经济增长时期的国民幸福感——基于CGSS数据的追踪研究

为回应有关中国国民幸福感的争论,评估过去10年宏观经济和政策变化对普通人生活的影响,利用中国综合社会调查数据(CGSS),分析近10年国民幸福感变化趋势。研究基于5个时点、44166个样本,发现中国国民幸福感在过去10年内一直处于上升趋势,不同政治身份、户口类型、年龄、收入、婚姻状况、民族等群体的幸福感在过去10年都有不同程度的提高。经济增长可能是幸福感提升的动力;如果经济收缩,那么幸福感也可能随之下降。要确保经济社会协调发展,尚需对幸福感进行更多、更细致的追踪和研究。     

Impartial Nominations for a Prize

A group of peers must choose one of them to receive a prize; everyone cares only about winning, not about who gets the prize if someone else. An award rule is impartial if one's message never influences whether or not one wins the prize. We explore the consequences of impartiality when each agent nominates a single (other) agent for the prize. On the positive side, we construct impartial nomination rules where both the influence of individual messages and the requirements to win the prize are not very different across agents. Partition the agents in two or more districts, each of size at least 3, and call an agent a local winner if he is nominated by a majority of members of his own district; the rule selects a local winner with the largest support from nonlocal winners, or a fixed default agent in case there is no local winner. On the negative side, impartiality implies that ballots cannot be processed anonymously as in plurality voting. Moreover, we cannot simultaneously guarantee that the winner always gets at least one nomination, and that an agent nominated by everyone else always wins.     

Modes of Entrance by Gender and Wage Differential in the French Labour Market

Abstract. This paper explores the gender wage differential after the exit from school in France. Using survey longitudinal data on young men and women leaving the French school system in 1998, we show that the residual entrance‐level wage differential by gender may be explained by the expected gender differential of access to job opportunities. A hierarchical classification is used to estimate the probability to obtain easy access to non‐subsidized jobs. After control for hours worked and hierarchical levels, and for the predicted values of this previous estimation, we find no significant impact of gender on entrance‐level wages.     

Choice functions over a finite set: A summary

A choice function picks some outcome(s) from every issue (subset of a fixed set A of outcomes). When is this function derived from one preference relation on A (the choice set being then made up of the best preferred outcomes within the issue), or from several preference relations (the choice set being then the Pareto optimal outcome within the issue, or the union of the best preferred outcomes for each preference relation)? A complete and unified treatment of these problems is given based on three functional properties of the choice function. None of the main results is original.     

Discriminatory Barriers and the Gender Wage Gap in France

Abstract. In this paper, we propose a method of decomposition that identifies the wage effect of the gender discriminatory barriers in the allocation of grades and full‐time jobs. Standard decomposition techniques tend to interpret the explained portion as a non‐discriminatory component, though discriminatory barriers in the labour market also affect the characteristics of individuals. Using survey data generated by INSEE in France in 2000, we find some evidence that the gender discriminatory barriers within the French labour market explain much of the difference between men and women's attainment and full‐time employment. Our method substantially changes the traditional empirical conclusions since the discriminatory barriers in the allocation of grades and full‐time jobs account for one quarter of the gender monthly wage gap. When adding to the pure wage discrimination portion, we thus show that half of the gender monthly wage gap is not explained.     

Choosing from a tournament

A tournament is any complete asymmetric relation over a finite set A of outcomes describing pairwise comparisons. A choice correspondence assigns to every tournament on A a subset of winners. Miller's uncovered set is an example for which we propose an axiomatic characterization. The set of Copeland winners (outcomes with maximal scores) is another example; it is a subset of the uncovered set: we note that it can be a dominated subset. A third example is derived from the sophisticated agenda algorithm; we argue that it is a better choice correspondence than the Copeland set.     

Generalized condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences

When preferences are single peaked the choice functions that are independent of irrelevant alternatives both in Nash's and in Arrow's sense are characterized. They take the Condorcet winner of the n individual peaks plus at most n-1 fixed ballots (phantom voters). These choice functions are also coalitionally strategy-proof.Next the domain of individual preferences is enlarged to allow for singleplateau preferences: again, Nash's IIA and Arrow's IIA uniquely characterize a class of generalized Condorcet winners choice functions. These are, again, coalitionally strategy-proof.     

Fair division under joint ownership: Recent results and open problems

Two microeconomic models of joint ownership are discussed: the division of unproduced commodities and the joint production of a single output by a single input. In both models the two principal interpretations of fairness are Equal Split Guarantee (ESG) and No Envy (NE). When combined with Pareto optimality these axioms are however not compatible with some appealing monotonicity properties. Resource monotonicity (more cake to share makes everyone happy) is incompatible with either ESG or NE, and Population Monotonicity (one more mouth to feed makes everyone unhappy) is incompatible with NE. This in turn suggests three disjoint classes of fair solutions. This paper contains very few new results, it is mostly a survey of recent literature.A first version of this paper was delivered in June 1989 at the University of Alicante, for the third German Bernacer Lectures. The hospitality of this institution is gratefully acknowledged. I am also thankful to Claude d'Aspremont, Louis Gevers and William Thomson for stimulating discussions and to an anonymous referee for helpful criticisms.     

Gender,the Body and Organization Studies: Que(e)rying Empirical Research

Even in organization studies scholarship that treats gender as performative and fluid, a certain ‘crystallization’ of gender identities as somehow unproblematic and stable may occur because of our methodological decision‐making, and especially our categorization of participants. Mobilizing queer theory — and Judith Butler's work on the heterosexual matrix and performativity in particular — as a conceptual lens, we examine this crystallization, suggesting it is based on two implicit assumptions: that gender is a cultural mark over a passive biological body, or is a base identity ‘layered over’ by other identities (class, race, age etc.). Following Butler, we argue that in order to foreground the fluidity and uncertainty of gender categories in our scholarship, it is necessary to understand gender identity as a process of doing and undoing gender that is located very precisely in time and space. Given this perspective on gender identities as complex processes of identification, non‐identification and performativity, we offer some pointers on how the methodological decision‐making underpinning empirical research on gender, work and organization could and should begin from this premise.     

Pseudo maximum-likelihood estimation of the univariate GARCH (1,1) and asymptotic properties

One provides in this paper the pseudo-likelihood estimator (PMLE) and asymptotic theory for the GARCH (1,1) process. Strong consistency of the pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimator (MLE) is established by appealing to conditions given in Jeantheau (1998) concerning the existence of a stationary and ergodic solution to the multivariate GARCH (p, q) process. One proves the asymptotic normality of the PMLE by appealing to martingales' techniques.