UNDERSTANDING MAIL SURVEY RESPONSE BEHAVIOR A META-ANALYSIS

A meta-analysis of prior studies of techniques designed to inducemail survey response rates was conducted. Research encompassing184 effects (study outcomes) in 115 studies (articles) for 17predictors of response rate was examined. The average effectsize across all manipulations was r=.065, indicating an averageincrease of about 6.5 percent in response rates for manipulations.Effect sizes for specific predictors and two potential moderatorsof effects were examined. Results indicated that repeated contactsin the form of preliminary notification and follow-ups, appeals,inclusion of a return envelope, postage, and monetary incentives,were effective in increasing survey response rates. Significanteffect sizes for the predictors ranged from an increase in responseof 2 percent to 31 percent. Implications of the results forthe conduct of mail surveys and future research on mail surveyresponse behavior are discussed.     

RACE-OF-INTERVIEWER EFFECTS IN A PREELECTION POLL VIRGINIA 1989

All published preelection surveys of the 1989 Virginia gubernatorialcontest overestimated the vote share of the black candidateand eventual victor, Douglas Wilder. We offer a "social desirability"interpretation of the polls' inaccuracies and hypothesize thatclaiming support for Wilder was the socially desirable responsefor some whites, especially when the interviewer was black.We show a race-of-interviewer effect on the vote intention ofwhite respondents of 8–11 percentage points in a preelectionsurvey of Virginia voters. The effects were greatest among whiteDemocrats and among whites who were more uncertain of theirvote intention. We discuss the implications of these findingsfor race-of-interviewer research and for improving the accuracyof preelection forecasts in contests with black and white opposingcandidates.     

Support for National Health Insurance: Intercohort Differentials

Past research has demonstrated that the majority of the Americanpublic favor some form of national health insurance (NHI), butthe sources of this support have not been clearly identified.This paper shows that support for NHI follows party lines, withDemocrats most favoring it, followed by Independents and Republicans.The young, women, blacks, the less educated (among others) alsofavor NHI more than others, but it is apparently not a "personalneed" for the insurance that prompts this support. Lack of adequateinsurance coverage, dissatisfaction with current care, or pooraccess to health care are not associated with support for NHI.Instead, cognizance of the larger socioeconomic issues (particularlyrising society-wide health care costs), in addition to politicalidentification, generates support for NHI.     

FINANCIAL INNOVATION, PRICE SMOOTHING, AND MONETARY POLICY

This paper examines an unregulated transaction services market that is subject to financial innovation in an economy that experiences aggregate supply and demand shocks. The availability of this unregulated market to transactors smooths the price response to these shocks. However, financial innovations act as money supply shocks that increase price disturbances. If there is persistence in the real aggregate supply shocks and in the rate of adoption of financial innovations, then the central bank can forecast some portion of the changes in transaction requirements that accompany these shocks and damp the residual variation in prices by accommodating these anticipated needs.     

COMBINING MONETARY AND SOCIAL SANCTIONS TO PROMOTE COOPERATION

We employ an experimental approach to consider the impact of a combination of formal and informal sanctions on contribution levels for a specific type of public good. We find that when both sanctions are available, contributions and overall welfare are higher than when only one of the two sanctioning systems is available. The availability of an array of sanctions of varying severity appears to enhance welfare. (JEL C92 )     

WHY ARE BETTER SEATS “UNDERPRICED”?

Faced with competition, one's behavior often depends on that of his competitors. The determination of price is one response to competition, and an important one indeed. But it is not the only one. All contracting parties may gain, if price can be reduced to encourage restraints on behavior. This paper shows that "behavior which restrains behavior" may be effectively induced by the simple expedient of a reduction in price.