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1.
Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumption good by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributions with a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of allocations obtained by any continuous sharing rule contains Pareto efficient allocations. We also present a mechanism that implements in Nash equilibrium the Pareto efficient allocations contained in an arbitrary sharing rule. Received: 29 June 1998/Accepted: 15 November 2000  相似文献   
2.
Urban Ecosystems - Free-ranging domestic dogs are the world most common exotic carnivore species that could negatively interact with the native wildlife as predators, competitors, and disease...  相似文献   
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We explore to what extent we can propose fixed negotiation rules and simple mechanisms (or protocols) that guarantee that political parties can form stable coalition governments. We analyze the case in which three parties can hold office in the form of two-party coalitions. We define a family of weighted rules that select political agreements as a function of the bliss points of the parties and electoral results (Gamson’s law and equal share among others are included). We show that every weighted rule yields a stable coalition. We use implementation theory to design a protocol (in the form of a mechanism) that guarantees that a stable coalition will govern. We find that no dominant solvable mechanism can be used for this purpose, but there is a simultaneous unanimity mechanism that implements it in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium. Finally, we analyze the case of a larger number of political parties.  相似文献   
5.
Alcohol abuse on college campuses continues to be a significant public health issue and health promotion strategies are being directed at changing the culture of collegiate drinking. From a qualitative research perspective such efforts remain uniformed since this area of research is currently dominated by large-scale surveys that illuminate little regarding undergraduate perceptions of alcohol use. This study describes results conducted on perceptions of drinking among college students, and discusses the implications these results may have for developing collegiate alcohol abuse prevention programs.  相似文献   
6.
Evaluation research pertaining to the development of assessment instruments that fully capture the facets of empowerment prevention perspectives among youth are sparse. With funding from the American Legacy Foundation, the University of New Mexico Center for Health Promotion and Disease Prevention, in partnership with the New Mexico State Department of Health, developed a measure of individual empowerment. Drawing from the various bodies of literature in adolescent development, substance abuse prevention, and program/coalition building, a questionnaire was developed to capture facets of individual empowerment as it pertains to tobacco prevention efforts among youth within New Mexico. Utilizing a sample of 112 youth participants, principal axis factor analysis with Varimax rotation revealed four valid sub-scales entitled active participation, empowerment efficacy, external organizational involvement, and participant satisfaction. Internal consistency reliabilities were satisfactory with Cronbach's alpha ranging from .78 to .84. Regression mediation analysis revealed that active participation mediated the relationship of empowerment efficacy and self-esteem. Challenges associated with conceptualizing and assessing empowerment among youth are discussed.  相似文献   
7.
Plurality rule is mostly criticized from being capable of choosing an alternative considered as worst by a strict majority. This paper considers elections in which the agenda consists of potential candidates strategically choosing whether or not to enter the election. In this context, we examine the ability of scoring rules to fulfil the Condorcet criterion. We show for the case of three potential candidates that Plurality rule is the only scoring rule that satisfies a version of the Condorcet criterion in two cases: 1) when preferences are single-peaked and, 2) when preferences are single-dipped.
Bernardo MorenoEmail:
M. Socorro Puy (Corresponding author)Email:
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8.
The effects of childbearing and work sector on women's hours and earnings in the 8 years following an index pregnancy were examined in a cohort of more than 2,000 women in the Cebu Longitudinal Health and Nutrition Survey. Change in cash earnings and hours worked were each modeled jointly with sector of labor force participation using an estimation strategy that deals with endogeneity of childbearing decisions and selectivity into sector of work. Two or more additional children born in the 8 year interval significantly reduced women's earnings, while having an additional child under 2 years of age in 1991 reduced hours worked. Received: 16 July 1998/Accepted: 22 March 2001 All correspondence to Linda Adair. The authors wish to thank Family Health International and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for their generous support. This publication was funded by USAID under Cooperative Agreement USAID/CCP-3060-A-00-3021-00 to Family Health International (FHI). David Guilkey's participation in this paper was also supported by the MEASURE Evaluation Project also with support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) under Contract Number HRN-A-00-97-00018-00. The conclusions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the policies of FHI or USAID. Helpful comments by two anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged. Responsible editor: T. Paul Schultz.  相似文献   
9.
A simple procedure to tighten the Lagrangian bounds is proposed. The approach is interpreted in two ways. First, it can be seen as a reformulation of the original problem aimed to split the resulting Lagrangian problem into two subproblems. Second, it can be considered as a search for a tighter estimation of the penalty term arising in the Lagrangian problem. The new bounds are illustrated by a small example and studied numerically for a class of the generalized assignment problems.  相似文献   
10.
In the citizen–candidate approach each citizen chooses whether or not to run as candidate. In a single-peaked preference domain, we find that the strategic entry decision of the candidates eliminates one of the most undesirable properties of Plurality rule, namely to elect a poor candidate in three-candidate elections since as we show, the Condorcet winner among the self-declared candidates is always elected. We find that the equilibria with three candidates are basically 2-fold, either there are two right-wing candidates and a left-wing candidate who wins the elections (or its symmetric), or there is a right-wing candidate, a left-wing candidate, and a candidate located in between the two others who becomes winner. We also show that when four or more candidates enter the contest, Plurality rule can elect the Condorcet-loser among the self-declared candidates.   相似文献   
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