排序方式: 共有7条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Paulo Barelli Srihari Govindan Robert Wilson 《Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society》2014,82(1):271-314
We define the class of two‐player zero‐sum games with payoffs having mild discontinuities, which in applications typically stem from how ties are resolved. For such games, we establish sufficient conditions for existence of a value of the game, maximin and minimax strategies for the players, and a Nash equilibrium. If all discontinuities favor one player, then a value exists and that player has a maximin strategy. A property called payoff approachability implies existence of an equilibrium, and that the resulting value is invariant: games with the same payoffs at points of continuity have the same value and ɛ‐equilibria. For voting games in which two candidates propose policies and a candidate wins election if a weighted majority of voters prefer his proposed policy, we provide tie‐breaking rules and assumptions about voters' preferences sufficient to imply payoff approachability. These assumptions are satisfied by generic preferences if the dimension of the space of policies exceeds the number of voters; or with no dimensional restriction, if the electorate is sufficiently large. Each Colonel Blotto game is a special case in which each candidate allocates a resource among several constituencies and a candidate gets votes from those allocated more than his opponent offers; in this case, for simple‐majority rule we prove existence of an equilibrium with zero probability of ties. 相似文献
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AbstractIn this contribution, we aim to prioritise the indicators to enhance the organisational supply chain’s (SC) effectiveness from an industrial perspective. It will help industries to develop strategies for managing the SC effectively and ensuring improvement in performance continuously. To achieve this, this work proposes to use a two-phase research methodology. First, 36 SC performance improvement indicators are recognised from a literature survey and from field and industrial expert’s inputs. Secondly, a structural model is proposed using the fuzzy analytical hierarchy process (AHP) to prioritise the indicators strategically to improve the SC performance. The fuzzy AHP method helps determine the priority of concerns of the identified indicators under fuzzy surroundings. Inputs in this research are taken from four ancillary Indian plastic manufacturing firms. Research findings indicate that collaborations and information exchange dimension indicators obtained the highest priority in improving SC performance. The model proposed is considered very useful for the SC managers/practitioners/decision-makers to understand better and distinguish the essential SC performance improvement indicators and to take systematic decisions specifically to improve the performance of business in a SC context. Sensitivity analysis was conducted to examine the priority ranking of the indicators. 相似文献
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Srihari Govindan Robert Wilson 《Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society》2012,80(4):1639-1699
For a finite game with perfect recall, a refinement of its set of Nash equilibria selects closed connected subsets, called solutions. Assume that each solution's equilibria use undominated strategies and some of its equilibria are quasi‐perfect, and that all solutions are immune to presentation effects; namely, if the game is embedded in a larger game with more pure strategies and more players such that the original players' feasible mixed strategies and expected payoffs are preserved regardless of what other players do, then the larger game's solutions project to the original game's solutions. Then, for a game with two players and generic payoffs, each solution is an essential component of the set of equilibria that use undominated strategies, and thus a stable set of equilibria as defined by Mertens (1989). 相似文献
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Srihari Govindan Andrew McLennan 《Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society》2001,69(2):455-471
Consider nonempty finite pure strategy sets S1,…,Sn, let S=S1×⋅⋅⋅×Sn, let Ω be a finite space of “outcomes,” let Δ(Ω) be the set of probability distributions on Ω, and let θ: S→Δ(Ω) be a function. We study the conjecture that for any utility in a generic set of n‐tuples of utilities on Ω there are finitely many distributions on Ω induced by the Nash equilibria of the game given by the induced utilities on S. We give a counterexample refuting the conjecture for n≥3. Several special cases of the conjecture follow from well known theorems, and we provide some generalizations of these results. 相似文献
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A player's pure strategy is called relevant for an outcome of a game in extensive form with perfect recall if there exists a weakly sequential equilibrium with that outcome for which the strategy is an optimal reply at every information set it does not exclude. The outcome satisfies forward induction if it results from a weakly sequential equilibrium in which players' beliefs assign positive probability only to relevant strategies at each information set reached by a profile of relevant strategies. We prove that if there are two players and payoffs are generic, then an outcome satisfies forward induction if every game with the same reduced normal form after eliminating redundant pure strategies has a sequential equilibrium with an equivalent outcome. Thus in this case forward induction is implied by decision‐theoretic criteria. 相似文献
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