RBI’s Monetary Policy and Macroeconomic Announcements: Impact on S&P CNX Nifty VIX

This study investigates the information content of RBI’s monetary policy and macroeconomic announcements and its impact on the implied volatility index. The empirical findings suggest that implied volatility (VIX) increases prior to the scheduled macroeconomic announcements. This study takes into account the RBI’s (Reserve Bank of India) monetary policy in the form of monetary credit information review meeting days, consumer price index, wholesale/producers price index, index of industrial production, employment report, gross domestic product. The empirical result explains that investors regard the scheduled macroeconomic announcements in the valuation of their financial assets. More specifically study shows that investors jointly consider the MCIR and GDP reports for their financial planning. This study contributes in two ways; it is useful in the forecasting of short-term market volatility and pricing of Options.     

Design of Auction Parameters to Reduce the Effect of Collusion

Government departments are increasingly turning to auctions to procure goods and services. Collusion among bidders, however, reduces competition and raises winning bid prices. Since conventional collusion control measures based on the redesign of auction mechanisms are less effective in government procurement auctions, there is a need to devise control measures that decrease the effect of collusion. This article demonstrates how the principles of design of experiments can be applied in a system dynamics model to find the auction parameter values that substantially reduce the effect of collusion in government procurement auctions. This research makes a number of contributions. First, it develops a feedback‐based dynamic mechanism of collusion in government procurement auctions. The mechanism proposes the winning bid price as being determined not by the total number of bidders but by the number of independent bidders. It defines each cartel as one independent bidder regardless of the number of bidders in the cartel. Second, the mechanism is tested by developing a system dynamics model to government auctions for procuring contracts for roadwork projects in India. Third, the principles of experimental design are applied to find the auction parameter values that ensure high bid participation and low winning price‐to‐reserve price ratios.