Marital Conflict,Ineffective Parenting,and Children's and Adolescents' Maladjustment

Data from the 1988 National Survey on Families and Households were analyzed to examine the associations among marital conflict, ineffective parenting, and children's and adolescents' maladjustment. Parents' use of harsh discipline and low parental involvement helped explain the connection between marital conflict and children's maladjustment in children aged 2 through 11. Parent‐child conflict was measured only in families with a target teenager and also was a significant mediator. Although ineffective parenting explained part of the association between marital conflict and children's maladjustment, independent effects of marital conflict remained in families with target children aged 2 through 11 (but not for families with a teenager). With a few exceptions, this pattern of findings was consistent for mothers' and fathers' reports, for daughters and sons, for families with various ethnic backgrounds, and for families living in and out of poverty.     

Employment-based health benefits: analysis of the April 1993 Current Population Survey

The April 1993 CPS differs from the March 1993 CPS in a number of respects. The April 1993 CPS supplement surveys only workers, whereas the March CPS examines the noncash benefits received by all Americans. The April CPS asks workers about health coverage in the week in which the questions were fielded, whereas the March CPS asks about coverage in the preceding year. In April 1993, there were 112.5 million civilian American workers between the ages of 18 and 64 with jobs. Eighty-two million (73 percent) of them worked for an employer that sponsored a health insurance plan, and 65 million (58 percent of all workers) participated in their employer's health plan. About one-third of workers at firms with fewer than 10 employees had employers who offer health benefits; about one-quarter of all of the workers in these firms participated in their employer's plan. Conversely, 94 percent of workers at firms with more than 1,000 employees had an employer who sponsored health benefits, and over 77 percent of these workers participated in their employer's plan. There are 16.5 million American workers whose employers sponsored health benefits but who did not participate in these benefits. Over one-half of these workers (8.5 million) chose not to be covered. Another 36 percent of these workers (5.9 million) did not participate because they were ineligible or denied coverage. Over 66 percent of the ineligible workers did not participate because they were part-time, contract, or temporary workers. Another 26 percent had not yet completed a probationary period. Among the reasons that those who chose not to participate in their employer's coverage, the vast majority (75 percent) stated they were covered by another health care plan. Twenty-nine percent stated that they chose not to purchase coverage because it was too costly or that they did not need or want the coverage. In 1993, there were 16.7 million workers with no health insurance coverage. The vast majority of these workers (95 percent) were employed by private employers. Sixty-six percent of the workers with no health insurance coverage were self-employed or worked for firms with fewer than 100 employees.     

Axiomatizations of the normalized Banzhaf value and the Shapley value

A cooperative game with transferable utilities– or simply a TU-game – describes a situation in which players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation. A solution concept for these games is a function which assigns to every such a game a distribution of payoffs over the players in the game. Famous solution concepts for TU-games are the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value. Both solution concepts have been axiomatized in various ways. An important difference between these two solution concepts is the fact that the Shapley value always distributes the payoff that can be obtained by the `grand coalition' consisting of all players cooperating together while the Banzhaf value does not satisfy this property, i.e., the Banzhaf value is not efficient. In this paper we consider the normalized Banzhaf value which distributes the payoff that can be obtained by the `grand coalition' proportional to the Banzhaf values of the players. This value does not satisfy certain axioms underlying the Banzhaf value. In this paper we introduce some new axioms that characterize the normalized Banzhaf value. We also provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value using similar axioms. Received: 10 April 1996 / Accepted: 2 June 1997     

Do flexible work schedules reduce turnover in U.S. federal agencies?

Agency theory suggests that when agencies adopt flexible work schedules, employees will be more likely to remain with the organization, because these programs demonstrate that the organization cares about their well-being in that flexible work schedules give them more flexibility regarding when, where, and how they perform their work. To test this proposition, cross-sectional panel data at the agency level were obtained from two federal government sources: Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey and FedScope. Furthermore, transfers and quits were the two forms of turnover examined. After lagging the independent variables behind turnover over several years so as to provide a robust test of causality, the results show only limited support for agency theory. Specifically, teleworking was found to lower quits. However, teleworking was not found to reduce transfers or turnover, in general. Furthermore, alternative work schedules were not found to have an impact on quits, transfers, or turnover generally.     

Master Production Scheduling Under Rolling Planning Horizons with Fixed Order Intervals

Fixed interval scheduling is studied in the context of a rolling horizon framework that is developed by building on previous work in the master scheduling area. The rolling horizon framework includes a stationary scheduling model which uses the “time fencing’concept by partitioning the planning horizon into three sections. The lengths of these sections and the frequency at which the stationary problem is updated and resolved are discussed as parameters of the rolling horizon model. Two different interpretations of the freeze interval parameter are examined, enabling confirmation and clarification of results presented in an earlier study. Details are given for three methods of calculating safety stocks as a function of rolling horizon parameters, including a method which results in optimal safety stock levels. A comparison of the safety stock methods shows that the constant safety stock method can result in inventories that are significantly above optimal under certain conditions, whereas the constant service level method consistently yields nearly optimal results.