Self-enforcing family rules,marriage and the (non)neutrality of public intervention

We demonstrate that the notion of a family ‘constitution’ (self-enforcing, renegotiation-proof norm) requiring adults to provide attention for their elderly parents carries over from a world where identical individuals reproduce asexually, to one where individuals differentiated by sex and preferences marry, have children and bargain over the allocation of domestic resources. In this heterogenous world, couples are sorted by their preferences. If a couple’s common preferences satisfy a certain condition, the couple have an interest in instilling those preferences into their children. Policies are generally nonneutral. In particular, wage redistribution may raise, and compulsory education will reduce, the share of the adult population that is governed by family constitutions, and thus the share of the elderly population who receive attention from their children.     

Tax reform and endogenous gender bargaining power

The conventional studies with unitary representation of the household have been seeking for the condition in which tax systems achieve improvements of both fertility and female labor supply. Such analyses may not be enough to capture the important aspects of family behaviors since their common-preference assumption is frequently inconsistent with observed economies. By making use of a family bargaining framework, we argue that the heterogeneity in parental preferences among household members influences the result of existing studies on tax systems. Our results show that when women prefer larger family size than men, the tax reform towards individual taxation raises the fertility rate even more. In this case, female labor supply can be still increased in spite of enhanced fertility due to bargaining allocation.     

On Test Statistics in Profile Analysis with High-dimensional Data

We consider profile analysis with unequal covariance matrices under multivariate normality. In particular, we discuss this problem for high-dimensional data where the dimension is larger than the sample size. We propose three test statistics based on Bennett’s (1951) transformation and the Dempster trace criterion proposed by Dempster (1958 Dempster, A.P. (1958). A high dimensional two samples significance test. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 29:995–1010.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). We derive the null distributions as well as the nonnull distributions of the test statistics. Finally, in order to investigate the accuracy of the proposed statistics, we perform Monte Carlo simulations for some selected values of parameters.     

Fertility and endogenous gender bargaining power

We develop an intra-household bargaining model to examine the feedback effect of household fertility decisions on gender bargaining power. In our model, the household balance of power is endogenously determined reflecting social interactions, i.e., the fertility choices by the other couples in society. We show the presence of multiple equilibria in fertility outcome: one equilibrium characterized by patriarchal society with a high fertility rate, and another in which women are sufficiently empowered and the fertility rate is low. In other circumstances, this study also demonstrates a positive relationship between female wage rates and the fertility outcomes. Finally, we discuss its policy implications, comparing the effects of two family policies: the child allowance and the subsidies for market childcare.