批发、零售行业的宏观营销效率研究

我国批发、零售行业宏观营销效率与发达国家相比还有很大的差距。造成这种差距既有经济方面的原因,又由非经济方面的因素。提高我国批发、零售行业宏观营销效率,政府、行业协会、企业三方必须采取相应的对策和方法。     

Intuitive Toxicology: Expert and Lay Judgments of Chemical Risks

Human beings have always been intuitive toxicologists, relying on their senses of sight, taste, and smell to detect harmful or unsafe food, water, and air. As we have come to recognize that our senses are not adequate to assess the dangers inherent in exposure to a chemical substance, we have created the sciences of toxicology and risk assessment to perform this function. Yet despite this great effort to overcome the limitations of intuitive toxicology, it has become evident that even our best scientific methods still depend heavily on extrapolations and judgments in order to infer human health risks from animal data. Many observers have acknowledged the inherent subjectivity in the assessment of chemical risks and have indicated a need to examine the subjective or intuitive elements of expert and lay risk judgments. We have begun such an examination by surveying members of the Society of Toxicology and the lay public about basic toxicological concepts, assumptions, and interpretations. Our results demonstrate large differences between toxicologists and laypeople, as well as differences between toxicologists working in industry, academia, and government. In addition, we find that toxicologists are sharply divided in their opinions about the ability to predict a chemical's effect on human health on the basis of animal studies. We argue that these results place the problems of risk communication in a new light. Although the survey identifies misconceptions that experts should clarify for the public, it also suggests that controversies over chemical risks may be fueled as much by limitations of the science of risk assessment and disagreements among experts as by public misconceptions.     

Poland's crisis and East European socialism

Conclusion We began this article by asking whether the Polish crisis is a socialist or a Polish disease. By citing the structural factors, we brought out the common difficulties affecting all East European societies in their political and economic development. These difficulties arose out of the transition from extensive to intensive economic growth and the consequent need to replace political mobilization of the population with their political integration. The structural contradictions occurred together with conjunctural developments in the world economy, the collapse of detente, the post-war demographic explosion, and natural calamities. Poland was least able to cope with these structural and conjunctural dynamics. The result was a society united on a national basis in its conflicts with the Party State apparatus. This conflict was never resolved by Solidarity nor by the subsequent military coup.While Poland and Romania had quite similar structural and conjunctural dynamics, it was only in Poland that the constellation of nation-specific factors yielded a societal reaction of system-threatening character. Looking at the rest of Eastern Europe, we do not see a similar constellation of factors. Rather, the combination of structural, conjunctural, and specific conditions has prevented the deeper contradictions from evolving into Solidarity-type mass movements of the Polish variety. Thus, we believe that the Polish developments will not be replicated in any of the other East European countries in the foreseeable future.Does this mean that the Polish experience is so unique that it is without relevance for the other East European states? On the contrary, the recognition of common structural problems points to fundamental conflicts in all the countries of actually existing socialism. The essence of these conflicts may be the same. It is the ability to identify and deal with them that distinguishes one East European regime from another. This ability varies with the specific and conjunctural factors as applied to each country. While there is little likelihood that the Polish disease will spread, this is partly because the other East European states are beginning to take preventive measures. In other words, they are learning from the Polish experience.There are several indicators that these regimes have learned from the Polish crisis. We can summarize them in the following predictions:First, we believe that state power and the repressive apparatus of the various East European countries will be reinforced and made more effective. This applies not so much to overt shows of force but to more sophisticated methods of social control and repression: e.g., limiting information channels, dispersing dissident groups, giving in to workers protests before they spread, taking practical measures to prevent consumer shortages from getting out of hand, and the like.Second, we can expect that oppositional forces, especially intellectuals, will be increasingly restricted in their ability to formulate and articulate system-threatening demands. The East European states will take any measures - jail, slander, internal deportation, cooptation, forced emigration - to make sure that intellectuals' contact with workers is weakened or at least strictly supervised.Third, we can expect the Eastern European states to take further measures to integrate potential system-threatening movements into the official system. We will see further attempts to improve the access possibilities for those social interests that have up to now been neglected, e.g. in physical and social infrastructures, neglected regions. Moreover, there will be renewed efforts to make the system of political socialization (education, propaganda, culture) more effective. Finally, we can expect anti-corruption campaigns within the State, Party, and industrial bureaucracies as the elites attempt to make these organs more legitimate in the eyes of the population.In recent months there seems to be considerable evidence that the East European regimes have taken all these measures. There have been attempts to re-invigorate the official trade unions. Yuri Andropov's succession was marked by a highly publicized anti-corruption campaign designed to win favor among rank-and-file workers. In Romania there have been exhortations towards more self-sufficiency and self-management, so that individual producers will be less dependent on State retail outlets, and the country less dependent on costly foreign imports. The reduction in East-West trade and decline of detente have also given more leeway for the East European repressive apparatus to crack down on dissidents and oppositional movements.With reduced trade, the economic benefits of detente no longer exist as a restraining factor on the authorities. The West now has reduced influence on domestic politics in East Europe. The combination of integration and repressive measures has so far prevented the structural contradictions from growing into true political crises of the Polish variety. Eastern Europe (and Poland) is remarkably quiet.With the broad enthusiasm fostered in the West by the rise of Solidarity, it is understandable that its brutal demise had generated parallel feelings of disillusionment. It would be erroneous to consider the Polish events as an archetype for Eastern Europe. The problems of East European regimes reflect a general system crisis (economic and political), each country's response depends on specific local conditions and fortuitous conjunctures. If the Polish events are to be understood, they must be explained as a variant in a larger East European context.Having concentrated on the crisis aspects in Poland and Romania should not blind us from the fact that these systems have an amazing ability to reproduce themselves - to muddle through. Actually existing socialism is more than simply brute force. Each of the East European societies exhibits a complex dialectic between the forces of functional stability and the forces of immanent contradictions. As such, in addition to their structural aspects, we must analyze each of these societies in their differing vulnerability to conjunctural events and in their specific political, social, and cultural characters.For those who seek to replace actually existing socialism with a more emancipatory socialism, the Polish crisis constitutes a key point of departure. It should be discussed both in terms of what it means for Poland, and for Eastern Europe. The Polish events provide further evidence that the tasks of social theory reside as much in explaining why societies muddle through as why they fall apart.     

Functional Upgrading and Value Capture of Multinational Subsidiaries

This paper investigates the relationship between the value capture of multinational subsidiaries and functional upgrading, which is defined as a diversification of employment from primary business functions to higher value adding activities such as ICT, R&D, marketing or logistics. By combining survey-based business function indicators with longitudinal accounting data for a representative sample of multinational subsidiaries located in six Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), we assess the impact of functional upgrading on foreign subsidiaries' value capture. The results provide robust evidence that the breadth as well as the scope of functional upgrading induces an upward shift of subsidiaries' value added. The effect of functional upgrading is stronger in the earlier phases after entry of the foreign investor, while the long-term growth trend remains unaffected.     

Communication after an integrity-based trust violation: How organizational account giving affects trust

How can an organization repair trust through communication after an ethical failure? This study examines how trust is repaired after an integrity-based trust violation using three different accounts: apology, excuse, and refusal. In our approach, we rely on two strands of attribution theory, which suggests that different attributions for responsibility and credibility affect trust. An experiment with n = 368 was conducted to explore trust repair effectiveness of apology versus refusal and apology versus excuse after an integrity-based trust violation. Results revealed apology as a double-edged sword; it repairs trust more successfully than refusal and excuse because it is evaluated as more credible. However, it is less successful than refusal and excuse because it is evaluated as more responsible.     

Models of social mobility

Properties of measures and models of social mobility are analyzed in relation to the conceptualization of mobility. Two main objectives of mobility research are identified. One is the study of determinants of occupational achievement, the other is the study of mobility as a characteristic of social systems. It is shown that the realization of both objectives is hindered by a failure of commonly used models and measures of mobility to separate out the various individual and structural factors responsible for mobility.     

冷战后的国家利益理论探讨

冷战的“意外”终结不仅意味着世界政治进入转型时期,也意味着国家利益的一些传统认识和维护方式发生一些深刻变化。冷战的结束给国家利益的判定带来新的变化,合法性和时间两个变量的影响不断增强。在国家利益的构成要素中,不同层面的利益趋于复合化,经济利益成为最重要的组成部分,“软实力”层面的利益受到关注。与此同时,国家利益的维护需要重视国际制度的作用。     

The “Silent Dog” Method: Analyzing the Impact of Self-Generated Rules When Teaching Different Computer Chains to Boys with Autism

The purpose of the study was to extend the literature on verbal self-regulation by using the “silent dog” method to evaluate the role of verbal regulation over nonverbal behavior in 2 individuals with autism. Participants were required to talk-aloud while performing functional computer tasks.Then the effects of distracters with increasing demands on target behavior were evaluated as well as whether self-talk emitted by Participant 1 could be used to alter Participant 2''s performance. Results suggest that participants'' tasks seemed to be under control of self-instructions, and the rules generated from Participants 1''s self-talk were effective in teaching computer skills to Participant 2. The silent dog method was useful in evaluating the possible role of self-generated rules in teaching computer skills to participants with autism.     

Pandemic Recovery Analysis Using the Dynamic Inoperability Input-Output Model

Economists have long conceptualized and modeled the inherent interdependent relationships among different sectors of the economy. This concept paved the way for input-output modeling, a methodology that accounts for sector interdependencies governing the magnitude and extent of ripple effects due to changes in the economic structure of a region or nation. Recent extensions to input-output modeling have enhanced the model's capabilities to account for the impact of an economic perturbation; two such examples are the inoperability input-output model^{( 1 , 2 )} and the dynamic inoperability input-output model (DIIM).^{( 3 )} These models introduced sector inoperability, or the inability to satisfy as-planned production levels, into input-output modeling. While these models provide insights for understanding the impacts of inoperability, there are several aspects of the current formulation that do not account for complexities associated with certain disasters, such as a pandemic. This article proposes further enhancements to the DIIM to account for economic productivity losses resulting primarily from workforce disruptions. A pandemic is a unique disaster because the majority of its direct impacts are workforce related. The article develops a modeling framework to account for workforce inoperability and recovery factors. The proposed workforce-explicit enhancements to the DIIM are demonstrated in a case study to simulate a pandemic scenario in the Commonwealth of Virginia.