The psychological contract: retaining newly employed physicians

You spend lots of time and money recruiting the best candidates to fill your physician positions. But sometimes you lose those physicians after only a year or two on the job. Discover ways to help stop the turnover and keep valued employees happy.     

Can preferences for catastrophe avoidance reconcile social discounting with intergenerational equity?

A social welfare function treating all generations equally is derived from a set of axioms that allow for preferences for catastrophe avoidance or risk equity. Implications for the case where there is a risk of world extinction are studied. We show that substantial time discounting can arise from the planner’s taste for catastrophe avoidance, even if the probability of the world ending is infinitesimally small. We wish to thank Marc Fleurbaey, Thibault Gajdos, two anonymous referees and an associate editor for many valuable comments.     

A Convolution Estimator for the Density of Nonlinear Regression Observations

Abstract. The problem of estimating an unknown density function has been widely studied. In this article, we present a convolution estimator for the density of the responses in a nonlinear heterogenous regression model. The rate of convergence for the mean square error of the convolution estimator is of order n ^?1 under certain regularity conditions. This is faster than the rate for the kernel density method. We derive explicit expressions for the asymptotic variance and the bias of the new estimator, and further a data‐driven bandwidth selector is proposed. We conduct simulation experiments to check the finite sample properties, and the convolution estimator performs substantially better than the kernel density estimator for well‐behaved noise densities.     

A complete and strongly anonymous leximin relation on infinite streams

Various extensions of the leximin order to the infinite dimensional setting have been suggested. They relax completeness and strong anonymity. Instead, by removing sensitivity to generations at infinite rank this paper defines a complete and strongly anonymous leximin relation on infinite streams. The order is axiomatized, and it is shown to be the limit of extended rank-discounted utilitarianism for any utility function, as the discount factor approaches zero.     

A critical survey on the status of multiple criteria decision making theory and practice

This paper seeks to review and to contrast the main streams of thought in Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) theory and practice, without attempting to review all MCDM methods in detail. The main purpose is to identify pitfalls in the usage of various approaches, and to suggest approaches which are most robustly and effectively useable, especially by the non-expert in MCDM methodology. Problem areas in MCDM still requiring further research are also discussed.     

Who Wins and Who Loses? Public Transfer Accounts for US Generations Born 1850 to 2090

Public transfer programs in industrial countries are thought to benefit the elderly through pension and health care programs at the expense of the young and future generations. This intergenerational picture changes, however, if public education is also considered as a transfer program. We calculate the net present value at birth of benefits received minus taxes paid for US generations born 1850 to 2090. Surprisingly, all generations 1950 to 2050 are net gainers, while many current elderly are net losers. Windfall gains from starting Social Security and Medicare partially offset windfall losses from starting public education, roughly consistent with the arguments of Becker and Murphy.     

The aggregation of preferences: can we ignore the past?

The article shows that a Paretian social welfare function can be history independent and time consistent only if a stringent set of conditions is verified. Individual utilities must be additive. The social welfare function must be a linear combination of these utilities. Social preferences are stationary only if, in addition, all individuals have the same constant discount rate. The results are implemented in two frameworks: deterministic dynamic choice and dynamic choice under uncertainty. The applications highlight that the conditions are unlikely to be met by individual preferences, and that they severely restrict social preferences.