Cooperative innovation through a talent management pool: A qualitative study on coopetition in healthcare

In recent years, the Dutch healthcare sector has been confronted with increased competition. Not only are financial resources scarce, Dutch hospitals also need to compete with other hospitals in the same geographic area to attract and retain talented employees due to considerable labour shortages. However, four hospitals operating in the same region are cooperating to cope with these shortages by developing a joint Talent Management Pool. ‘Coopetiton’ is a concept used for simultaneous cooperation and competition. In this paper, a case study is performed in order to enhance our understanding of coopetition. Among other things, the findings suggest that perceptions of organizational actors on competition differ and might hinder cooperative innovation with competitors, while perceived shared problems and resource constraints stimulate coopetition. We reflect on the current coopetition literature in light of the research findings, which have implications for future research on this topic.     

BayesProject: Fast computation of a projection direction for multivariate changepoint detection

Statistics and Computing - This article focuses on the challenging problem of efficiently detecting changes in mean within multivariate data sequences. Multivariate changepoints can be detected by...     

CAN THE PRESIDENT REALLY AFFECT ECONOMIC GROWTH? PRESIDENTIAL EFFORT AND THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE

Presidential elections are often seen as referendums on the health of the economy; however, little evidence exists on the president's ability to influence gross domestic product (GDP). This study examines the effect of the incentive to be reelected and the resulting increase in presidential effort on GDP growth. Growth is found to rise in reelection years for first‐term presidents after 1932 and to fall in election years before 1932, when reelection was uncommon, and for second‐term presidents generally. This effect is largest for high‐quality presidents—who probably have the highest return to effort—and is spread across multiple sectors of the economy. (JEL D78, D72, E32, J24)     

Social Antecedents of Medical Fraud and Over-Servicing: What Makes A Doctor Criminal?

Medical fraud and overservicing are estimated to cost the Australian community between $130 and $200 million per annum, a figure far greater than the national cost of burglary and almost the same as the total property loss from all conventional crime. An examination of the social antecedents of medical fraud and overservicing suggests that the predisposition of some doctors to engage in these practices occurs because of the following: (1) medical training and professional socialization that orientate student doctors away from altruistic health issues towards narrower self-interested professional concerns; (2) career expectations of a high pattern of material consumption that are often frustrated by an increasingly competitive medical market place; and (3) professional medical organizations that lobby for national health policies which reflect the mercenary self-interest of doctors rather than the health interest of the nation.