How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?

We estimate the frequencies with which ten voting anomalies (ties and nine voting paradoxes) occur under 14 voting rules, using a statistical model that simulates voting situations that follow the same distribution as voting situations in actual elections. Thus the frequencies that we estimate from our simulated data are likely to be very close to the frequencies that would be observed in actual three-candidate elections. We find that two Condorcet-consistent voting rules do, the Black rule and the Nanson rule, encounter most paradoxes and ties less frequently than the other rules do, especially in elections with few voters. The Bucklin rule, the Plurality rule, and the Anti-plurality rule tend to perform worse than the other eleven rules, especially when the number of voters becomes large.     

REVELATION MECHANISMS AND ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY

We show that revelation mechanisms affect owners' valuations of the assets they own and that different mechanisms provide owners with the incentive to reveal—truthfully—different valuations. Self‐assessment of property with compulsory sale at the self‐assessed price is the only known mechanism that promotes allocative efficiency by providing efficient incentives for transferring property to those who value it most. We introduce two modifications of the standard self‐assessment mechanism that maintain full incentives to invest and raise as much public revenue as can be raised efficiently. (JEL D61, D82, H21, K11)     

Structurally consistent probabilities of selecting answers

This paper offers a procedure for specifying probabilities for students to select answers on a multiple-choice test that, unlike previous procedures, satisfies all three of the following structural consistency conditions: (1) for any student, the sum over questions of the probabilities that the student will use the correct answers is the student's score on the test; (2) for any student, the sum over possible answers of the probabilities of using the answers is 1.0; and (3) for any answer to any question, the sum over students of the probabilities of using that answer is the number of students who used that answer. When applied to an exam, these fully consistent probabilities had the same power to identify cheaters as the probabilities proposed by Wesolowsky, and noticeably better power than the probabilities suggested by Frary et al.     

Independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of voting

In social choice theory there has been, and for some authors there still is, a confusion between Arrow'sIndependence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and somechoice consistency conditions. In this paper we analyze this confusion. It is often thought that Arrow himself was confused, but we show that this is not so. What happened was that Arrow had in mind a condition we callregularity, which implies IIA, but which he could not state formally in his model because his model was not rich enough to permit certain distinctions that would have been necessary. It is the combination of regularity and IIA that he discusses, and the origin of the confusion lies in the fact that if one uses a model that does not permit a distinction between regularity and IIA, regularity looks like a consistency condition, which it is not. We also show that the famous example that proves that Arrow was confused does not prove this at all if it is correctly interpreted.     

Long-term planning and forecasting in Europe

In January 1968, in the light of the Consultative Assembly's recommendations (Recommendation 516) aimed at giving the Work Programme a forward-looking dimension, the Secretary General invited a group of personalities of world-wide reputation to discuss the role they thought the Council of Europe might play in the field of long-term planning and forecasting. Following this meeting, which was attended, among others, by MM. Pietro Ferraro, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Robert Jungk, Johan Galtung and Professor Karl Steinbuch, a number of proposals were formulated with a view to intensifying co-operation between member countries in the field of future research at both governmental and non-governmental level. Such co-operation was intended, inter alia, to lay a scientific foundation for work concerned with the future which might find a place in the activities of the Council of Europe. The first step in this direction would be to compile an inventory of European bodies engaged in long-term planning and forecasting studies and of their activities (research, seminars, publications, etc.).     

Varieties of failure of monotonicity and participation under five voting methods

In voting theory, monotonicity is the axiom that an improvement in the ranking of a candidate by voters cannot cause a candidate who would otherwise win to lose. The participation axiom states that the sincere report of a voter’s preferences cannot cause an outcome that the voter regards as less attractive than the one that would result from the voter’s non-participation. This article identifies three binary distinctions in the types of circumstances in which failures of monotonicity or participation can occur. Two of the three distinctions apply to monotonicity, while one of those and the third apply to participation. The distinction that is unique to monotonicity is whether the voters whose changed rankings demonstrate non-monotonicity are better off or worse off. The distinction that is unique to participation is whether the marginally participating voter causes his first choice to lose or his last choice to win. The overlapping distinction is whether the profile of voters’ rankings has a Condorcet winner or a cycle at the top. This article traces the occurrence of all of the resulting combination of characteristics in the voting methods that can exhibit failures of monotonicity.