In complex voting mechanisms, voters’ optimal strategy may vary with the size of the electorate. Therefore, in order to interpret optimal voting as sincere for complex voting mechanisms, we describe the optimal voting strategy when voters not only have no information but also have no pivotal power, i.e., as the size of the electorate tends to infinity.     

On ranking opportunity distributions

Our results show the intimate relationship between a large group of apparently different rankings of opportunity distributions. First, we provide a set of core basic axioms that are intuitively plausible under any concern for equality or efficiency aspects. Second, we introduce two very opposed views of the problem by incorporating different perspectives of the notion of advantage (better opportunity set) and we provide some axioms that might be defended under such extreme positions. For any of these two different perspectives, we characterize the families of rankings which satisfy the core axioms and the group of axioms corresponding to that view. These characterizations will prove insightful to better understand most of the criteria already introduced in the literature, which are part of the families we study.