Effects of fixed costs in two-person sequential bargaining

Rubinstein (1982) considered the problem of dividing a given surplus between two players sequentially, and then proposed a model in which the two players alternately make and respond to each other's offers through time. He further characterized the perfect equilibrium outcomes, which depend on the players time preferences and order of moves. Using both equal and unequal bargaining cost conditions and an unlimited number of rounds, two experiments were designed to compare the perfect equilibrium model to alternative models based on norms of fairness. We report analyses of final agreements, first offers, and number of bargaining rounds, which provide limited support to the perfect equilibrium model, and then conclude by recommending a shift in focus from model testing to specification of the conditions favoring one model over another.     

Expected frequency and mean size of the paradox of new members

The paradox of new members occurs when the addition of one or more new members to a weighted voting body increases, rather than decreases, the voting power of some of the old members. Extending the computational work of Brams and Affuso (1976), the mean size of the paradox and the relative frequency of its occurrence are presented for small and moderate-size weighted voting bodies. Computational results are presented and conclusions are drawn for the two power indices of Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf, three different decision rules, and voting bodies with or without dictator. Although the paradox cannot be dismissed as either contrived or improbable, its mean size in moderatesize voting bodies is sufficiently small to question its practical significance.     

Comparison of theories for payoff disbursement of coalition values

Summary and Conclusion The present paper addresses the problem of comparison of models ofpayoff disbursement in coalition formation studies which make point,line, or area predictions. A satisfactory solution to this problem is criticalfor model comparison, which has been the major focus of research oncoalition forming behavior during the last decade. The goal of this paperis to devise and subsequently apply a test procedure which, in comparingthe models to each other, offsets the advantage that the less specific modelhas over its competitor. In addition, the test procedure should employmeasures of error which yield intuitive results and are consistent with theprinciples underlying present coalition theories.It was contented that both the error measure of Bonacich and the netrate of success of Selten and Krishker suffer from serious deficiencies.Bonacich's approach allows for degrees of confirmation of a model butemploys an index of error which yields counterintuitive results. Theapproach of Seken and Krischker also defies intuition and commonpractice by treating all payoff vectors that do not fall in the model'sprediction set in exactly the same manner. The test procedure proposedin the present paper allows the prediction set of a model to expanduniformly in all the directions (dimensions) of the outcome space untilit encompasses all the observed payoff vectors which lie in this space. Indoing so it generates a function, called a support function, which relatesthe cumulative proportion of observed payoff vectors within the expand-ed set of predictions against the relative size of this set. By comparing toeach other the cumulative proportions for two different models when therelative sizes of their expanded predictions sets are held equal, theprocedure offsets the advantage possessed by the less specific modelwhich initially prescribes a larger or more dispersed prediction set.Like the index of error E devised by Bonacich, the procedure proposedin the present paper incorporates the intuitive idea that differentoutcomes diffentially confirm a theory if they are not contained in itsprediction set. Error is allowed to be continuous even if the theory underconsideration is algebraic. Statistical tests of algebraic theories in otherareas of psychology are almost always based on this assumption. Theprocedure also incorporates the shortest rather than the mean squareddistance between a payoff vector and a set of predicted payoff vectorsas the appropriate measure of error. The shortest distance is appropriatebecause coalition theories are mute with respect to the degree of importance, representativeness, of 'typicality' of the predictions they make.The procedure seems to yield satisfactory results. When applied to thetwo studies by Rapoport and Kahan (1976) and Kahan and Rapoport(1980) it has not favored models making line predictions over modelsmaking point predictions. It has established either strong or weak domi-nance relations between all pairs of models tested in these two studies.And it has confirmed the major conclusions of the two studies, which hadbeen originally reached by less rigourous tests of a smaller number ofmodels.     

Two-person sequential bargaining behavior with exogenous breakdown

We examine bargaining behavior in a noncooperative game in which players alternate in making and responding to proposals over the division of a given surplus. Although the number of bargaining periods is unlimited and time is not discounted, the bargaining is subject to exogenous breakdown at each period with a fixed probability which is common knowledge. We manipulate three probabilities of break-down in a between-subjects design that allows comparison with previous studies of two-person bargaining with time discounting. Assuming that subjects maximize expected utility, and this utility is measured by monetary payoffs, our results reject both the subgame perfect equilibrium and equal split solutions. Data analyses reveal that a substantial percentage of subjects behave adaptively in that they systematically search for the highest acceptable demands.     

Beware of Greeks? Some aspects of intercultural communication in international training programs for educators

The last decade has witnessed a growing number of international exchange and training programs for educators, particularly in the areas of social studies. Dramatic changes in Central and Eastern Europe made the western, particularly the American, experience in civic education and teaching for democracy more and more desirable. In many instances, instructors from the US and western Europe have acted as experts in those programs. However, there are observations that challenge the success of the ‘West as Expert model.’ In the described study, a group of Russian faculty and administrators of teacher‐training universities was probed on questions regarding their attitudes toward foreign and native teachers and instructors. The results of the study demonstrate that, despite unanimous support for international education, all respondents, regardless of the length of their professional experience, demonstrated a slight preference for Russian teachers and instructors compared with foreign teachers and instructors. This preference is a result of differences in school cultures, determined mainly by specific features of every school, local cultural traditions, and prejudices and misconceptions of the local population.     

Bioecological Theory, Early Child Development and the Validation of the Population-Level Early Development Instrument

The Early Development Instrument (EDI; Janus and Offord in Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science 39:1–22, 2007) project is a Canadian population-level, longitudinal research project, in which teacher ratings of Kindergarten children’s early development and wellbeing are linked to health and academic achievement variables at the individual level, and to demographic, cultural, and socioeconomic variables at the community level. In this article, we draw from Bronfenbrenner’s bioecological theory of human development to create a coherent theoretical framework for guiding validation research within a population-level approach to child development research in general and for the EDI project in particular. The discussion draws from a range of social and health sciences as well as validity theory. The paper seeks to align complex conceptual, theoretical, methodological, and psychometric considerations, to provide specific design, methodology, and validation recommendations for a population-level approach to studying children’s development and wellbeing, and to discuss the strengths and challenges of this approach.     

The impact of child obesity on active parental consent in school-based survey research on healthy eating and physical activity

Previous studies have shown that active consent procedures result in sampling bias in surveys dealing with adolescent risk behaviors such as cigarette smoking and illicit drug use. To examine sampling bias from active consent procedures when the survey topic pertains to childhood obesity and associated health behaviors, the authors pair data obtained from both active and passive consent procedures. The authors find that parents of children who are overweight or at risk for being overweight are significantly less likely to give active consent. In addition, parents of children enrolled in lower grades are more reluctant to consent to participate.     

The Target Parameter of Adjusted R-Squared in Fixed-Design Experiments

R-squared (R²) and adjusted R-squared (R²_Adj) are sometimes viewed as statistics detached from any target parameter, and sometimes as estimators for the population multiple correlation. The latter interpretation is meaningful only if the explanatory variables are random. This article proposes an alternative perspective for the case where the x’s are fixed. A new parameter is defined, in a similar fashion to the construction of R², but relying on the true parameters rather than their estimates. (The parameter definition includes also the fixed x values.) This parameter is referred to as the “parametric” coefficient of determination, and denoted by ρ²_*. The proposed ρ²_* remains stable when irrelevant variables are removed (or added), unlike the unadjusted R², which always goes up when variables, either relevant or not, are added to the model (and goes down when they are removed). The value of the traditional R²_Adj may go up or down with added (or removed) variables, either relevant or not. It is shown that the unadjusted R² overestimates ρ²_*, while the traditional R²_Adj underestimates it. It is also shown that for simple linear regression the magnitude of the bias of R²_Adj can be as high as the bias of the unadjusted R² (while their signs are opposite). Asymptotic convergence in probability of R²_Adj to ρ²_* is demonstrated. The effects of model parameters on the bias of R² and R²_Adj are characterized analytically and numerically. An alternative bi-adjusted estimator is presented and evaluated.