Echoes of the baby boom and bust: Recent and prospective changes in living alone among elderly widows in the united states

Today the great majority of noninstitutionalized elderly widows live alone, a striking increase from a quarter-century ago. A noticeable difference has occurred, however, in trends by age; the proportion of the young-old widows living alone is starting to decline. while that of the old-old continues to increase. We use a model suggested by earlier studies to explain the emergence of this difference, and assess the prospects of its continuing over the next three decades. We find that the recent differential change in the proportions of younger and older widows living alone is due primarily to a differential change in kin availability that has emerged as the baby boomers’ parents have begun to reach retirement age. Over the next decade, the same type of differential change by age in kin availability will continue; living alone is likely to become less common among young-old than among old-old widows, in a reversal of the pattern of the last quarter-century. In the first two decades of the next century, as the baby boom affects kin availability among the old-old, and as the subsequent baby bust affects that among the young-old, the age pattern of living arrangements among elderly widows will reverse once again.     

Application of Granger-Sims causality tests to monthly fertility data, 1958–1984

When applied to monthly age specific data, Granger-Sims causality tests provide a useful technique for identifying the effective lag between business cycles and fertility in the United States. Male and female monthly age specific unemployment rates are used as a proxy for the business cycle, and test results are presented for first and higher order birth rates, as well as total age-specific monthly fertility rates. The period is subdivided (January 1958 – May 1973 and June 1973 – December 1984) in order to identify possible trends. Four results hold in all cases studied, with respect to the relationship between unemployment and fertility. (1) Noncausality is rejected in the direction from unemployment to fertility, and no feedback effect is indicated; thus the relationship is one of simple causality. (2) In the critical decision period from 9–16 months prior to realized fertility rates, the sign of the effect of unemployment on fertility is negative: this holds for both male and female unemployment rates. (3) There appears to have been a shortening of the effective lag between unemployment and fertility, of perhaps 2 – 3 months, between periods 1 (1959 – 1973) and 2 (1973 – 1984). (5) The strength of the (negative) relationship between unemployment and fertility appears to have increased from period 1 to period 2.Presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America, Chicago, April 30, 1987. This paper has benefitted from discussions with and comments by Andrew Weiss, Clive Granger, Lee Ohanian and Pietro Balestra, and from comments by two anonymous referees. For help in obtaining previously unpublished data, the authors are grateful to Stephanie Ventura (NCHS), G. P. Goings (BLS) and Paula Schneider (Bureau of the Census). Financial support was provided by the University of Southern California     

Relative cohort size: source of a unifying theory of global fertility transition

Using United Nations estimates of age structure and vital rates for 184 countries at five‐year intervals from 1950 through 1995, this article demonstrates how changes in relative cohort size appear to have affected patterns of fertility across countries since 1950—not just in developed countries, but perhaps even more importantly in developing countries as they pass through the demographic transition. The increase in relative cohort size (defined as the proportion of males aged 15–24 relative to males aged 25–59), which occurs as a result of declining mortality rates among infants, children, and young adults during the demographic transition, appears to act as the mechanism that determines when the fertility portion of the transition begins. As hypothesized by Richard Easterlin, the increasing proportion of young adults generates a downward pressure on young men's relative wages (or on the size of landhold‐ings passed on from parent to child), which in turn causes young adults to accept a tradeoff between family size and material wellbeing, setting in motion a “cascade” or “snowball” effect in which total fertility rates tumble as social norms regarding acceptable family sizes begin to change.     

Relative Cohort Size,Relative Income,and Married Women's Labor Force Participation: United States, 1968–2010

Relative cohort size—the ratio of young adults to prime‐age adults—and relative income—the income of young adults relative to their material aspirations—have experienced substantial changes over the past 40 years. Results here show that changes in relative cohort size explain about 60 percent of the declines in women's starting wage—both relative and absolute—in 1968–82, and 97 percent of its increase in 1982–2001. Relative income is hypothesized to affect a number of behavioral choices by young adults, including marriage, childbearing, and female labor force participation, as young people strive to achieve their desired standard of living. Older family income—the denominator in a relative income variable—increased by 59 percent between 1968 and 2000, and then declined by 9 percent. Its changes explain 47 percent of the increase in the labor force participation of white married women in their first 15 years out of school between 1970 and 1990, and 38 percent of the increase in hours worked in the same period. The study makes use of individual‐level measures of labor force participation and employs the lagged income of older families in a woman's year‐state‐race‐education group to instrument parental income and hence material aspirations.     

A conversation with Richard Easterlin

After an introduction touching on various biographical highlights, this paper summarizes a wide-ranging discussion with Richard Easterlin which occurred in the Autumn of 1996. We considered the Easterlin Hypothesis – its genesis and current status, together with Easterlin‘s views on attempts to develop measures of relative income – and then moved on to “The Fertility Revolution” and questions regarding the applicability of the theory of household choice in modernizing societies. This was followed by a discussion of his early career development and influences on him at that time, ending with ruminations regarding the current state of economics, and the validity of training given to young economists today. JEL classification: J10, J11, J13 Received February 13, 1997 / Accepted February 26, 1997     

Complex demoeconomic dynamics

We show how various kinds of qualitative long run demoeconomic behavior depend on household preferences, productivity and the cost of childrearing. In particular, a dominant trend in growth can be interspersed with periods of fluctuation as slowly moving changes in productivity, preference and child care costs push nonlinearities past crucial bifurcation points. Moreover, nonperiodic, essentially unpredictable demoeconomic behavior is robust, thus suggesting a possible explanation for persistent and substantial errors in population forecasts.[/p]A partial draft of the present paper was first presented at the annual meetings of the Population Association of America, San Francisco, April 3, 1986. The computer experiments were performed by Changseob Kim and Weihong Huang.     

How have American baby boomers fared? Earnings and economic well-being of young adults, 1964–1987

For American baby boomers, altered demographic behavior has been the key to transforming adverse labor market conditions into favorable living levels. The economic well-being of baby boomers is, on average, higher than that of their predecessors, because they are disproportionately remaining single, having fewer children, doubling up with others, forming unmarried couple unions, and coupling mother's work with childbearing. In the 1980s, baby boomers share in common with all cohorts an increase in income inequality. In contrast to the findings on average income, demographic changes had little effect on the trend in inequality of economic well-being compared with that in earnings.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America, Toronto, Canada, May 3, 1990. The authors are grateful to Donna Hokoda for excellent assistance and to the University of Southern California for financial support. Support for Easterlin was also provided by a Guggenheim Fellowship, 1988–1989. The uniform file prepared by Mare and Winship (1985) was used for the 1965 Current Population Survey data reported here.     

The role of demographics in precipitating economic downturns

There are significant effects of changing demographics on economic indicators: not only growth in GDP but also the current account balance and gross capital formation. The 15–24 age group is one of the key age groups in these effects, with increases in that age group exerting strong positive effects on GDP growth, and negative effects on the CAB and GCF. There have been major shifts in the share of the population aged 15–24 during the past half century or more, and 80% of these globally coincide with declines in GDP growth. This appears to have been the pattern in four financial crises since 1980 as well as Japan’s “lost decade.” The effect is even more pronounced for the 2008–2009 period.