Enhancing a Randomized Response Model to Estimate Population Means to Sensitive Questions

ABSTRACT

Candidate parametric mortality models are tested graphically. If the model is correct, the transformed data are distributed exponentially. The graphical test is based on scale and space inference. It involves smoothing of the hazard rate and simultaneous confidence intervals. It is applied to a frailty model used to set annuity reserves. Simulation and the comparison with other non-graphical tests shows that the graphical test helps localize discrepancies of empirical data with respect to the tested model.     

DETERRENCE,PREEMPTION, AND PANIC: A COMMON‐ENEMY PROBLEM OF TERRORISM

A game‐theoretic analysis of terrorism examines interactions between a terrorist organization and multiple target countries. It considers both preemption and deterrence as counter‐terrorist policies. Damage from terror includes material costs and resultant fear. Fear effects lead to different equilibria and implications for counter‐terrorism policies. The model identifies conditions under which greater preemption may be the rational response to an increase in terrorism, that is, it analyzes the merit of the dictum “offense is the best defense.” It also examines the characteristics of cooperative behavior among target countries in dealing with the threat of terrorism. (JEL C72, D74, F52, F53, H41)     

Catalogue of group structures for two-level fractional factorial designs

SUMMARY Taguchi introduced the concept of split-unit design to sort factors into different groups with respect to difficulties involved in changing the levels of factors. Li et al. have developed all possible group structures for eight factors in an L16 orthogonal array for resolution IV with split-plot design. Chen et al. have searched for a best design, according to the various criteria for two-level fractional factorial design and have presented a catalogue. In this paper, we have developed an algorithm for generating group structure and possible allocations for various 2n- k fractional factorial designs that correspond to the designs given by Chen et al.     

VOTING FOR INCOME‐IMMISERIZING REDISTRIBUTION IN THE MELTZER–RICHARD MODEL

This paper argues that income received via redistributive transfers, unlike labor income, requires no direct sacrifice of leisure; this makes it attractive to many voters even if it leaves them poorer. This point is made within the classic Meltzer and Richard (1981) model wherein heterogeneous voters evaluate an income‐redistribution program that finances a lump‐sum transfer to all via a distorting income tax. The political‐equilibrium policy under majority rule is the tax most preferred, utility‐wise, by the median voter. Ironically, this voter, and many poorer voters, may support a redistribution policy that leaves them poorer in income terms but with higher utility. (JEL H2, E6, D72)     

WHO IS AFRAID OF THE FRIEDMAN RULE?

We explore the connection between optimal monetary policy and heterogeneity among agents in a standard monetary economy with two types of agents where the stationary distribution of money holdings is nondegenerate. Sans type-specific fiscal policy, we show that the zero-nominal-interest rate policy (the Friedman rule) does not maximize type-specific welfare; it may not maximize aggregate ex ante social welfare either. Indeed, one or, more surprisingly, both types may benefit if the central bank deviates from the Friedman rule. ( JEL E31, E51, E58)