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We use the glass cliff to study the appointment and employment duration of 193 female CEOs between 1992 and 2014 in a sample of large, small and mid‐size North American firms. Consistent with the glass cliff, we find that women are appointed as CEOs in precarious situations. However, we find female CEOs are 40% less likely to face turnover at any point after appointment than male CEOs. This conflicts with an implication of the glass cliff and differs significantly from existing research which shows that female CEOs have only a slightly lower risk of turnover than male CEOs. Our larger, more recent sample captures changes in the labour market that explain the departure from the results of earlier studies. We find evidence that the lower turnover rate of female CEOs is related to firms’ desire to avoid the negative publicity that would accompany their termination, and we also show that greater education has a positive impact on CEO job security.  相似文献   
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We propose that outside CEO candidates will have greater bargaining power than insiders. As a result, outside CEO successors will likely receive greater total compensation than inside CEO successors. Outside successors, meantime, pose more risk to the hiring firm than inside successors due to higher information asymmetry. As a result, outside successor compensation packages are tilted towards more performance-related pay-at-risk, while inside successor packages have a higher percentage in salary. In addition, outside successors may want to utilize the structure of their compensation at their previous firm in their new contracts. Using a sample of 99 firms with outside successors who were not CEO in their prior firms, matched by industry and size to firms that hired inside candidates, we find evidence supporting these hypotheses.  相似文献   
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