Capital accumulation,endogenous population growth,and Easterlin cycles

In this paper we attempt to explain the occurrence of population cycles in industrialised economies where the birth rate depends on the difference between the actual and the expected consumption rate. This model of an endogenously growing population brings together Easterlin's idea of an adapting aspiration level with the neoclassical optimal growth paradigm. It is shown that in this highly aggregated demo-economic system (i.e., without inclusion of the age structure of a population) swings both in the economic and demographic variables may exist. The reason behind this strange optimal behaviour is identified to be an intertemporal substitution effect between current and future levels of consumption.We wish to thank A. Novak for helpful assistance and an anonymous referee for useful comments. Financial support by the Austrian Science Foundation under contract No. P6601 is acknowledged.     

Coordinating Production and Marketing with Dynamic Transfer Prices

Decentralized decision making is a fact in the modern business world accompanied by extensive research that looks into its consequences for overall firm profits. We study the interactions of decentralized marketing and operations divisions in a corporation and explore their impact on overall firm profits in the case with and without coordination of the two decentralized units. We assume that the marketing department is responsible for the price that influences the demand (sales), and the operations department is responsible for the production rate. We allow for backlogging over time. We model the interdependence involving marketing and operations decisions as a non‐cooperative differential game, with the two divisions as strategically interacting players. We find that, without coordination, strategic interactions of marketing and production result in inefficiencies that can quantitatively be substantial. Next, we introduce a dynamic transfer pricing scheme as a coordination device and evaluate if it establishes efficient (first best and fully coordinated) outcomes. We show that if production and marketing play a game with pre‐commitment strategies, there exists a dynamic transfer price that efficiently (fully) coordinates decentralized decision making and hence results in Pareto‐efficient company profits. If the two decentralized divisions play a game without pre‐commitment, dynamic transfer prices can partially coordinate decentralized decision making but fail to fully eliminate overall inefficiencies arising from strategic interactions among decentralized divisions.     

The credit channel of monetary policy transmission: evidence from stock returns

This paper offers a novel test of the credit view of the monetary policy transmission mechanism using stock market returns. We identify Fed policy shocks using newspaper accounts and track daily stock prices immediately following the shocks. If the credit channel is important, then firms that are dependent on bank credit and internal funds should receive a relatively greater benefit (loss) from a Fed easing (tightening) than firms with access to nonbank credit at favorable terms. We identify ten policy shocks during the expansion of 1993-94 and the 'credit crunch' period of the 1990-91 recession and find little evidence supportive of an operative credit channel.