On Optimality of Bayesian Wavelet Estimators

Abstract.  We investigate the asymptotic optimality of several Bayesian wavelet estimators, namely, posterior mean, posterior median and Bayes Factor, where the prior imposed on wavelet coefficients is a mixture of a mass function at zero and a Gaussian density. We show that in terms of the mean squared error, for the properly chosen hyperparameters of the prior, all the three resulting Bayesian wavelet estimators achieve optimal minimax rates within any prescribed Besov space     for p  ≥ 2. For 1 ≤  p  < 2, the Bayes Factor is still optimal for (2 s +2)/(2 s +1) ≤  p  < 2 and always outperforms the posterior mean and the posterior median that can achieve only the best possible rates for linear estimators in this case.     

Tax differentiation,lobbying, and welfare

To what extent a taxing authority should be granted the power to impose different tax schedules to different groups of taxpayers? Although the policy maker aims at maximizing social welfare, her tax policy may be distorted by the lobbying activity of taxpayers. In this political environment we characterize the conditions under which social welfare can be increased by restricting the set of tax instruments available to the policy maker; i.e., the scope of tax differentiation. We show that full differentiation is more costly, in terms of welfare distortions, when the lobbies are asymmetric in size, while minimal differentiation is more costly when the tax bases are asymmetric across different groups.     

Strategies for Europe proposals for science and technology policies industrial innovation in Europe

Europe's performance with respect to industrial innovation is compared to those of USA and Japan. The reasons for Europe's relatively poor performance are examined and related to institutional, cultural and social factors. An appropriate strategy for innovation in European industry is then defined.     

Dynamic capabilities and high-tech entrepreneurial ventures’ performance in the aftermath of an environmental jolt

This paper contributes to studies on dynamic capabilities (DCs) by showing that a neglected environmental contingency – i.e. the occurrence of a jolt – shapes the DCs–performance relationship. We focus on high-tech entrepreneurial ventures because these are the firms that jolts affect most; in so doing, we also advance the understanding of DCs in the entrepreneurship field. We argue that, in the aftermath of an environmental jolt, the high-tech entrepreneurial ventures that use internationalization and new product development capabilities to modify their resource configuration and regain environmental fit enjoy better performance. Econometric estimates on a sample of 340 Italian high-tech entrepreneurial ventures confronting the consequences of the global economic crisis that began in 2008 confirm that separately using these two DCs has a positive performance effect. This effect is stronger for relatively smaller ventures. Interestingly, despite synergies should arise from the combined use of the two DCs, we do not detect any superadditive effects.     

The 'Lombardy Model': Subsidiarity-informed Regional Governance

This article provides a concise overview of the Lombardy region's experience of government during the past twelve years. During this period, legislative, political and administrative strategic decisions have been informed by a distinctive vision, anchored in the principle of subsidiarity. The main characteristics of the emerging governance model are discussed: its political, juridical and social contexts; its underlying principles; its main policy goals, instruments and initiatives; and its criticalities and challenges.     

CUSTOMER OWNERSHIP AND QUALITY PROVISION IN PUBLIC SERVICES UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

The implementation of projects producing external effects is often a source of disagreement and conflict between hosting and nonhosting communities. The article focuses on the impact of participatory ownership on conflict resolution and social welfare in the presence of asymmetric information and imperfect quality monitoring. We show that in such situations the participatory solution may help solve deadlocks that money transfers to a for‐profit operator cannot solve. The analysis highlights three main factors behind this fact. First, a customer‐owned cooperative internalizes, at least partially, the external effects generated by the project. Second, the alignment of cooperative members' preferences with those of the social planner reduces (in some cases eliminates) the distortions caused by information asymmetries. Third, cooperatives require less costly monitoring than their for‐profit counterparts. We also show that cooperatives' productive inefficiency with respect to for‐profits may emerge endogenously as a consequence of a lower pressure to compete on costs for the market. (JEL H23, L33, P13)