‘Incorrect,loose and coarse terms’: classifying nineteenth-century English-language causes of death for modern use. An example using Tasmanian data

This paper outlines a cause-of-death classification system applicable to nineteenth-century English-language death data. Consisting of 32 categories, this system combines aspects of William Farr’s nosology, developed in nineteenth-century Britain, and the modern International Classification of Diseases. It is sufficiently broad for meaningful categories to be created for analytical purposes, but specific enough for particular cause-of-death trends and patterns to be traced. Individual-level death registration data from the British colony of Tasmania, 1838–1899, are used to demonstrate the application of this classification system. The paper describes the history of recording causes of death in nineteenth-century Tasmania and discusses several problems particular to nineteenth-century cause-of-death data. The benefits and disadvantages of three existing nosologies, Farr’s, Preston’s and the International Classification of Diseases, are considered with reference to nineteenth-century data. The final sections outline the data and method, and discuss an application of the classification system developed for cause-specific child mortality in nineteenth-century Tasmania.     

Births,debts and mirages: The impact of the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) and other factors on Australian fertility expectations

This paper uses survey data to examine the effect of the income-contingent charge mechanism, the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS), and other demographic and attitudinal variables on fertility expectations in Australia over the recent past. HECS requires former Australian students to fund some of the costs of higher education through the repayment of interest-free loans made by the Australian government. Its defining characteristic is that repayments only occur when and if students future incomes exceed a particular level. Since its introduction in 1989, media and other populist commentary has suggested that HECS has had unanticipated effects on behaviour. Most recently, attention has focused on the effects of HECS on fertility, with some arguing that university graduates are delaying births, and having fewer children, because of their HECS debts. This paper demonstrates that the introduction of HECS has had no discernible impact on Australian fertility rates, nor on the number of children that people expect to have. However, education, age and a number of attitudinal factors are associated with significant differences in fertility expectations.     

Using Split-Population Models to Examine Predictors of the Probability and Timing of Parity Progression

Survival models are widely used in demography to analyse the timing of events such as death or leaving school. However, for events such as marriage or childbirth that are not experienced by everyone, standard survival analysis conflates the speed of progressing to an event with the proportion that never experience the event. The problem can be overcome by applying a ‘split population’ or ‘cure’ survival time model which splits the population into those who eventually experience the event and those who do not, and determines the speed of progression for the former. This paper demonstrates the use of split-population models in examining variables which affect the propensity and timing of additional births. The data analysed are from a sample of women from the 2001 Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey (N = 4,611). We model the propensity and time to have another child given sex composition of existing children, number of siblings and age at first birth for three cohorts of women. The study finds evidence of a preference for a mixed-sex composition, and an increased propensity for women with two boys to try for a third child. Women in later cohorts tend to have more children if they themselves come from larger families. Age at first birth is strongly associated with the propensity to have another child and with the speed of progression.     

The Impact of Long–term Visitor Migration on Projections of Australia's Population

In 1999 and 2000, net long–term visitor migration to Australia exceeded net permanent migration for the first time. A shift in Australia’s migration entry from permanent settlers to long–term visitors has many implications. This paper focuses on the longer–term demographic impacts of this change. In conventional projections of Australia’s population, particular levels of annual net overseas migration are assumed and there is an implicit assumption that these levels represent permanent migration. The question addressed in this paper is: if permanent residents and temporary residents of Australia are treated as two separate populations, does this change the outcomes of population projections? The paper uses a new projection model that divides the Australian population into these two components. Each population is projected separately with provision for movement from the visitor population to the permanent population. Visitors who do not convert to permanent residence are “tagged” with their expected year of departure and are taken out of the population in that year. They are also assumed to have a zero birth rate (because any births they have will leave with them). A conventional population projection based on 1999 levels of annual net overseas migration (88,000) results in an Australian population of around 25 million in 2050. In contrast, a “standard” projection, which is also based on 1999 migration levels, but considers permanent movements (50,000 net annually) and long–term visitor movements (125,000 annual arrivals) separately results in a population of 23 million by 2050. Other projections are carried out in which specified net migration targets are met through varying either the level of net permanent–resident migration, the level of long–term visitor arrivals, or the rate of conversion of long–term visitors to permanent residence. The central conclusion of the study is that dividing the Australian population into two parts, permanent residents and long–term visitors, and projecting them separately into the future makes a considerable difference to the results of population projections.     

Taking stock: parents' reasons for and against having a third child

In developed countries with below-replacement fertility, the proportion of people who have at least three children make a substantial difference to the aggregate level of fertility. This study, based on 40 in-depth interviews with Australian parents of two children, analyses what factors influence the decision to have a third child. Using a grounded theory method of qualitative analysis, the study finds that parents who have decided to stop at two children are more able to articulate their reasons than are parents who are considering having a third child. The reasons for stopping include age and health; work and finances; and the capacity to parent another child. The weighing up of multiple factors is evidence of parents taking stock of personal and financial resources when making complex family formation decisions. The reasons for having a third child are expressed with far less elaboration and are more guarded and personal. We conclude that there is less shared or familiar language for articulating the value of family relationships. The contemporary context is one in which parents are attempting to manage risks related to having children, including the personal and financial implications of time out of the workforce. This study finds a persistent story of limited resources among parents of two children. Policies aimed at increasing fertility need to address this perception of limited resources through direct measures like affordable childcare and more generally through greater government and community support for families.     

Labor Supply Prospects in 16 Developed Countries, 2000–2050

Over the past 20 years, policy attention has been focused upon the implications of below‐replacement fertility for the aging of populations. This article argues that another potential consequence, a decline in the absolute size of the labor force, may prove to be an equally compelling issue because of its impact on rates of economic growth. Because the United States will experience both increasing labor productivity and an increase in its labor supply, the growth orientation of the global economy is likely to persist. In this circumstance, given relatively comparable changes in the productivity of labor across countries, countries that face major declines in their labor supply will fare less well than countries that are able to maintain their labor supply at least constant. The article examines the labor supply prospects of 16 developed countries for the period 2000–2050, drawing attention to the ways in which countries may be able to influence the future levels of their labor supply.     

Origins of ‘the gap’: perspectives on the historical demography of aboriginal victorians

Journal of Population Research - Australia enjoys ninth place out of 190 countries on the United Nations Life Expectancy Index. Aboriginal Australians—as a fourth-world people within a...