ANALYZING INDUSTRY‐LEVEL VULNERABILITY BY PREDICTING FINANCIAL BANKRUPTCY

This study introduces a novel framework for building company bankruptcy models and a methodology for assessing the vulnerability of industrial economic activities. We consider the identification of bankruptcy as a classification problem and assume that bankruptcy criteria differ across industries. We build highly accurate industry bankruptcy models by constructing separate models for each industry. We also propose a method of analyzing the vulnerability of industrial economic activities in various countries and industries using new indicators we call “expected potential loss,” which we obtain using the predicted likelihood of bankruptcy and company information. (JEL G0, C0)     

Salvage therapy trial for erectile dysfunction using phosphodiesterase type 5 inhibitors and vitamin E: Preliminary report

We report our initial experience with salvage therapy for low responders to PDE-5 inhibitors by adding vitamin E. Of 89 patients with ED who visited our clinic between January 2004 to August 2006, 9 were unable to obtain a full response to a PDE-5 inhibitor and included in the present study. After providing informed consent, each was given 300 mg per day of α-tocophenol at least 1 month and completed IIEF-5 questionnaires to assess its efficacy while also taking a PDE-5 inhibitor. With α-tocophenol administration, the average IIEF-5 score increased from 13.8 ± 3.2 to 17.1 ± 3.6. Four of seven patients who completed the questionnaire each time showed improved IIEF-5 scores, with a maximum elevation of 9 points. Further, eight of the nine patients experienced favourable subjective changes, the majority being increased penile rigidity. The present clinical trial results are, to our knowledge, the first known to show the effects of vitamin E for enhancing the efficacy of a PDE-5 inhibitor.     

Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem

We present an algorithm to compute the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs as the discount factor tends to 1 for stochastic games with observable states and public (but not necessarily perfect) monitoring when the limiting set of (long‐run players') equilibrium payoffs is independent of the initial state. This is the case, for instance, if the Markov chain induced by any Markov strategy profile is irreducible. We then provide conditions under which a folk theorem obtains: if in each state the joint distribution over the public signal and next period's state satisfies some rank condition, every feasible payoff vector above the minmax payoff is sustained by a perfect public equilibrium with low discounting.